Architectures for embedded multimodal sensor data fusion systems in the robotics : and airport traffic suveillance ; domain by Schönefeld, Janis
Architectures for Embedded
Multimodal Sensor Data Fusion Systems
in the Robotics
- and Airport Traffic Surveillance -
Domain
Doctoral Thesis
to be awarded the degree




approved by the Faculty of Mathematics/Computer Science
and Mechanical Engineering,
Clausthal University of Technology,
Date of oral examination
10 June 2014
i
Chairperson of the Board of Examiners
Prof. Dr. Sven Hartmann
Supervising tutor
Prof. Dr.-Ing. D.P.F. Möller
Reviewer
Prof. Dr. F. Mayer-Lindenberg
ii
Abstract
Smaller autonomous robots and embedded sensor data fusion systems often suffer from
limited computational and hardware resources. Many ‘Real Time’ algorithms for multi
modal sensor data fusion cannot be executed on such systems, at least not in real time and
sometimes not at all, because of the computational and energy resources needed, resulting
from the architecture of the computational hardware used in these systems. Alternative
hardware architectures for generic tracking algorithms could provide a solution to over-
come some of these limitations. For tracking and self localization sequential Bayesian
filters, in particular particle filters, have been shown to be able to handle a range of track-
ing problems that could not be solved with other algorithms. But particle filters have
some serious disadvantages when executed on serial computational architectures used in
most systems. The potential increase in performance for particle filters is huge as many
of the computational steps can be done concurrently. Again a generic hardware solution
for particle filters can relieve the central processing unit from the computational load
associated with the tracking task.
The general topic of this research are hardware-software architectures for multi modal
sensor data fusion in embedded systems in particular tracking, with the goal to develop a
high performance computational architecture for embedded applications in robotics and
airport traffic surveillance domain. The primary concern of the research is therefore:
The integration of domain specific concept support into hardware architectures for low
level multi modal sensor data fusion, in particular embedded systems for tracking with
Bayesian filters; and a distributed hardware-software tracking systems for airport traffic
surveillance and control systems.
Runway Incursions are occurrences at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of
an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing
and take-off of aircraft. The growing traffic volume kept runway incursions on the NTSB’s
‘Most Wanted’ list for safety improvements for over a decade [82]. Recent incidents [90]
show that problem is still existent. Technological responses that have been deployed in
significant numbers are ASDE-X and A-SMGCS. Although these technical responses are
a significant improvement and reduce the frequency of runway incursions, some runway
incursion scenarios are not optimally covered by these systems, detection of runway in-
cursion events is not as fast as desired, and they are too expensive for all but the biggest
airports [113]. Local, short range sensors could be a solution to provide the necessary
affordable surveillance accuracy for runway incursion prevention. In this context the fol-
lowing objectives shall be reached. 1) Show the feasibility of runway incursion prevention
systems based on localized surveillance. 2) Develop a design for a local runway incursion
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1.1 Motivation
Smaller autonomous robots and embedded sensor data fusion systems often suffer from
limited computational power and hardware resources. Many “real time” algorithms for
multi modal sensor data fusion cannot be executed on such systems, at least not in real
time and sometimes not at all, because of the computational and energy resources needed
for the computation of the algorithm. The amount of resources needed results from the
serial architecture of the computational hardware used in these systems. Alternative
hardware architectures for tracking algorithms could provide a solution to overcome some
of these limitations. For tracking and self-localization sequential Bayesian filters have
been applied with success to many tasks. Especially particle filters have been shown to
be able to handle a range of problems that could not be solved with other algorithms.
Unfortunately particle filters have some serious disadvantages when executed on the serial
computational architectures used in most systems. The potential increase in performance
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for particle filters is huge, as many of the required computational steps can be done con-
currently. Again a generic hardware solution for particle filters can relieve the central
processing unit from the computational load connected to the tracking task. The im-
plementation in hardware results in a, with respect to the safety and reliability of the
solution, more robust system, since failures of operating systems etc. do not affect the
hardware based algorithms. What is true for robots is also applicable to many systems
that act as agents; a selection of these application scenarios is given in the following text.
1.1.1 Application Scenarios
Application scenarios for embedded data fusion arise in every application context, where
the operational constraints like reliability, size power consumption, heat dissipation, and
real-time demands do not allow a software implementation. Examples like face detection
in digital cameras or 3D cameras show the power of embedded data fusion solutions and
their impact on everyday live. Experimental systems from the automotive field show that
low level data fusion is often the crucial factor when meaningful information is required.
Without a proper low level fusion adding semantics to the data is often not possible at
all, while the proper fusion allows such derivations [43, 108, 89]. In the following text the
applicability of the research results to important areas in the human society is explained.
Airport
Nowadays traffic surveillance at many airports is not optimal. Reasons are manifold. One
of the more important reasons is that it is very difficult to integrate accurate sensors into
the airport infrastructure. The sensor installation alone requires that the traffic in the
area where the sensor is installed is shut down, which may include runways. More over the
communication infrastructure is often not suited to transmit high volumes of data, like
raw sensor data with low latency, which would require an upgrade of the communication
infrastructure forcing a shutdown of at least parts of the airport and being very expensive.
Embedded data fusion solutions allow the integration of sensor data fusion algorithms, like
vehicle tracking into local sensors that can be plugged into existing airport infrastructure
and communicate only relevant events via power line communication, a technology that
exists on most airports or can be installed with little effort.
The integration of hardware sensor data fusion solutions into sensors results in a more
reliable and more secure solution that can easily be integrated in planes and airport service
vehicles increasing the situational awareness under unfavorable environmental conditions.
Automotive
Today’s number of traffic accidents that involve cars is very high and the impact on the
involved persons as well as for the society is strong. Every year ten thousands of people die
in traffic accidents and more are injured. Sensor technology available today provide the
basis for autonomous driving and driver assistance technology to increase traffic safety.
However current data fusion solutions implemented in driver assistance technology is often
limited to solutions as simple as alpha-beta filters. While these provide, given a reasonable
sensor performance, a reasonable robust estimate of the current vehicle dynamics, they can
hardly predict the traffic situation for more than a second and cannot reliable deal with
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occlusion of targets. Particle filters have been shown to be able to reliable track targets
that are occluded for some time. Therefore they provide a better situation assessment
that is the basis for better autonomous driving and better driver assistance technology.
Robotics
In robotic applications it is often useful to track more than one object, e.g.: A soccer
playing robots performance will increase significantly if the robot is able to track not only
the ball and it’s own position on the field, but also the positions of its team mates and the
opponent robots. In order to track multiple objects individually, detected features must
be associated with the tracked objects, discarded as false detections or associated with a
track yet to be initialized. This tasks are commonly referred to as data association and
track management. A pure software solution requires computational resources that, in
the best case, grow linear with each track - as does the execution time. A solution using
both custom hardware and software can efficiently decrease the execution time, free the
CPU from the computational load and decrease the power consumption of the system.
Indoor Pedestrian tracking
Recently it has been shown [66] that it is possible to navigate indoors using a particle filter
implemented on a smart phone with an accuracy of about 1.5m. The software implemen-
tation requires most of the computational resources available and drains the battery of the
smart phone very quickly. Computationally similar complex tasks require between 300-
900mW [8]. The prototype FPGA implementation of the particle filter discussed in this
work uses about 61mW and removes the need to perform the computationally expensive
processing on the central processing unit (CPU) of the smart phone. Further performance
improvements can be expected by realizing the prototype as full custom hardware design.
Accurate indoor navigation is the basis for a wealth of applications. While particularly
the visually impaired, children, and other persons that must rely on guidance can profit
from such a technology as it allows the easy navigation in complex buildings like Air-
ports, train stations, libraries, and shopping malls the most, many task requiring indoor
navigation will become much easier. In conjunction with speech-recognition and text to
speech technology navigation in complex, confusing indoor environments will be much
more convenient.
1.2 Research Topics
The general topic of this research are hardware-software architectures for multi modal sen-
sor data fusion in embedded systems, in particular self-localization and tracking with the
goal to develop high performance computational architectures for applications in robotics
and airport traffic surveillance. The following points are the primary concern of the
research:
1. Integration of domain specific concepts support into hardware architectures for low
level multi modal sensor data fusion, in particular embedded systems for tracking
with Bayesian filters.
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2. Distributed hardware-software tracking for teams of autonomous robots in the RoboCup
SPL.
3. Distributed hardware-software tracking systems for airport traffic surveillance and
control systems.
1.3 State of Research
The following text provides a brief overview on the state of research with respect to the
research topic of this work as defined above. The state of research is the basis for the
selection of the research objectives defined in the next section. A concise description of
the contribution to the state of research by this thesis is given in Section 6.1.
1.3.1 Integration of Domain Specific Concepts
The general process of multi sensor data fusion can be described by a functional model,
a set of functions that can compose any data fusion system and the relation between
them. The general functional model as in [75] is made of the basic functions that are
necessary to perform most data fusions: Data association, data fusion, data abstraction
and a knowledge representation of the current system state. One of the most used models
is suggested by the Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL).
Inferential Model for Multi-sensor Data Fusion: The inferential model provides
another view on the data fusion process, and emphasizes the importance of data abstrac-
tion. Since it is not always useful to fuse information from different sources on the lowest
level, data fusion and inference are often done on feature level or decision level. The
revised model of the JDL distinguishes between five levels of inference from 0 up to 4, the
original model had 4 levels from 1 up to 4. The definitions of the levels are [41]:
• Level 0 - Sub-object data assessment:
Estimation and prediction of signal or object observable states on the basis of signal-
level data association and characterization.
• Level 1 - Object assessment:
Estimation and prediction of entity states on the basis of inference from observations.
• Level 2 - Situation assessment:
Estimation and prediction of entity states on the basis of inferred relations between
entities.
• Level 3 - Impact assessment:
Estimation and prediction of effects on situations of planned or predicted/estimated
actions of the participants.
• Level 4 - Process refinement:
Adaptive data acquisition and processing to support mission objectives.
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Integration of Domain Specific Concepts: Software tracking applications integrate
domain specific concepts into low level data fusion mostly using interactive multiple model
solutions, localized, and possibly dynamically interacting, behavior models and back-
ground knowledge like maps, combined with auxiliary information like pose estimates
[93, 21, 36, 115, 47, 64]. Particular particle filters are well suited for the use of localized
individual behavior models.
Works on hardware architectures that support the integration of domain specific concepts
are not known to the author.
Embedded Hardware Architectures: Both functional and inferential approaches
do not provide a process model which describes the canonical flow of process in detail.
Because process models for hardware solutions have a strong dependency on the available
technology and modeling tools, other works on this topic are not generally applicable.
Sequential Monte Carlo methods (for multi-sensor data fusion) are the topic of numerous
works. Among the most popular are “Sequential Monte Carlo Methods in Practice” and
“Probabilistic Robotics” [24, 111] that cover the basic principles and some advanced ap-
plication specific topics. More specialized publications are available for many application
areas, and in the mathematical analysis of the particle-filter algorithm and its various
optimizations [19, 38, 26].
Works on hardware implementations of particle filters include [118, 7, 95, 45]. These
works aim on the partitioning of the particle filter algorithm into concurrently executable
parts and the optimization of these parts, as well as pipeline optimizations of the whole
algorithm. The reduction of the hardware complexity of data fusion architectures, while
maintaining the performance, is also topic of current research.
1.3.2 Distributed Hardware-Software Tracking Systems for Teams
of Autonomous Robots in the RoboCup SPL.
In the SPL integration of domain specific concepts has been done in software tracking
for example in [64, 101, 92, 107]. In the SPL hardware modifications are not allowed,
making the SPL an ideal candidate to compare the performance of the hardware-software
solution to the performance of state of the art software solutions. The performance of
the developed hardware software solution can be compared to the performance of pure
software solutions developed by other teams.
1.3.3 Distributed Hardware-Software Tracking Systems for Air-
port Traffic Surveillance and Control Systems.
Airport traffic surveillance is not a new topic. The growing intensity of traffic and the
passenger capacity of planes led to serious accidents during the last 15 years. Some of these
accidents might have been avoided if the surveillance of the airport traffic would have been
better. Traditional airport surveillance was carried out by humans and radar, sometimes
supported by more or less unreliable local sensors. A work published 1998 by C. Meier
[75] explored the possibilities of multi-sensor data fusion using most sensors available at
that time based on Kalman filters and IMM’s. The work was done in cooperation with the
DLR which provide an experimental test range with a complete infrastructure for testing
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and verifying Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems or parts of it
on the Research Airport Braunschweig [50].
The computational resources of modern computers, recent developments in sensor technol-
ogy, and sensor data fusion techniques made new approaches to the surveillance of airport
traffic possible. Most of these approaches favor the use of highly reliable and accurate
short range sensors. The ISMAEL [105, 106] project is an international project funded by
the EU. The focus of research is the weak point in current Advanced Surface Movement
Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS), which is also the focus of this work. The
ISMAEL project is developing magnetic field sensors that measure the magnetic field of
the earth and locate disturbances caused by vehicles.
Alternative approaches use long range sensors with different modalities like sound and
vision to track vehicles [88]. Often the different environmental conditions at airports make
the use of certain sensors impossible. Other research directions aim at more elaborate
motion and environment models and better classification of the vehicles that can be
used with new sensors and commonly used sensors for a better tracking of airport traffic
participants. But airport traffic surveillance is just a special case of tracking vehicles,
which has been of great interest for the military since the second world war and is also
of growing interest for the civilian sector. A survey is provided by Li and Jilkov in
[71, 68, 69, 70, 73, 72]. Tracking any kind of objects, including self localization is essential
for autonomous robots. The use of multi modal sensors in robotics did contribute to the
state of the art of multi modal multi-sensor data fusion[93, 117, 112, 64, 63] . Also, faster
computers have made methods of higher computational complexity available for real time
tracking and multi sensor data fusion [35, 34].
1.4 Research Objectives
The following text describes the objectives of the research done on the previously described
topics.
1.4.1 Objectives related to Embedded Tracking Systems
• Develop a hardware architecture for a particle filter based tracking system (HW-
PFTS).
• Develop a formal distributed architecture - with a focus on concurrency - for the
task of tracking multiple objects.
• Develop a formal interface for easy usage of the developed hardware.
• Develop a distributed hardware software architecture for tracking of multiple ob-
jects.
1.4.2 Objectives related to RoboCup
The robots used in the RoboCup Standard Platform League are Nao robots produced by
the French company Aldebaran Robotics. Naos are small humanoid robots with limited
computational resources. Although the success of teams like B-Human show that it
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is possible to solve the main problems related to RoboCup, computational power still
limits the performance of the robots in the RoboCup environment. As stated above self
localization, tracking and image processing require the most complex operations.
Cinan and Doucet have shown that the available sensor data is a major contributing
factor for the convergence of sequential Bayesian filters [19]. The number of samples used
in particle filters is another major contributing factor to the precision and convergence
of particle filters [111]. The computational resources of the Nao limit these important
parameters for image processing, self localization and tracking. The development of a
hardware solution for tracking tasks that acts as a sensor data fusion co-processor can
free the central processing units from much of the computational load of tracking. The
following research questions are addressed in this context.
• Integrate the HWPPTS into the ball tracking of the RoboCup Software and demon-
strate the gain in performance.
1.4.3 Objectives related to Airport Traffic Surveillance
Runway Incursions are occurrences at an aerodrome, involving the incorrect presence of
an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing
and take-off of another aircraft. The growing traffic volume kept runway incursions on the
National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB)’s “Most Wanted” list for safety improve-
ments for over a decade [82]. In the past, runway incursions have led to accidents with
significant loss of life. The worst accident following a runway incursion was at Tenerife,
Canary Islands, Spain in 1997 were two 747 collided. Recent incidents [81] show that
the problem is still existent. Although the number of runway incursions that result in an
accident is small, the number of runway incursions does not decline. Statistics and results
from simulation studies strongly indicate that the increase of runway incursions grows
much more rapidly than the traffic volume. Depending on the airport topography an
increase of 20% traffic volume may result in 140% increase of runway incursion potential
for a single runway [52].
Technological responses that have been deployed in significant numbers are the Airport
Surface Detection Equipment Level X (ASDE-X) and the Advanced Surface Movement
Guidance and Controls System (A-SMGCS). These systems rely strongly on sensors that
monitor the whole airport area, usually Surface Movement Radar (SMR) as primary
sensor and Multilateration (MLAT) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
(ADS-B) as secondary sensors. The sensors are used as a basis for the assessment of
the traffic situation and detect runway incursions. A few installations have adopted the
runway lighting system and additional lights on taxiways to the traffic situation while the
majority relays on Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Ground Movement Control (GMC) to
transmit runway incursion alerts to the involved traffic participants. Another approach
requires a retrofit of the cockpit as well as a data link between airport and aircraft
[119]. Although these technical responses are a significant improvement and reduce the
frequency of runway incursions, there is a big potential for further improvements. Some
runway incursion scenarios are not optimally covered by these systems and the detection
of runway incursion events is not as fast as desired. Non cooperative targets, which
account for a large fraction of runway incursions involving commercial airliners [84, 83],
are only detected by the SMR that typically has an update rate of 1 Hz and a 90%
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probability of detection [18]. The cost of app. $15 million are a problem for smaller
airports. Both ASDE-X and A-SMGCS are too expensive for all but the biggest airports
[113]. Currently only 35 major airports in the USA field such systems [58]. Only a fraction
of these use runway lighting to provide information to flight crews [84], a feature strongly
recommended by several studies [119, 102]. Local, short range sensors might be a solution
to provide the necessary surveillance accuracy for runway incursion prevention. In this
context the following objectives shall be reached.
• Show the feasibility of runway incursion prevention systems based on localized
surveillance.
• Show the superior performance of a runway incursion system based on localized
surveillance.
• Develop a design for a local runway incursion alerting system based on local sensors.
• Realize a prototype of the system design using the HWPPTS.
1.5 Structure of this Thesis
The topic of this thesis is double-edged. On one side there is a very formal part dealing
with the theory of embedded systems, their formal design, the theory of multi sensor data
fusion, and the underlying mathematical models. On the other side is a very practical part
dealing with the development of an airport ground traffic surveillance and control system.
The connection of these parts is the application of the embedded system design theory
on the general data fusion problem of tracking multiple targets to develop an embedded
tracking system suitable for a broad range of embedded tracking applications. Thus the
remainder of this work is organized as follows.
The second chapter introduces the theory of embedded systems and the theory of multi
sensor data fusion in general on a higher abstraction level. A design paradigm, appropriate
for the development of an embedded multi sensor data fusion system, is chosen and the
formalisms that are used in the remaining chapters are explained.
In the third chapter the design paradigm - chosen in the second chapter - is applied
the theory of data fusion to formally model the tracking problem. Using the Hardware-
Software-CoDesign formalism the tracking problem is divided into blocks of a formal
functional model. Each part of the model is analyzed, with respect to the application
context of the tracking systems, to find a suitable algorithmic solution or mathematical
model, from the data fusion research field. In order to achieve an optimal solution the time
complexity for the execution of the model is estimated, with respect to a software solution,
a hardware solution, and a hardware software solution. The result of the estimation
favor a hardware-software solution where the functionality is distributed to hardware and
software components, and a general architecture concept is proposed. The remainder
of the chapter discusses the necessary hardware-software interfaces, and the means to
implement the support of domain specific concepts.
Consequently in the fourth chapter the architecture of the tracking hardware needed
for the systems architecture is developed. The chapter provides solutions for problems
that arise from the violation of the mathematical models of the tracking algorithm, and
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proposes an extension of the multivariate normal probability density function calculation
that allows the realization of the calculation for measurements featuring arbitrary subsets
of the tracked objects state space. This function provides the necessary flexibility for the
mathematically sound integration of sensor measurements from a broad range of sensors,
with a minimum of chip area. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the capabilities
of the developed hardware based on the performance of the prototype implementation.
Chapter 5 puts the system into a real world application scenario the detection of runway
incursions, a problem that is considered important enough to be of major concern for
the National Transportation Safety Board of the United States of America. Because a
certain amount of background knowledge is helpful to understand the environment where
the tracking system is embedded, and the context of the application, the chapter starts
with a survey on runway incursions, and the airport environment. In order to empha-
size the advantages of a runway incursion prevention and alerting system, made possible
through the use of the embedded architecture developed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 as
a core component, the chapter continues with the theory of runway incursion prevention
technology, and provides an overview of existing technological approaches to the problem.
Afterward a performance comparison based on a simulation study is done, which shows
the requirements for systems that can handle runway incursion incidents intractable by
currently deployed solutions.
The chapter continues with a safety analysis of the developed runway incursion prevention
and alerting system, which is based on extensions of the formal models used in Hardware-
Software-CoDesign. Next the details of the systems design are explained by two sample
installations in a simulated environment that show that the design is feasible, and a
prototype realization of the design is introduced.
The last chapter concludes with a summary of the status of the research objectives, and
the contributions that have been made to the state of research. Directions for future work
are also discussed.
The work also contains two appendices, one on the details of a mathematical function
important for the data fusion process, the other is a survey of standard key technologies
used by runway incursion alerting and prevention systems.
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This chapter introduces the theory of embedded sensor data fusion. The theory of embed-
ded multi sensor data fusion is largely concerned with applying the theory of embedded
systems to the theory of multi sensor data fusion. Therefore this chapter starts with
an introduction to multi sensor data fusion, continues with the theory of the design of
embedded systems and the implications on this work, and in conclusion introduces the
chosen design paradigm.
2.1 Multi Sensor Data Fusion
Multi sensor data fusion theory deals with the problem of getting the best information
by combining multiple data from multiple sources over a specific time. The theory is
primary concerned with mathematical models and formal architectures suitable to solve




Multi sensor data fusion is a special case of general data fusion, although multi sensor data
fusion is often referred to as data fusion. Several definitions of multi sensor data fusion
are established. Mitchell [76] defines multi sensor data fusion as “the theory, techniques
and tools which are used for combining sensor data, or data derived from sensory data,
into a common representational format” and states “The general concept of multi-sensor
data fusion is analogous to the manner in which humans and animals use a combination of
multiple senses, experience and the ability to reason to improve their chances of survival.”
Waltz [116] says “This field of technology has been appropriately termed data fusion
because the objective of its processes is to combine elements of raw data from different
sources into a single set of meaningful information that is of greater benefit than the sum
of its contributing parts”. The comparison of data fusion with biology has also been done
by Hall[40]: “Data fusion is analogous to the ongoing cognitive process used by humans to
integrate data continually from their senses to make inferences about the external world.”
These definitions agree that data fusion is the process of integrating information from
different sources into a sound representation that holds more information than the sum
of the single data of the sources. This means that the goal of the process is to achieve a
higher quality of information than the information contained in the single data (source).
It is also well supported that the concept is very similar to that of biological organisms
that combine millions of different sensing cells with different modalities to derive a high
quality representation of the world.
Multi sensor data fusion may be applied to data from different sensors that might be
using different modalities, as well as to data from one sensor at different times, or any
combination of those.
2.1.2 Synergic Effect
The primary benefit of multi sensor data fusion, the improvement of the quality of infor-
mation in a synergic process, is also the main motivation for the use of it. A synergic
process is a process in which the resulting whole is more than the sum of its parts. Be-
cause a fusion of data does not automatically mean a synergy, the following points specify
how multi sensor data fusion enhances the available data to achieve the synergic effect.
According to Mitchell [76] multi sensor data fusion enhances the information available to
a system using sensors in different ways.
1. Representation.
The information obtained during, or at the end, of the fusion process has an abstract
level, or a granularity, higher than each input data set.The new abstract level or
the new granularity provides richer semantic on the data than each initial source of
information.
2. Certainty.
If V is the sensor data before fusion and p(V ) is the a prior probability of the data
before fusion, then the gain in certainty is the growth in p(V ) after fusion. If VF
denotes data after fusion, then we expect p(VF ) > p(V ).
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3. Accuracy.
The standard deviation on the data after the fusion process is smaller than the
standard deviation provided directly by the sources. If data is noisy or erroneous,
the fusion process tries to eliminate noise and errors. In general, the gain in accuracy
and the gain in certainty are correlated.
4. Completeness.
Bringing new information to the current knowledge on an environment allows a more
complete view on this environment. In general, if the information is redundant and
concordant, there could also be a gain in accuracy.
2.1.3 Functional Model
The general process of multi sensor data fusion can be described by a functional model
defined as: ‘A set of functions that can compromise any data fusion system and the
relation between them’. A functional model is not a process model, which would describe
the canonical flow of a process in detail. Figure 2.1 shows the general functional model as
suggested in [75]. This model is made of the basic functions that are necessary to perform
most data fusions: Data association, data fusion, data abstraction, and a knowledge
representation of the current system state. One of the most used models suggested by the
Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1: Functional model of a multi sensor data fusion module.
2.1.4 Inferential Model
The inferential model provides another view on the data fusion process and emphasizes
the importance of data abstraction. Since it is not always useful to fuse information from
different sources on the level of signals, data fusion and inference are often done on feature
level or decision level. The levels of inference can be seen in the original functional model
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of the JDL as shown in Figure 2.2. The JDL distinguishes between five levels of inference
from 0 up to 41. The definitions of the levels are[41]:
• Level 0 - Sub-object data assessment
Estimation and prediction of signal or object observable states on the basis of signal-
level data association and characterization.
• Level 1 - Object assessment
Estimation and prediction of entity states on the basis of inference from observations.
• Level 2 - Situation assessment
Estimation and prediction of entity states on the basis of inferred relations between
entities.
• Level 3 - Impact assessment
Estimation and prediction of effects on situations of planned or predicted/estimated
actions of the participants.
• Level 4 - Process refinement
Adaptive data acquisition and processing to support mission objectives.
Figure 2.2: The JDL model, and the revised JDL model [41]
The levels of the JDL model touched by this work are 0, 1 ,2 and 4. Level 4 is included
since the setup of the sensors is also relevant to this work. Notice that in the contextual
hierarchy level 4 is located between level 3 and 2 [41].
2.1.5 System and Process Design
Biological multi sensor data fusion procedures are the result of millions of years of try
and error and the resulting capability of the organism to sense its external and internal
system state is amazing. Finding the right procedure for multi sensor data fusion in the
context of the application is a big challenge for computer scientist and engineers. Several
authors find that it is useful for this task to divide a multi sensor system in three parts.
A physical domain, an information domain and a cognitive domain. Once divided, the
flow of data between these parts is determined, see Figure 2.3.
When the formal processes and the formal data flow have been designed, the next challenge
is to realize the system according to the constraints of the application scenario. This topic
is addressed in the next section, Section 2.2.
1This is true for the revised version of the model, the original model has 4 levels from 1 up to 4.
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Figure 2.3: Division of the multi sensor data fusion system in three domains, the parts
important for this work are highlighted in orange.
2.2 Embedding Data Fusion
The theory of advanced data fusion algorithms in general is, with respect to computer
science, mostly about formal architectures, mathematical models, and the implementa-
tion of these in software. The primary motivation is that this is often the most convenient
solution to implement a mathematical model, and provide a proof of concept prototype
as soon as possible. Interestingly many of these algorithmic implementations are mislead-
ingly labeled "real time" in publications. While most of these algorithm can be executed
on a high performance desktop or multiprocessor system, under soft real time constraints,
most reasonable application scenarios imply constraints that cannot be satisfied by the
software implementation. The feasibility of efficient hardware implementations is usually
not researched, but rather assumed to be given. The more complex algorithms are seldom
implemented in hardware, although there are exceptions that are often very successful,
like smile detection in cameras or the Asus xtion 3D sensor or multimedia extensions in
modern general purpose processors (GPs). The software based approach and alternative
approaches for embedding data fusion systems are discussed in the following subsection.
2.2.1 Implementation Approaches
Figure 2.4 shows a, in computer sciences common, view on the typical embedded system.
The view distinguishes between the analog domain and the digital domain, where the
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Figure 2.4: A typical embedded system.
focus is on the digital domain. While it is, in some limited cases, possible to implement
data fusion systems without the usage of digital components, the majority of data fusion
algorithms requires digital resources. To realize such a system 3 distinct common ap-
proaches can be identified: The software based approach, the hardware based approach,
and the hardware-software based approach.
Software Based: The software implementation is one polar point of realizing the typical
embedded system, as shown in Figure 2.4. A software based solution resorts to readily
available of the shelf components to interface sensors and actors as needed, it has the
option to resort to a great number of software libraries and programs to preprocess and
post process data, allowing the scientist to focus on his research. Another advantage
is the possibility to use very high level programming languages, software frameworks,
and scientific/mathematical IDEs like MatLabTM or LabViewTM which do not require any
programming experience. Visualization and debugging are also very convenient on desktop
computers. A drawback of the software implementation is that the syntax and semantics of
most programming languages, as well as the architecture of desktop computers, provide
only a strong support for serial computations2, and therefore approaches that imply a
parallel architecture are often not researched.
Hardware Based: Opposite to the software solution is the pure hardware solution of
an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). ASICs provide the optimal performance
2Support for general purpose GPU computing can be considered weak in this context.
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in terms of size, execution time, power consumption, and heat dissipation. The drawback
is that their development is very expensive, and the production is also very expensive
unless a great amount of ASICs is produced.
Hardware-Software Based: Between the software and the hardware solution a range
of possible target technologies and design styles must be considered as well as any com-
bination of hardware and software. See Figure 2.5 for a view on the hierarchy of target
technologies, and Figure 2.6 for the different design styles. Beside GPs and ASICs, micro
controllers, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific instruction-set proces-
sors (ASIPs), and programmable hardware, particularly field programmable gate arrays
(FPGAs), are possible target technologies as well as any combination of these.
Figure 2.5: Target technologies for embedded systems.
For rapid prototyping, systems on a chip (SOCs) are available that include a GP, an
FPGA, Memory, and some peripheral interfaces. With these SOCs come IDEs and oper-
ating systems (OSs). The peripherals and the GP support the convenient assessment of
interfaces to connect the SOC to other resources like sensors, actors or desktop comput-
ers. They provide the flexibility of a software solution, while the FPGA allows the quick
and convenient realization of algorithms in hardware. FPGA and GP communicate via
own bus systems or shared memory. Alternatively soft core GP’s are available for most
FPGAs. The soft core provides the same functionality as the SOC GP, but it is usually
less performant.It requires a part of the FPGA resources, but the interfaces between the
soft core GP and other hardware parts can be freely defined, and peripherals can be cus-
tom implemented or chosen from available packages. The benefit of this approach is that
one can profit from the advantages of both worlds: The flexibility and convenience of the
software solution, and the performance of the hardware solution.
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Design Styles: If one needs to realize a unique integrated circuit a suitable design style
must be chosen. The general distinction is between semi custom design and full custom
design. Full custom designs allow the optimization on all levels of the design resulting
in a circuit of optimal performance, but require large amounts of time to develop and
are very expensive. Semi custom designs realize the circuits through the configuration
of reconfigurable components. The reconfiguration can be specified algorithmically by
high level languages, therefore these devices are commonly called programmable logic
devices (PLDs). Because they are produced and sold in big numbers, and programmed
by the customer, PLDs are inexpensive but provide the necessary performance for most
applications, while satisfying most constraints on size and energy consumption.
Figure 2.6: Design styles for integrated circuits.
2.2.2 Hardware Software Co Design (HSCD)
A well researched systematic approach to develop an embedded system based on a for-
mal model is the Hardware/Software Co-Design (HSCD) approach, which focuses on the
concurrent, coordinated, and integrated design of hardware and software components of
a system. The HSCD approach supports a systematic design flow and provides formal
models to support the design. In this work the HSCD approach is used to develop an
embedded tracking solution.
The design process, see Figure 2.7, starts with a behavioral description of the system that
is transformed into a formal system representation. Constraints that apply from the ap-
plication scenario or limited hardware resources are integrated as formal representations.
The formalisms used for the system representation will be discussed later in this section
in detail. Although the schematics shown in Figure 2.7 are flat, the process itself is an
iteratively deepening process, where the tasks of allocation, partitioning, and estimation
are of major importance.
• Allocation is the task of choosing a valid set of hardware to realize the behavioral
model. The selection of the hardware may be constrained by circumstances from the
application scenario like environmental conditions, use cases, or safety standards.
Allocation is not a trivial task; when formulated as a search problem the search
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Figure 2.7: A schematic of the hardware software co design process.
space is often indefinite and nearly unlimited. During the initial design phases
it is reasonable to consider abstract hardware concepts, instead of real hardware
components, to reduce the size of the search space.
• During the partitioning it is determined how each part of the behavior is mapped to
each part of the hardware, which also determines what is implemented in hardware
and what is implemented in software. Depending on the granularity of the behav-
ioral specification this enforces one to model the system on deeper levels to achieve
optimum performance.
• During estimation the feasibility and the performance of the design is estimated.
This includes the estimation of the execution times of the behavioral model as well
as energy usage and other important parameters. Estimation can be done by hand
on the system level, which is not an uncommon approach, using the knowledge of
experts, by algorithm on the level of logic formulas and program code, or as any
mixture of these two approaches.
The results of the estimation are then used to improve and refine the design in subsequent
cycles of allocation, partitioning, and estimation. Once a suitable system design is found
the design process continues with the synthesis. Figure 2.8 shows the process of iteratively
deepening the system design, starting from the behavioral specification of the system.
Further improvements of the design can be achieved if partitioning and allocation are not
done on system level but on the level of subsystems.
Formal system representations that can be used for both synthesis and design are the
problem graph, the architecture graph, and the specification graph. These formalisms are
briefly introduced in the following text, and they are used in the following chapters of the
thesis to visually demonstrate features of the system’s architecture.
Problem Graph: The problem graph Gp(Vpc, Vpf , Ep) is a directed acyclic graph of
communication nodes Vpc, functional nodes Vpf , and directed edges Ep ⊆ Vpc × Vpf ∪
Vpf ×Vpc that connect the nodes. The problem graph can be derived from the most basic
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Figure 2.8: The design of an embedded system as an iterative deepening model where
behavior and structure depend on each other.
form of the data flow graph (DFG), by the insertion of communication nodes between
operations. Figure 2.9 shows the problem graph for a tracking problem.
Architecture Graph: The architecture graphGA(Vac, Vaf , Ea) represents the (abstract)
hardware architecture of the system. It is a directed, often cyclic, graph of functional
nodes Vaf that represent computational resources like memory, ALUs, or, on system level,
a complete computer, and communication nodes that represent means of communication
like a bus or a network, and edges Ea ⊆ Vac×Vaf ∪Vaf ×Vac that connect the nodes. See
Figure 2.9 for the architecture-graph of a tracking system.
Specification Graph: A specification graph GS(Vs, Es) represents all possible map-
pings from the problem graph to an architecture graph. The specification graph includes
both the complete problem graph and the complete architecture graph, as well as all
possible edges from functional nodes of the problem graph to functional nodes of the
Figure 2.9: Left: Problem graph for a tracking task. Red nodes are functional nodes,
blue nodes are communication nodes. Right: Architecture graph of a tracking system.
Magenta nodes are communication nodes, blue nodes are functional nodes.
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Figure 2.10: Binding of the tracking system design. Sensor observations (S.Obs.) are
generated (S.O.) by the sensor and communicated over the bus to the multi tracker,
where the tracking algorithm is executed and the tracks are stored.
architecture graph and all possible edges from the communication nodes of the problem
graph to all nodes of the architecture graph; formally Vs = Vac ∪ Vaf ∪ Vpc ∪ Vpf and
Es = Ep ∪ Ea ∪ Vpc × Vac ∪ Vpc × Vaf ∪ Vpf × Vaf .
A binding is any subset of the specification graph. A valid binding is a binding that
allows the execution of the problem graph on the hardware, which results in a number
of formal constraints that apply to the binding. For example consecutive nodes in the
problem graph must be mapped to neighboring nodes in the architecture graph, and
functional nodes in the problem graph cannot be mapped to communication nodes in
the architecture graph. Figure 2.10 shows a valid binding for the problem graph and the
architecture graph shown in Figure 2.9.
Graph Refinement: Both the problem graph and the architecture graph can be refined
or coarsened. During refinement a node is expanded to a new graph of the same type,
with the requirement that the nodes in the boundary of the new graph have the same
type as the node that has been expanded. New edges must specify the connection with
the boundary of the new graph. Coarsening encapsulates a subgraph of a graph into a
new node, with the requirement that the nodes in the boundary of the subgraph have
the same type, which determines the type of the encapsulating node. Edges from the
boundary must be merged to new edges that connect the encapsulating node with the
graph. Figure 2.11 shows the refinement of the architecture graph shown in Figure 2.9.
Bindings and specification graphs change accordingly to the coarsening or the refinement
of the graphs. New edges must be included and existing edges merged, to reflect the
changes in the architecture graph and the problem graph. On higher abstraction levels
valid bindings include bindings that map nodes of the problem graph to multiple nodes
of the architecture graph, to represent distributed execution and storage, under reason-
able constraints. Figure 2.12 shows a binding for a refined problem graph and a refined
architecture graph. The binding shown is explained in detail in later chapters and, in this
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Figure 2.11: Refinement of the architecture shown in Figure 2.9. In the upper image the
"Multitracker"-node is refined to a pc104 connected to a FPGA. In the lower image the
pc104-node and the FPGA-node are refined to more detailed architectures.
section, merely demonstrates the effect of coarsening and refinement on the binding.
This work follows the hardware software co-design approach to support the design and de-
velopment of the architectures for the embedded multi sensor data fusion algorithms and
the descriptive formalisms to describe the embedded system design and its components.
Because of the application context the formalism was extended to support the semiauto-
matic estimation of system characteristics related to functional safety, the details on this
are discussed in Section 5.5. In the following text the formalism is used for the following
purposes:
• Navigation: The visualization of the graphs allow the convenient orientation dur-
ing the, unavoidable, ex-courses into mathematical aspects, algorithmic details etc.,
with respect to the data fusion process and the system architecture. Graphs where
only the relevant parts are colored provide a one look orientation during text pas-
sages concerning the very details of topics only remotely relevant to the architecture
itself.
• Lucidity: The visualization of the graphs allows the intuitive understandable display
of the relations between different parts of the formal models, algorithms, processes,
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Figure 2.12: Binding on higher abstraction level; nodes in the architecture or problem
graph may be mapped to multiple nodes in the other graph.
system architecture, hardware, and software. While there are exceptions, the graphs
are generally better suited to provide a more convenient view on the internal rela-
tionships than a text.
• Demonstration: The easily accessible semantics of the graphs, particularly the bind-
ing, supports the convenient assessment of the reason-ability of various aspects of
the systems architecture.
Figure 2.12 illustrates the above points. Even a concise description of systems internal
relations will not be as easily accessible as the binding graph shown in the figure. Dis-
tributed calculations and data storage are visible at the first glance, identifiable by the
multiple edges from single nodes in the problem graph to multiple nodes in the archi-
tecture graph. It is also immediately accessible that all nodes of the problem graph are
bound to at least one part of the architecture graph. A closer look reveals that there
is a path trough the architecture graph for every path in the problem graph, and the
hierarchical relationships of both the architecture and the data fusion process are clearly
visible.
2.3 Summary
This chapter introduces the theory of multi modal sensor data fusion, it’s goals, standard
architectures, and the general process and system design. Common approaches to realize
an embedded data fusion system are explained as well as different design styles. The
Hardware/Software-Co-Design approach and the relevant formalisms are introduced, and
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In this chapter the difficulties and limitations that apply to the mathematical theory of
tracking an object, and the impact of these on the tracking performance are discussed.
The sources of uncertainty and error are identified, and they are analyzed with respect
to the computational resources needed and to the tracking performance of the developed
system. The embedded tracking system has been partially developed in the RollMops
project, which is part of the national air transport research program "Competitive Airport
(WWF)" by the Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology (BMWi) special program
LuFo IV. Nevertheless the developed architecture is suitable for a wide range of tracking
problems. The chapter starts with the theory of tracking against this background, fol-
lowed by a discussion of the system design. The chapter concludes with an analysis of
the possibility and feasibility to integrate domain specific information in the data fusion
process.
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Figure 3.1: Problem graph for the tracking problem. 1 or more sensors (S.O.) generate
measurements or observations (S.Obs.) from which tracks (Tracks) , that represent the
state of vehicles in an area, are derived (Tracking).
3.1 Theory
This section covers the theory of tracking multiple targets in a cluttered environment, that
is the mathematical models and the errors and limitations of these models, with respect to
the airport ground traffic situation assessment application scenario. Most of the discussed
topics apply to general 2D map tracking, which has a broad range of application scenarios.
The task is formally expressed by the problem graph shown in 3.1, and it includes the
following nodes:
• Sensor Operation (S.O.): A functional node representing 1 or more sensors. The sen-
sor(s) measures it’s (their) environment and generate(s) observations that describe
the measurement on the abstraction level of signals or features.
• Sensor Observation(S.Obs.): A communication node representing the observations
of the sensor(s)
• Tracking: A functional node representing the tracking task. Sensor observations
are integrated to extract meaningful information, in the form of the position and
movement of objects, from the measurements of the sensor.
• Tracks: A communication node representing the abstract and human understand-
able information about the position and movement of objects in the area monitored
by the sensors.
Figure 3.2: The refined problem graph of the tracking task.
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The heterogeneous environment and the complexity of the tracking task require adequate
mathematical models and suitable representations to allow for the realization as an em-
bedded system. In the following text aspects of the different tasks and involved data
types are discussed on the basis of the refined problem graph of the tracking task, shown
in Figure 3.2. The refined problem graph is used to show how the different parts of the
algorithm and the data types are related to the formal modeling of the task. The refined
problem graph includes the following nodes.
• Sensor Operation (S.O.): A functional node representing one or more sensors. The
sensor(s) measures it’s (their) environment and generate(s) observations that de-
scribe the measurement on the abstraction level of signals or features.
• Sensor Observation(S.Obs.): A communication node representing the observations
of the sensor(s)
• Sensor Observation Conversion (S.O.C): A functional node that represents the con-
version of a sensor observation in a sensor specific format to a common represen-
tational format. The common representational format is useful to integrate sensor
measurements and other sources of information into a consistent model to represent
the distribution of the possible states of the environment.
• Converted Sensor Observation (C.S.O.): A communication node representing the
sensor data in the common representational format.
• Store Observation from Sensor(S.O.S): The converted sensor data is stored in an
organized way together with sensor data of earlier execution cycles, which can still
be of use for the data fusion process.
• Sensor Observation Storage (S.O.St.): A data base holding the sensor observations
of the present and recent past that are useful for the tracking task.
• Track Data Base (T.DB.): A distributed data base holding the information about
the belief of the vehicles state variables like position, heading, etc..
• Sensor Observation Data Association (S.O.D.A.): Based on the information from
the track data base and the stored sensor observations, sensor data is associated to
tracks representing vehicles in order to decide which data is integrated into which
track.
• Data Association Matrix (D.A.M.): A communication node that represents the data
association matrix (DAM). The DAM is a data type that maps observations to their
likely origin.
• Sensor Observation Data Integration (S.O.D.I.): A functional node that represents
the integration of the track data, background knowledge, and sensor observations
into a consistent model of the state of the world. The new estimation of the state
of the environment is reflected in the update of the track data base and the sensor
observation storage.
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• Track Data Base Update (T.DB.U.) : The integration of the sensor data in the track
data base results in the updated track data base.
• Sensor Observation Storage Update (S.O.St.U.): The integration of the association
information results in an updated sensor observation storage, where observations
integrated in the preceding operation have been deleted.
• Track Management (T.M.): A functional node representing the task of managing
tracks. This is mostly the initialization of new tracks and the deletion of old tracks.
The task results in an update of the track data base and the sensor storage, as sensor
observations that could not be associated with any existing track might be associated
with a new instantiated track, or tracks were not associated to any measurement
for a long time are deleted.
• Track Data Base Update 2 (T.DB.U2.): The instantiation of new tracks and removal
of obsolete tracks results in a second update of the track data base.
• Sensor Observation Storage Update 2 (S.O.St.U2.): Sensor observations used during
track management and not needed anymore have been deleted.
• Situation Assessment (S.AS.): This functional node represents the task of assessing
the environmental situation on a higher level than that of single tracks, for example
the traffic situation in an environment, which also integrates knowledge about the
interaction of traffic participants, schedules, or traffic rules. It’s output is a human
understandable list of tracks representing the tracked objects.
• Tracks: A communication node representing the abstract and human understand-
able information about the position and movement of objects in the area monitored
by the sensors.
3.1.1 Common Representational Format
In order to integrate the multi modal data of multiple data sources it is useful to have
a abstract representation that allows the expression of the belief over the state of the
system that is monitored. This abstraction is commonly referred to as the common
representational format (CRF). It has to be chosen in such a way that it is possible to
transform, with a negligible corruption or loss of information, the data of arbitrary sensors
into the CRF for optimal usage in the application context. Another necessary requirement
is the computational efficiency of the chosen CRF. To localize the transformation to the
CRF in the tracking process refer to Figure 3.3 that shows the refined problem graph of
the tracking problem. The colored nodes deal with the transformation of the data from
various sensors and tracks to the CRF.
The common representation chosen for the tracking task is a feature based 2 dimensional
map with Cartesian coordinates, where objects are represented by a probability density
over the position, heading and the 1 derivative of these values, as well as an id that iden-
tifies the object, and a time-stamp to determine the last update of the object. Probability
densities are represented by normal distributions. Special properties like points of refer-
ence, signatures, or boundary can be accessed using the id of an object and a database but
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Figure 3.3: Parts of the problem graph that are primarily concerned with the transfor-
mation of data to the common representational format (CRF).
are not part of the CRF. The choice of the CRF with respect to the application scenario
is motivated on the following pages.
Time-Stamp
Time-stamps are required for most tracking algorithms, to align sensor observations or
target positions in a common time line. The time is given by a tuple of seconds and
microseconds as commonly used to represent Greenwich mean time (GMT). GMT is also
the common time axis used. However some components or sensors do not provide time-
stamps, which must be inferred by the tracking system from the characteristics of the
system components and the architecture. The topic of temporal alignment is addressed
later in the following text.
2D Map
In many application scenarios it is useful and necessary to focus on the most relevant
aspects of the world and to use abstractions such as point wise linearization, instead of
modeling the world with arbitrary precision. The 2 dimensional map is an excellent ex-
ample. While the worlds coordinate system is spherical, structured artificial environments
and moment limitations that arise from physical constraints, allow the assumption of flat
2 dimensional maps with a isometric coordinate system, where the position of a vehicle
is expressed as a triple (x, y, θ) stating the position and the heading of the vehicles own
coordinate system.
While the 2 dimensional map is a nearly perfect approximation at small scales, there is
a difference on bigger scales. A floor in an regular office building will be mapped with
sufficient accuracy, but exact representation of an airport requires a spherical coordinate
system unless the effort has been made to remove the earths curvature for a perfectly
plain airport surface. Fortunately areas of the size of major airports for example cannot
be mapped, using a barrel projection, to an isometric 2 dimensional space with a difference
smaller than s a few meters at the boundary of the map [100]. The distortion results in a
systematic error that is depending on the characteristics of the sensors and the required
accuracy of the tracking, negligible for most sensors, which is shown in the discussion of
the sensor value normalization later in the following text.
Normal Distribution
Because of the uncertainty of sensors and vehicle movements, reasonable accurate algo-
rithms require the integration of these uncertainties. The normal distribution provides a
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compact closed form representation that is suitable to represent most sensor measurements
as well as the state of the dynamics and the position of vehicles on the map. Because of
this ,and its efficient representation, it is perfectly suited for the common representational
format and for the exchange of information between components of the tracking system.
It is also widely accepted as an input format by many other tracking systems and human
machine interfaces (HMI).
ID
With respect to the possible high data rates, the limited resources available in reasonable
target technologies used to realize components of the system, and the flexibility of the
implementation both in software and hardware it is reasonable to limit the CRF to the
properties of the targets that are required for the tracking task and may be subject to
constant change. Properties that are not subject to change, or which are just needed at
special components, can be represented individually by a suitable chosen representation,
and they can be referenced by the id of the CRF, e.g.: The outline of a vehicle that is
used for the visualization in a HMI may be inferred by the information in a database that
object with id=X is a Boeing 747.
3.1.2 Spatial Alignment
Spatial and temporal alignment or registration is a process where local coordinates and
time-stamps are mapped to a common time axis and a common coordinate system defined
in the CRF. Figure 3.4 shows the which nodes of the refined problem graph are concerned
with the spatial and temporal alignment.
Figure 3.4: Localization of the spatial and temporal alignment in the refined problem
graph.
Conversion of probability distributions from polar to Cartesian coordinates
The majority of sensors encountered in the airport, automotive, and robotics environment
use their own polar coordinate system with their own measurement units. To update the
belief over the targets state these values have to be passed through a function that maps
the sensors measurement space to the common representational format. Almost all sensors
assume a Gaussian distributed error for their measurements, where the individual errors
are not correlated . Unfortunately the transformation from polar to Cartesian coordinates
is not linear, thus the mapping of a linear Gaussian probability density function in polar
coordinates to a linear Gaussian probability function in Cartesian coordinates - and vice
versa - induces an error. Common approaches to deal with this challenge are: The
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unscented transform, the working point linearization, and the inverse transformation.
These are introduced in brief in the following text, and there suitability for the use in an
embedded system is discussed.
Unscented Transform The unscented transform is a transformation developed to deal
with non linear transformations of linear defined probability density functions. The un-
derlying idea is that is is easier to approximate the transformed probability density than
to approximate the transformation. The unscented transform has been developed by
Julier and Uhlmann in 1997, see [60, 61]. A brief introduction can be found in [111]. The
unscented transform aim to capture and preserve the moment of the probability density
function. The algorithm, which is in depth described in the Appendix B, uses so called
σ-points to capture the moment of the untransformed probability distribution and com-
putes a normal distribution from the transformed σ-points. For most sensor data given in
polar coordinates the transformation is straightforward, the σ-points, for each dimension
µ− σ, µ and µ+ σ, are transformed from polar coordinates to Cartesian coordinates, and
the mean µ and covariance Σ is then calculated from the transformed σ-points. The error
induced by this transformation is strongly dependent from the amount of uncertainty of
the sensor measurement and the distance to the sensor, see Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Illustration of the error induced by the unscented transform. The leftmost
image shows the measurement in the sensors polar coordinate system. The rightmost
image shows the approximate PDF from the unscented transform. The image in the
middle shows the exact mapping of the measurement to Cartesian coordinates. In contrast
to the working point linearization , which preserves the mean, the mean is about 7 meters
from the direct mapping, but the moment of the PDF is preserved better than by the
working point linearization. The σ-points are shown on the σ-boundary, at points µ− σ
and µ+ σ.
Working point linearization This approach tries1 to preserve the mean of a normal
distribution by linearization the transformation function at the position of the mean. As
1Actually the mean of an normal distribution approximation of the real transformed PDF is most
times not exactly preserved. See [111] for some vivid examples.
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stated before, state transitions and measurements are in practice often not linear, or no
linear transformations are required to convert the data to the CRF. A transformation
from polar to Cartesian coordinates using a linear function results in a preservation of
the mean, but the moment of the probability density function is lost. The working point
linearization, which is also the basis for the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), approximates
the non linear transition function by a linear function tangent to the mean - the working
point - of the normal distribution. Many techniques exist for the linearization of nonlinear
functions. The most popular is the first order Taylor expansion. However the derivation
of the tangent function used for the linearization is more complex than the unscented
transform, and the performance of the unscented transform has been found to be superior
to that of the working point linearization in many cases [111]. Because of the indications
from the literature and the elegance of the unscented transform algorithm, which is better
suited for a hardware implementation, the unscented transform has been chosen as a
transformation method, and the performance of the working point linearization has not
been compared experimentally.
Inverse transformation: Using a non parametric representation2 of the belief (of
the target position), like the particle filter does, it is possible to use the inverse function
f−1 to transfer the belief representation to the sensors coordinate system, and update the
individual values of the particle filter that make up the belief in the sensors coordinate
system. For particle filters, where the probability density is given by the density of a finite
number of samples, this method has the nice property of removing the mathematical error
that is normally induced by the transformation of the sensors measurement to the CRF.
The drawback of this approach is that it requires the computation of f−1 for every sample
in the sample set of the particle filter, instead of the one time transformation of the sensor
measurement itself. Because of the expected additional hardware requirements, which also
would result in a higher energy usage, the unscented transform was chosen as a method
to convert the probability distributions, and not the inverse transformation.
Mathematical error analysis
When applying the unscented transform to the problem of converting normal distribu-
tions from polar coordinates to Cartesian coordinates the results strongly depend on the
parametrization of the normal distribution. The bigger the uncertainty, the bigger the er-
ror of the approximation. The transformation is quite precise for universal medium range
radar (UMRR) measurements and Laser measurements, but has a significant error for long
distance measurements of older surface movement radars (SMR). Figure 3.6 illustrates the
influence of the angular uncertainty on the σ-boundaries of the transformed probability
2Opposed to commonly used parametric representations that use a parametrized mathematical func-
tion or model with a fixed number of parameters for the representation of objects or distributions and
assume a fixed structure of the model, non parametric representations have a flexible number of param-
eters that depends on what one wants to represent and the structure is determined from the given data.
E.g.: A normal distribution is a parametric representation where the parameters are chosen in such a
way that the fixed structure assumed best fits the data at hand. A set of samples is a non parametric
representation that does not assume a fixed structure of the data, but requires a method to reasonable
extract the structure from the sample set.
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Figure 3.6: Sigma boundaries of close, medium, and long distance measurements, and
the σ-boundaries of the approximation by the unscented transform for SMR (top) and
UMRR (bottom) sensors. The red line plots the σ-boundaries of the transformed PDF.
The blue line the approximation by the unscented transform. The dots mark the mean
of the PDF.
density function. With growing distance the shape of the transformed probability density
functions σ-boundaries changes from a ellipsoid shape to a triangular shape.
To determine the error induced by the transformation one should consider the following
facts. The probability that a variable x is inside an interval [a, b] is given by the integral
under the probability density function, where x is a possible state of the system, in
most cases the position of a tracked mobile, and the probability density function is given
by a sensor observation z. With respect to the accuracy of a tracking system however
the error of the mean and the error of the main moment may be more important than
the overall error. So not only on the absolute error, the difference between the local
probability density at any point of the probability density functions, but on the effect to
the convergence behavior of the tracking algorithm is of major concern.
Because the normal distribution is a continuous probability density function (continuous
PDF) its appliance in digital computation is not without problems. As mentioned above,
a continuous PDF f allows the computation of the probability that a value x is inside
an interval [a, b] by integration over the interval, P (x ∈ [a, b] = ∫ ab f(x)dx), but the
probability at any point is infinitely small P (X = x) = 0. With a digital representation
it is only possible to compute the probability density at discrete points or over intervals
within the representative capabilities of the digital number representation.
Therefore the continuous probability density function has to be approximated by a discrete
probability density function. Using the law of total probability this is done by sampling
over the digital space, which includes all points where the carrier of every function applied
to the digital representation is not 0.
There are different approaches to compute the probability given at a specific discrete
point in digital space. For equidistant points one approach is to integrate the probability
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density function over the interval [x − β2 , x + β2 ], where β is the distance between the
points. Using a working point linearization assumption, this can be done very efficient
using equation 3.1, where x is the position of the point (the system state) and µ and Σ
are the mean and covariance of a normal distribution z = N(µ,Σ) representing a sensor
observation.
ppolar(x|z) = ηN(x, µ,Σ)β2 (3.1)
For the following text the notation η will denote the normalizer in Bayes rule variable
that ensures that the law of total probability is satisfied. The normalizer is computed




Here X is the set of points representing the digital representable system state (target
position). Although the normal distribution is never 0 in continuous space it is sensible
to restrict the set of points x′ ∈ X to the points where the magnitude of the normal
function is not negligible N(x′, µ,Σ) > . Equation 3.3 shows that the the area β2 can be
canceled out to make the computation even more efficient. This approach can be applied
to higher dimensional spaces.
ppolar(x|z) = 1∑
x′ N(x′, µ,Σ)β2
N(x, µ,Σ)β2 = N(x, µ,Σ)∑
x′ N(x′, µ,Σ)
(3.3)
To determine the error induced by the transformation one has to sum up the difference
between the probability in polar coordinates ppolar(x|z) and the probability in Cartesian
coordinates pcartesian(x|zusc) under the transformed probability density function zusc. To
calculate the probability density in Cartesian coordinates the points are converted from
polar coordinates to Cartesian coordinates using the function fp2c and applied to the un-
scented transform of the probability density function Nusc in Cartesian coordinates. The
problem that arises from the conversion of polar coordinates to Cartesian coordinates is
that the points equidistant in polar coordinates are not equidistant in Cartesian coordi-
nates and vice versa, and the area in polar coordinates is not the same as the areas in
Cartesian coordinates for each sampling point (see Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7: Conversion of an isometric pattern from polar to Cartesian coordinates.
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Figure 3.8: Difference between the original probability function and the unscented trans-
form. For this plots the probability density function has been sampled with 900 data
points in an isometric pattern over the interval [µ − 5σ, µ + 5σ]. The plots show a far
away measurement where the difference between the normalized volumes sums up to
38.6% of the volume of the polar probability density function.
Therefore each sampling point has to be weighted by the area represented by this partic-
ular sampling point in the coordinate system the isometric pattern is transformed to. In
this case Equation 3.3 can only be applied to the isometric sample point pattern. For the
transformed pattern the area has to be computed for each sampling point x and used as a






Equation 3.4 shows that all constant factors can be removed from the computation of the
weight, leaving only the shortest distance to the begin and end of the area used for the
calculation of the weights as variables.
To error Eω,θ(zusc) of the unscented transform zusc of a single observation z at a specific





The magnitude of this error is strongly dependent on the characteristics of the sensor and
the position of the observation’s mean in sensor coordinates. An example visualization
of the error analysis is shown in Figure 3.8. The average error Esensor for a sensor can
be obtained by sampling Equation 3.5 over the reasonable angular range Θ and distance









For some of the more common sensors this results in the values shown in Figure 3.9 and
presented in Table 3.1. The distribution of the error with respect to the magnitude of the
error is plotted in Figure 3.10. Depending on the uncertainty in angle σΘ and distance σΩ
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Figure 3.9: The error distribution of the unscented transform for the reasonable range
and angle of four common sensors. Except for the surface movement radar (SMR) the
error is very low except at very close distances. Because the absolute uncertainty of Laser
and UMMR measurements are very low, the relative high increase at very close ranges
does not significantly affect the performance with respect to most tracking scenarios.
the error is significant either at long range or short range. If the angular uncertainty is
high the error grows with the distance, as shown for the Surface Movement Radar (SMR).
Sensor σΩ σΘ UST WPL IT.
Surface Movement Radar (SMR) 10.00 m 0.050 rad 30% > 30% 0
Universal Medium Range Radar (UMRR) 00.60 m 0.005 rad < 1% > 1% 0
Laser Scanner 00.01 m 0.001 rad < 0.5% > 0.5% 0
Surface Movement Radar Improved (SMRi) 02.00 m 0.050 deg < 0.3% > 0.3% 0
Table 3.1: Comparison of the average error induced by different transforms for different
sensors. IT denotes the inverse transform error, WPL the working point linearization
error, and UST the unscented transform error.
3.1.3 Temporal Alignment
Temporal alignment of data from sensors and other sources is a topic not to be underesti-
mated. Safety features in full scale airport surveillance systems for major where useless or
even dangerous, because of the incorrect temporal alignment of data from multiple sensors
[110]. The means chosen to align data temporarily depend on the application scenario
and the architecture of the system embedding the data fusion functionality. In some cases
it is possible to infer the temporal alignment from sensor data without any information on
the time of the measurement, e.g. when tracking exactly one continuously moving object
with two sensors measuring the position of the object, the data of both sensors can be
aligned by probabilistic plausibility checks. But these cases are very specific and do not
apply to all tracking scenarios.
Therefore sensor data and other relevant data used for tracking contains a time-stamp.
In the optimal case the time-stamps are accurate, flawless, and synchronized allowing the
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Figure 3.10: The images shows the distribution of the error with respect to the magnitude
of the error. The plots are normed to an area of 1.0.
exact temporal alignment of the data. For scenarios where this is not possible algorithms
as the Lamport time can be applied to partially reconstruct the temporal alignment of
the data. So called Babylonian scenarios, where a data source fakes time-stamps, are
the worst case scenarios. Although this case appears to be very unlikely it is a problem
frequently encountered in airport traffic surveillance, and it has led to severe problems
with airport traffic surveillance systems [53]. These systematically flawed time-stamps can
be rooted to circumstances and technological incompatibilities frequently encountered at
airports, see [109] for details.
For reasons of time and because of the broad range of application scenarios and the
circumstances of the primary research objectives ensuring the temporal alignment is no
topic that needs to be discussed in depth in this work. The developed design supports the
temporal alignment, and the prototypical implementation provides the necessary support
for the temporal alignment in the application scenarios relevant to the research objectives.
3.1.4 Data Fusion
The previous part of this section dealt with the prerequisites for a successful data fusion.
Now the fusion of the data from multiple times and sources will be discussed. As stated
before in Section 2.1 the goal of the fusion is "to combine elements of raw data from
different sources into a single set of meaningful information that is of greater benefit than
the sum of its contributing parts" and achieve the following synergic effects:
1. Representation: The information obtained during the fusion process or at the end
of the fusion process has an abstract level or a granularity higher than each input
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Figure 3.11: Localization of the core data fusion process, the data integration, in the
refined problem graph. The parts of the graph that are primary concerned with the data
fusion are colored.
data set. The new abstract level or the new granularity provides richer semantic on
the data than each initial source of information.
2. Certainty: If V is the sensor data before fusion and p(V ) is the a prior probability of
the data before fusion, then the gain in certainty is the growth in p(V ) after fusion.
If VF denotes data after fusion, then we expect p(VF ) > p(V ). 3
3. Accuracy: The standard derivation on the data after the fusion process is smaller
than the standard derivation provided directly by the sources. If data is noisy or
erroneous, the fusion process tries to eliminate noise and errors. In general, the gain
in accuracy and the gain in certainty are correlated.
4. Completeness: Bringing new information to the current knowledge on an environ-
ment allows a more complete view on this environment. In general, if the information
is redundant and concordant, there could also be a gain in accuracy.
The benefits that apply, with respect to these synergic effects of data fusion, to tracking
will be discussed in the following.
Representation: While the information from different sources like sensors, background
knowledge, or auxiliary information like traffic databases only capture a part of the state
of the target or the environment, and the data itself is most times not associated to any
individual object, the fusion process results in a meaningful information in the context of
the application. For example a radar provides a measure of reflection for each angle and
distance, an information that is without further processing hardly useable for tracking
objects in a cluttered environment like airport ground traffic. At the airport swaying
grass, birds, buildings, rain, and multi path reflections affect the readings of the sensor in
such a way that the data hardly interpretable by a human, even when it is displayed as
an image showing the reflection intensity. When fused with data from other sensors like
more radar sensors, background knowledge like maps, and auxiliary information like the
previous sensor data, it is possible to derive the meaningful information which vehicles
are at the airport, their positions, their past, current, and future movement, and their
schedule from the fused data. Another example is the multilateration radar, where each
sensor measures the run time of a signal from an active transponder at the vehicle to the
3This seems to be not true taken by word, obviously the probability of the sensor data before the
fusion is the same as after the fusion, but after the fusion the belief over the state of the world will much
more resemble the true state of the world.
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receiver of the sensor. While the single run time is often useless, multiple receivers (often
up to 30 at major airports) allow the localization of the transponders position with some
accuracy,[77] and [78].
Certainty: Almost all sensors used for tracking suffer from significant random noise
errors and systematic errors. These errors may be caused by the environment, inferences
of the sensor with other parts of the system the sensor is embedded in, or the sensor it-
self. Auxiliary information like traffic databases are also prone to errors, and background
knowledge is often incomplete or inaccurate. This is a situation where the data from a
single source is not only incomplete but also uncertain. For example one cannot be sure
whether the reflection measured by a radar is caused by environmental conditions that
were not meant to be measured or by a vehicle reflecting the radar beam; Pixels in a
camera image may be affected by electronic inference during the conversion of the analog
charges of the photosensitive cells to digital numbers. The fusion of the data like for
example filtering a neighborhood of pixels, or combination of data from multiple radar
sensors makes it possible to estimate the likelihood of the single data much better, re-
sulting in a higher certainty. This is also true when fusing data over time, here radar
reflection centers that exhibit a , with respect to the application scenario, sensible be-
havior, can be assumed to be a vehicle with much more certainty than is possible from a
single measurement.
Figure 3.12: Accuracy: The fusion of the competitive measurements, shown in the left
plot, with Bayesian method, shown in the middle plot, and additive method, shown in
the right plot, leads to a more accurate estimate of the variable then the individual
measurements.
Accuracy: As sensors suffer from random and systematic errors, each measurement or
observation is more or less prone to these errors and therefore more or less inaccurate.
Multiple measurements or observations, be it from multiple sources or multiple times can,
under favorable circumstances, be combined to a much more accurate information. Figure
3.12 shows how the simple multiplication or addition of sensor observation probability
densities can increase the accuracy. Accuracy enhancing data fusion is achieved using
competitive sensor setups that measure the same quality of the environment.
Completeness: Most sensors or other sources of data provide only a fraction of the
desired information on a tracked object’s state. Completeness is often achieved with so
called complementary sensor setup that measure different qualities of the environment.
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Figure 3.13 shows the fusion of two independent measurements, one measuring the x-
translation of an object and the other its y-translation using Bayes law.
Figure 3.13: Completeness: The combination of the complementary measurements of the
x variable, shown in the left plot, and the y variable, shown in the middle plot, results in
more complete estimate, shown in the right plot, of the state of the joint variables then
any of the single measurements.
3.1.5 Data Fusion Methods and Algorithms
The following text in the section discusses the means to reach this goal that is the math-
ematical models, the algorithms and the formal architecture of the system. There exists
a broad range of approaches that show reasonable performance. Figure 3.14 shows the
difference of two different data fusion methods. Although booth methods have a good
performance, their data fusion results show a significant difference. While the Bayesian
fusion is mathematically sound it does not necessarily outperform other methods if the
model doesn’t capture the environmental mechanics good enough.
Figure 3.14: Comparison: The fusion of the competitive and complementary measure-
ments of the x and y variable, shown in the left plot and the middle plot, results in a
more accurate and complete estimate of the state of the variables. As visible in the right
plot, depending on the fusion method, the result can be quite different.
Tracking is a process, which integrates sensor data that represents measurements of spe-
cific qualities of the environment at discrete4 times, over time. Therefore it is necessary to
model the change of the environment between the measurement points. Besides Bayesian
laws that provide a mathematically sound foundation, there exist a wealth of data fusion
methods, ranging from logical inference to neural networks that have been shown to be
4Of course the measurements measure over a certain duration, but these are usually so small that it
is legal to refer to this periods as points.
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able to handle tracking task. Unfortunately many of these are not suited for the real-
ization as an embedded system. Reasons for this are manifold and will not be discussed
further at this point.
The important fact is that there is a certain degree of orthogonality in the concepts and
task involved in the tracking process. A well designed architecture can reflect this or-
thogonality in the independence of the (formal) process architecture. To derive such an
architecture it is useful to start with the most basic model of a sensible digital represen-
tation of a dynamic environment. This model is based on the following assumptions.
• The current state of the world xt at time t is directly caused only by the past state
of the world xt−1 at time t − 1, so the future state of the world xt+1 at time t + 1
will be directly caused only by the state of the world at time t.
• Usually one cannot assess the state of the world directly, but rather perceive per-
ceptions zt
Figure 3.15: Model for discrete data fusion. The left image show the basic net based on
the sensible assumption that the state of the world x at time t only depends on the state
of the world before, at time t− 1. The right image adds an observation model where each
observation z only depend on the state of the world.
This model is shown in the diagrams of Figure 3.15, which is the basic model is the basis
for a vast range of filtering algorithms, as well as for full scaled architecture concepts. In
order to provide sufficient results this approach requires that the model that represents the
world captures the state of the world in such a way that everything that directly affects
the dynamic state of the world significantly is included in the representation of the state
of the world. Furthermore the transition function that determines the relation between
the current state of the world and the past state of the world must use that information
so that the information contained in the current state of the world is self sufficient.
There exists a, for many embedded system sensible, extension that includes the actions
of the system itself as these are usually known and not perceived, as well as their direct
consequences.
• The state of the world is affected by ones own actions u and we can predict the
direct consequences with sufficient accuracy.
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Figure 3.16: Extended discrete word model. In the right image information about actions
u that are known rather than perceived have been added, to the model shown in the left
image. The current world state is modeled as a consequence of the past world state and
the current actions.
• In this case the current state of the world xt, depends directly only on the state of
the world before and one’s actions at that time ut.
The resulting model is shown in Figure 3.16. Like its predecessor, the model is well suited
as a basis for data fusion algorithms and architectures. Orthogonal concepts are now
accessible, the only formal requirement of the transition function that computes the next
world state is that it accepts the previous world state xt−1 and the control information
ut as input and provides the current world state xt as output. Therefore this function
is completely independent of the function that models the relation between the state of
the world and the perception z of the world, and its inverse that models what the state
of the world is given the perception of the world. With increasingly finer granularity of
the model more orthogonality emerge that, if resembled by the architecture, allow a large
degree of freedom in the design of the individual architectural components. As a result
software or hardware implementations of these architecture can be very flexible, because
they have a modular design that allows the configuration of the system from a set of
solutions for the individual tasks.
Bayes Filter
To derive the Bayes filter convert the model shown in Figure 3.15 or that shown in Figure
3.16 into a dynamic Bayesian network. The Bayes filter algorithm, as shown in listing
Algorithm Bayes Filter (Xt−1, Zt), can be run from any time t0. The algorithm performs
an iterative processing of the recursive mathematical definition of the filter as the dynamic
network grows as time proceeds.








The recursive mathematical definition is that the current state of the world Xt is defined
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by the past states of the world Xt−1, . . . , X0 so the probability distribution P (Xt) is
defined by the equation
P (Xt) = P (Xt|Xt−1, . . . , X0) (3.7)
With respect to the first order Markov assumption explained in the preceding text - and
shown in the left image in Figure 3.15 - the equation resolves to
P (Xt) = P (Xt|Xt−1)P (Xt−1) = α
∫
p(xt|Xt−1)P (Xt−1)dxt (3.8)
with the normalizing constant α that ensures that P (Xt) integrates to 1 and
p(xt|Xt−1)P (Xt−1) = α
∫
p(xt|xt−1)p(xt−1)dxt−1 (3.9)
If one does not know the state of the world but has to rely on measurements, the actual
problem is to determine the current state of the world given the observations of the current
state and past states of the world, with the equation
P (Xt) = P (Xt|Zt, . . . , Z0) (3.10)
The assumption of the conditional independence of the observations Zt, . . . , Z0, which
was explained in the preceding text and shown in the right image in Figure 3.15, and the
application of Bayes law to calculate P (Xt|Zt) results in the Bayes filter algorithm. The
initial distribution P (X0) is usually assumed to be even, or it is based on background
knowledge and/or auxiliary information.
Bayes filters can be generally classified into parametric and non parametric filters. Para-
metric filters use parametric representations to represent probability distributions. Para-
metric representations use a parametrized mathematical function or model with a fixed
number of parameters for the representation of objects or distributions and assume a fixed
structure of the model. Non parametric filters use non parametric representations to rep-
resent probability distributions. Non parametric representations have a flexible number
of parameters that depends on what one wants to represent and the structure is deter-
mined from the given data. While parametric filters are often computationally efficient
for linear filtering tasks, non parametric filters can handle non linear system behavior
much better, often at the cost of additional computational resources. The larger amount
of computational resources needed by non parametric filters result from the fact that the
representation of the state of the world X must be represented by a sufficiently large
set of variables x that represent the different possible states of the world with sufficient
precision and coverage. For typical tracking and localization tasks the following popular








From these the particle filter is of particular interest for the application scenarios, because
it can approximate arbitrary probability density functions. The particle filter allows the
implementation of very complex state transition functions that can not be realized us-
ing other approaches. Compared to a histogram filter the particle filter is more efficient
in terms of accuracy when using the same computational resources, because it concen-
trates the computational resources at areas of high probability allowing a more accurate
estimation of the systems state.
Particle Filter
The particle filter is a nonparametric Bayesian filter. This class of Bayes filters does not
rely on a fixed functional form, like normal distributions, of the posterior. The probability
distribution is represented by a finite number of values, in the case of the particle filter
samples. Each sample refers to a specific point in the state space of the systems state.
For tracking ground traffic tasks usually the position, heading and the first derivative.
The algorithm of the particle filter is explained in detail in Section 4.
3.1.6 Tracking Multiple Objects
Tracking only one object does not meet the requirements of many robotic tracking ap-
plications that require dealing with persons, objects and other robots. Even a lot of
tasks that do not explicitly require the tracking of multiple objects can be done more
efficiently by a robot that is able to track multiple objects. Tracking multiple objects
is a demanding task, not only from a mathematical point of view but also with respect
to the computational resources and time needed for the execution of the tracking algo-
rithms, and includes problems where a proper mathematical treatment can be shown to
be NP-Hard, , see Appendix C. To efficiently track multiple objects the Bayes filter can
be extended on the basis of some weak assumptions on the conditional independence of
the objects behavior.
Adoption of the Bayes Filter Model to Multi Object Tracking
When tracking multiple objects with the Bayes filter the formal model can be treated as
a model where the state of the world Xt is a vector Xt = {x1t , . . . , xnt } of the states of the
objects in the world one is interested in, see Figure 3.17. The perception of the world Zt
is a vector Zt = {z1t , . . . , zmt } of observations from different sources. If the state, in this
case the movement in the immediate future, of an object does not significantly affect the
state of other objects it is possible to divide the task of tracking multiple objects.
Challenges specific to Multi Object Tracking
Tracking multiple objects is generally far more complicated than tracking a single object.
Circumstances usually encountered in real world scenarios that contribute to this are:
• Multiple objects of interest: There is more than one object of interest in the en-
vironment, and the exact number of objects in the environment is unknown and
changes over time.
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Figure 3.17: The Bayes filter applied to multiple object tracking. The assumption of the
conditional independence of the tracked objects allows the division of the traffic situation
estimation problem into many object state estimation problem.
• Different and unknown types of object: Often the tracked objects are of different
types and behave different. Depending on the difference it can be impossible to
accurately model the relationship between past, current, and future state of the
objects with a general function.
Often the environment is also cluttered. In the context of tracking multiple targets a clut-
tered environment refer to an environment that is characterized by the following qualities,
which complicate the tracking task.
• (Partial) Occlusion: Objects of interest may be occluded by other objects of interest
or parts of the environment. The occlusion may be fully or partially for an arbitrary
duration.
• False Alarms: The environment or errors in the sensor technology cause systematic
or random sensor measurements that are wrongly classified as a objects of interest.
• Object Inference: Objects may infer with each other, which affects the dynamic
behavior of the objects in such a way that the complexity of the computation of an
appropriate mathematical model is intractable.
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• Unidentified Observations: The measurements of different objects of interest do
not have a characteristic signature that allows the ambiguous mapping of sensor
measurements to objects.
• Uncertainty of Sensor Measurements: The complexity of the environment leads to
systematic and random errors that result in a deviation between the measured state
of the world and the true state of the world.
In order to deal with these circumstances the tasks Data Association, Track Management,
and Observation Management, which will be explained in detail later in the text, are
usually part of the task of tracking multiple object.
Figure 3.18: Localization of the data association in the problem graph.
Data Association: One of the most frequent5 problems encountered when tracking
multiple objects is the correspondence between objects and observations. When the task
of tracking multiple objects is divided into multiple task of tracking single objects, it is
important to know which observations are caused by which object. Many sensors do not
provide this information, so a part of the dynamic Bayesian network that describes the task
is hidden, see Figure 3.19. With respect to the different levels of abstraction, association is
optimally done on the level of signals, situations, and most frequently features. Like many
tasks related to data fusion data association is not a trivial task, which is among other
difficulties caused by the computational complexity. The exact solution of the problem
can be shown to be NP-hard, see Appendix C.
Although the problem is not new and is topic of established books, for example the authors
of [94] state that “With n observations and n tracks... ...there a n! possible assignments
of observations to tracks; a proper probabilistic treatment must take all of them into
account, and this can be shown to be NP-hard”. By 2001 the problem was considered
to be solved generally, but Uhlman [41] stated that “Over the years, many attempts
have been made to devise an algorithm for multiple-target tracking with better than
O(n2) performance. Some of the proposals offered significant improvements in special
circumstances or for certain instances of the multiple-target tracking problem, but they
5The estimation of the combined and individual state of multiple objects does not necessary require
data association, as the following statement of Hall et al shows ”Association is not an essential ingredient
in combining multiple pieces of data. Recent work in random set models of data fusion provides general-
izations that allow state estimation of multiple targets without explicit report to target association.“ [41]
. Also a broad range of methods from the field of artificial intelligence is available that can - based on
noisy observations - provide robust estimates of a systems state without the need to explicitly associate
the data. Machine learning algorithms such as recurrent neural networks can reconstruct the state of a
system from noisy and partial data.
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Figure 3.19: The data association problem. In many application scenarios sensors cannot
identify objects. Therefore it is not known which observation belongs to which object.
retained their O(n2) worst-case behavior.. . . . . . Even with the new methods, multiple-
target tracking remains a complex task that strains the capacity of the largest and fastest
supercomputers.” Data association is important for this work because the approach to
track objects individually, which supports a distributed and hierarchical architecture,
requires an explicit data association. Thus the system must support data association
related functionality at multiple locations, a constraint that strongly influences the design
of the tracking system. Also the concurrent computation of the data association reduces
the time complexity a lot as shown in the Section 3.2.2.
Track Management: An important task is the management of tracks. Based on the
past and current information the number of tracks must be estimated, tracks that have
left the area must be deleted, and new tracks that appear must be instantiated.
There exist numerous approaches and track management is often closely coupled to ob-
servation management, which is discussed right after track management. Most popular
approaches are probabilistic and use the overall number of observations or the number of
observations per sensor in a fixed time interval to determine the most likely number of
tracks. Another popular approach is to collect observations that could not be associated
with any existing track and infer tracks from these observations; often with additional
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Figure 3.20: The track management in the problem graph.
plausibility checks, and regression solving to instantiate new tracks with parameters in-
ferred from the observations, e.g. heading and speed from a set of position measurements.
Observation Management: The management of the incoming sensor observations is
very important. Incoming sensor observations should be stored in a database for a number
of reasons.
Figure 3.21: Observation management in the problem graph.
• Delay: Different delays during transmission cause sensor observations to be received
unordered, and the newest observations may not always be the most accurate. In
some cases it is therefore recommendable to update the track by integrating late
sensor observations.
• Data Association: In a broad range of tracking tasks it it sensible not to associate
observations as soon as available, but rather consider a set of observations and tracks
to find the most likely association for the observations.
• Estimating the number of tracks: The number of observations made by sensors is
usually closely related to the number of objects in the area. Depending on the
circumstances in the application scenario, the number of objects may be directly
inferred from the number of observations, or the likelihood of an untracked object
can be estimated from observations that could not be assigned to a track.
• Instantiating new tracks: When a new track is instantiated, the object has usually
caused some sensor observations that where not assigned already. The new track
can be instantiated more accurately based on these observations. A well establish
paradigm is "track before report". Unassociated sensor observations are searched
for meaningful patterns that could be caused by an object. If the likelihood for a
new track exceeds a threshold the new track is instantiated.
• Improvement of quality: The quality of tracking results can be improved using a
technique know as smoothing, where the state of a tracked object is inferred by past
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and future measurements of the object. It is also a common approach to use stored
observations to counter effects, which are caused by deficiencies of the mathematical
models of the observed processes in particle filters, by rerunning the algorithm on
a part of the sample set with past measurements. The deficiencies are usually
related to the 1. order Markov chain assumption that is not fulfilled because the
mathematical model does not capture all aspects of the tracked objects state with
sufficient accuracy.
3.1.7 Situation Assessment
Figure 3.22: Localization of the situation assessment in the problem graph
To be of use for humans or superordinate technological instances the meaningful informa-
tion, which results from the data integration process, should be presented in a compact
form. Also information that is not deductible from single track data should be deduced
during this stage of the data fusion process when considering all tracks, background
knowledge and auxiliary information. Such information includes, but is not limited to:
Imminent conflicts between tracked vehicles, dangerous situations, or the violations of no
go areas. The result of the situation assessment is a list of extended tracks that contains
a compact representation of the probability density function over the tracked vehicles
state, and also contains auxiliary information on the tracks that is valuable in the specific
application context of the tracking system.
3.2 Hardware-Software Partitioning
This section discusses the theory of the design, development, and implementation of an
embedded tracking system, consisting of hardware and software components, for applica-
tion in scenarios from the robotics, airport, or automotive field. The conceptual design
of the architecture is introduced and motivated based on the requirements and specifica-
tion of the precedent mentioned application scenarios and the theory introduced in the
previous section.
Formally, the problem is to map the problem graph to an architecture graph of the
systems hardware in such a way that the resulting system is well suited for the majority
of application scenarios. The basic mapping as shown in Figure 2.10, must be refined to
determine which parts of the data fusion process are realized in software and which parts
are realized in hardware. The resulting mapping, as shown in Figure 2.12, is motivated
and explained in the rest of this section.
The refined problem graph is shown in Figure 3.2, and the refined architecture graph
is shown in Figure 3.23; the system architecture is made from 3 functional nodes: The
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Sensor node, the pc104 node, and the FPGA_Tracker node. These are connected by 2
communication nodes: The bus node that connects the sensor node and the pc104 node
and the pc1042fpga_bus that connects the pc104 node with the FPGA_Tracker node.
Figure 3.23: Refined architecture graph of the multi tracker system.
The system architecture is a good basis for a research and development prototype for
of the following reasons. First, the pc104 node represents an industrial standard pc that
allows the convenient integration of additional peripheral components and provides plenty
of interfaces to attach sensors to the system, while being robust enough to be deployed in
a real application scenario. Also the pc104 can be replaced by a desktop pc outside the
application environment to allow for better research and development working conditions.
With the pc is possible to test the functionality and integration of hardware in the system,
by software components that mimic the hardware. Second a FPGA, represented by the
FPGA_Tracker node, is a very flexible yet powerful choice to implement algorithms in
hardware with a semi custom design style. FPGA development boards that support a
reasonable range of additional peripheral hardware are available from most major FPGA
distributors along with integrated development environments (IDEs). System builders
that provide soft core processors, which allow the convenient design of systems on a chip
including custom logic components, are readily available for these IDEs. FPGAs can
be configured trough the combination of different design approaches, and the developed
designs can be used as a basis for a full custom design.
3.2.1 Requirements & Specifications
Based on the target application scenarios the following requirements have been defined
for the tracking system.
• System Integration: The tracking system should be easy to integrate into existing
mobile or fixed platforms like robots, cars, airport infrastructure, and sensors.
• Tracking Accuracy: The system performance in terms of accuracy must be on par
with state of the art software solutions.
• Tracking Speed: The system must be able to integrate sensor data and provide
results in compliance to hard real time constraints. For most of the application
scenarios these constraints require a sensor data integration rate of at least 30Hz.
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• Power Consumption: The power consumption of the system should be very low
compared to software solutions.
• Heat Dissipation: The system must operate under extreme environmental condition
and will often be placed in a housing with very limited heat exchange capabilities.
Therefore the system should produce a minimum of heat.
• Size: The system should be small enough to be integrated into small humanoid
robots or embedded sensors as encountered in the automotive field.
• Reliability: The systems formal models, algorithms, and hardware should be robust
in such a way that the system can provide its functionality under the environmental
conditions encountered in reasonable application scenarios.
• Maintenance: The system should be easy to maintain. Hot swaps of components
should be possible.
• Safety: The system should not harmfully infer with other systems. The system
must be capable of self diagnostic functions and indicate failures to superordinate
systems and personnel.
• Flexibility: The system should be flexible enough to adopt to new circumstances,
data sources or changes in the environment - or system - it is embedded within.
The lower bound for the fulfillment of the above requirements on tracking accuracy, re-
liability, flexibility, and system integration is set by the formal models and algorithms
used for the tracking. Shortcomings of the formal models and the algorithms cannot
be compensated for by the performance of hardware or software implementation of these.
Therefore the fundamental decision is about the right tracking algorithms and right math-
ematical models. From the wealth of models and algorithms available Bayes filter are best
suited to provide the flexible, transparent, and sound mathematical background that allow
the system to be adopted to the circumstances encountered in the broad range of possible
application scenarios. From the Bayes filter algorithms the particle filter is the one that
has been shown to be successfully applicable to a broad range of scenarios, without major
modifications of the core algorithm and the underlying mathematical models.
In the context of tracking multiple objects a particle filter can be used to track a sin-
gle object, calculate independent data association probabilities, and integrate data from
sensors and other sources. The particle filter’s intrinsic ability to approximate arbitrary
probability density functions and in-cooperate non linear models, allow the adoption of
the particle filter to almost any tracking scenario without a significant changes of the
algorithm. Furthermore the particle filter can be directly used to calculate the indepen-
dent data association probability, and it allows the integration of sensor data with a full
joint data association probability. With the full joint data association probability the
individual tracks are updated with respect to all possible data associations.
Although extensions of the Kalman filter have been developed that can handle a limited
degree of non-linearity and allow the appliance of the joint probability data association
[4], these algorithms usually require much more tuning, to be fitted to the application
scenarios needs, than the particle filter. The major drawback of the particle filter, when
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Figure 3.24: Example formal architecture of a tracking system for a small autonomous
soccer playing robot.
compared to other Bayesian filter variants, is the computational complexity of the oper-
ations needed during the calculation of the data association and data integration.
In order to find a suitable partitioning into hardware and software the time complexity
of the execution of the most time consuming part of tracking multiple object is com-
pared for a software only and a hardware only solution. The comparison is done under
the assumption that only custom hardware can provide the concurrent computation of
multiple particle filters under the constraints that apply from the requirements on power
consumption, heat dissipation, and size. The formal architecture used for the estimations
might for example look like the one shown in Figure 3.24 that was developed for small
humanoid soccer playing robots. It supports methods for observation management, track
management, data association, and data integration as introduced in Section 3.1.
3.2.2 Performance Estimation of Software vs Hardware and Soft-
ware
The computationally most expensive part of tracking multiple objects with multiple par-
ticle filters is the data association and data integration. Figure 3.25 shows a flow chart
of this part of the process. While some parts of the algorithm do not benefit from a
concurrent execution, the time complexity of this part of the data fusion process can be
significantly decreased by the concurrent execution of the core particle filter algorithm
by dedicated hardware. Here the gain in performance is not only from the execution of
the core algorithm in hardware but from the concurrent execution. To account for the
requirements on power consumption and heat dissipation, the clock of the hardware is set
significantly lower6 for this estimation. Also a fast data association method that assigns
6A comparative study found that for matrix multiplication operations the speed of a 150 MHz FPGA
is comparable to that of a 1.5 GHz Pentium. Here a 50 MHz FPGA is compared to a 2.5 GHz desktop
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Figure 3.25: Multitracker data association and data integration flow chart. The magenta
colored parts can be executed computationally efficient in a serial manner, while the
concurrent execution of the blue parts allows the reduction of the time complexity of the
algorithm.
maximal 1 measurement to each track is used for the estimation.
The number of samples used by each particle filter is an important factor for the time
complexity of the execution. The number of samples apparently sets the limit to the accu-
racy and error of particle filters, which is an active field of research [24]. The performance
of particle filters can be estimated in comparison to the optimal filter. The optimal filter
is, except for a very restricted set of dynamic models, not expressible in a closed form.
It has been shown that the upper bound on the variance of estimation error depends on
the number of samples M and has the form c ·O(M−1). The upper bound is independent
to the number of dimensions of the sample state space, but that the constant c heavily
depends on the state vector dimension [21, 19]. The grow of c is linear to the number
of dimensions with a good importance density respectively proposal distribution; with a
bad proposal distribution the variance of error becomes exponential to the dimension of
the state vector. This “curse of dimensionality” has been experienced in many practical
applications [91] and also applies to robotic applications like tracking or pose estimation.
While tracking stationary objects on a 2 dimensional map requires only 3 dimensional
state vector, tracking moving objects in a 3 dimensional volume requires a 12 dimensional
state vector. Therefore a high number of samples is necessary to keep the error small and
enable the robot to achieve its goals when dealing with complex environments like the
real world.
Because the number of state space dimensions for robotic applications is often bigger
than 3 the number of samples should be in the order of hundreds or thousands. The time
needed to execute a software particle filter is the total time needed for data association,
track management, update of the tracks, and extraction of the probability density. For the
sequential execution with a software system, which is at time step t tracking Nt objects
when Kt features are detected, this time is approximately given by the equation
KtNtcKtM +KtNta+KtdM +NtzM +NtpM (3.11)
where M is the number of samples used by each particle filter, cKt is a constant for the
time needed computing the independent data association probability of a detected feature
pc processor, which results in a ratio of app. 1 to 10. [8]
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and sample, a is the computation of the data association probability with respect to all
tracks and detected features, d is a constant for the time needed to update a sample given
a feature, z is a constant for the time needed for the importance sampling, and p is the
time needed to integrate a sample in an abstract representation of the probability density.
The time needed for the execution of the algorithm strongly increases with the number
of detected features and tracks.
Moving most of the computations from software to hardware allows the concurrent compu-
tation for each track. The computational architecture of the particle filter implementation
as multiple hardware particle filters allows the concurrent execution of major parts of the
particle filter algorithm, in particular the computational expensive computation of the
particle filter algorithm. Therefore M an Kt and Nt are removed as a factor from most
terms, and the time needed by this system can be approximated Equation 3.12.
Ktchw +KtNta+ dhw + zhw(M) + phw(M) (3.12)
Here chw is the time needed by each hardware particle filter to calculate the independent
data association probability of the track given a feature. dhw is the time needed by each
hardware particle filter to update the track given a feature. zhw(M) is the time needed
each hardware particle filter for the importance sampling, and phw(M) is the time needed
by each hardware particle filter to extract the probability density from the sample set of
the track. In comparison to the time needed by a pure software solution, as shown in
(3.13), the number of tracks Nt does not play a major role anymore as does the number of
samples M . Furthermore chw and dhw are close to independent of the number of samples
M .
This is due to the fact that the independent data association probability of a sample and
the weight of a sample can be calculated independent from other samples in the sample set
of the track. The prototype implements a low variance resampling algorithm that is linear
to the number of samplesM . The time needed for the extraction of the probability density
is also linear, with respect to the number of samplesM , in the prototype implementation.
Fig. 3.26 shows the time needed for the execution of the algorithm by the two systems.
For the calculation of the values shown in the plot constants in Figure (3.12) are 10,
constants in Figure (3.13) are 1 to account for the lower clock rate of the FPGA, and the
number of samples N is 1000 for both equations. Kt and Nt are given on the x-axis and
y-axis of the plot.
The hardware solution outperforms the software solution for the majority of cases. Under
the assumption of a full joint data association probability (FJDAP) , often desirable in
robotic scenarios, the formulas need to be changed to:
KtNtcKtM +KtNta+KtNtdM +NtzM +NtpM (3.13)
for the software solution, and to
Ktchw +KtNta+Ktdhw + zhw(M) + phw(M) (3.14)
for the hardware solution. To make the estimate more robust and account for the reduced
computation overhead, optimized control, and data flow of the hardware, the speed advan-
tage of the software solution has been changed to factor 2 and the formal time complexity
has been estimated also with these values. The results are shown in the lower row of
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Figure 3.26: Comparison of the (formal) time complexity for tracking multiple objects
with a hardware solution (red), a hardware-software solution (green), and a software
solution (yellow). The hardware-software solution performs significantly better than the
software solution despite the high transmission delays assumed for the calculation.
Figure 3.26. It can be seen that for a, with respect to the robotics and automotive ap-
plication domain, reasonable numbers of tracks and features the hardware solution has a
complexity advantage of more than 1000 in extreme cases, and of 10 to 100 in the majority
of cases.
Performance Estimation for a hardware-software solution
Some of the operations needed during the normalization of the data, the conversion in
the common representational format (CRF), and the calculation of the data association
are algorithmically complex and can be executed very efficient in software. Fortunately
some of the concepts are orthogonal and it is possible to distribute multi object particle
filter to hardware and software components. This allows a faster and more convenient
implementation of the algorithm and adds greater flexibility to the solution. Changes in
software components and in the hardware components do not require a re-engineering of
the other components as long as the interfaces are untouched, because of the orthogonality
of the concepts.
The calculation of the time complexity of such a solution needs to account for the com-
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munication delay that could be neglected in the time complexity calculations of the pure
hardware and software solutions where communication delays where not significant. The
following equation, where Dhwsw denotes the delay during hardware to software transmis-
sions and Dswhw denotes the communication delay in the other direction, estimates the time
complexity of the hardware-software solution. For the calculation broadcast messages are
allowed. Again chw is the time needed by each hardware particle filter to calculate the
independent data association probability of the track given a feature, dhw is the time
needed by each hardware particle filter to update the track given a feature, zhw(M) is the
time needed each hardware particle filter for the importance sampling, and phw(M) is the
time needed by each hardware particle filter to extract the probability density from the
sample set of the track.
KtD
sw
hw +Ktchw +KtNtDhwsw +KtNta+tDswhw +Ktdhw + zhw(M) + phw(M) +tDhwsw (3.15)
Depending on the means of communication the delay induced by the transmission may
be negligible, if for example the hardware is attached via pcie-bus. Other means of com-
munication provide more freedom with respect to the integration of the system but may
induce longer transmission delays. For example TCP/IP transmission allows the flexible
local area network wide distribution of the hardware the length of the transmission delay
will be in the order of milliseconds. Figure 3.26 shows the influence of the transmission
delay on the time complexity of the system is not as strong as one might expect. The
hardware-software solution is significantly faster than the software solution.
3.2.3 Hardware-Software Information Interfaces
Figure 3.27: Locations of hardware-software-interfaces. Nodes in the problem graph that
are bound to the pc104 and the fpga_tracker distribute their functionality and require
hardware-software-interfaces to transmit data between hardware and software.
When realizing a hardware software tracking system the interfaces between hardware and
software are very important. The formal interfaces were developed as soon as possible in
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the stage of conceptual development, with respect to the various processes that involved
the hardware and software components and the requirements and topology of the accord-
ing problem graphs. The problem graph was refined during the later development process,
and the interface was adopted according to the changes made during the refinement.
The initial formal interfaces were derived from the refined problem graph bound to a
suitable architecture graph as in Figure 3.2.3. Since the focus is on exchange of information
between hardware and software components only the formal interfaces for these parts
are discussed here. With respect to the tasks needed for tracking multiple objects the
individual trackers need to provide the following services:
• Initialize a new track with given parameters
• Return the independent data association probability (IDAP) of a track and an
observation given an observation.
• Update an existing track given an observation a data association probability.
• Provide a compact representation of the probability density of the tracks state.
• Provide a prediction of the tracks probability density to predict track movements.
• Delete an existing track.
To keep the implementation convenient the message format was chosen in such a way
that the size of the format is always the same. There are 3 types of messages, 1 from the
software to the hardware and 2 from the hardware to the software. Communications are
always initialized from the software side.
The communication scheme, as developed during the prototypical FPGA implementation,
for the initialization of track is shown in Figure 3.28. The communications between
hardware and software during the life cycle of a track are:
1. The software receives a sensor observation from a sensor.
2. The software needs to instantiate a new track and sends an unassigned observation
as broadcast message with the observation to the connected hardware trackers.
3. Because the message is unassigned the trackers calculate and return the IDAP. If the
tracker is not initialized it returns the value -1 to indicate its uninitialized status.
4. Once the software has received the answers of all trackers it calculates the joint data
association probability and, if the observation could not be assigned to any existing
track, sends the assigned observation ( marked by the id of the unassigned tracker)
as a broadcast message to the connected hardware trackers.
5. The uninitialized tracker reacts on the observation assigned to it and initializes the
track with parameters based on the observation.
6. The following steps a repeated until the tracker does not receive any more observa-
tions originating from the tracked object.
(a) The software receives a sensor observation from a sensor.
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Figure 3.28: Communications during the initialization of a track. The chart is from the
report on the initial development of the prototype [14].
(b) The software sends an unassigned observation as broadcast message with the
observation to the connected hardware trackers.
(c) Trackers calculate and return the IDAP.
(d) Software calculates JDAP from the received IDAPs.
(e) Software sends assigned observations to trackers.
(f) Trackers integrate assigned observations and send back a normal distribution
approximation of the tracks probability distribution.
7. There where no observations assigned to the track for such a long time that it is
most likely that the object has left the area, the software broadcasts a message with
the id of the track to remove the track.
8. The hardware with the according id returns to an uninitialized state.
To support these operations the messages were defined in the following way.
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Software to hardware: The following data is sufficient, when using a clever commu-
nication scheme and overloading data fields, to do all the necessary communications with
the hardware needed to realize the operations as defined above.
• The Joint data association probability, values outside the interval [0,1] are used for
control messages.
• The id of the tracker (receiver) (0 = broadcast), and the id of the track.
• The measurement header consisting of: The id of the sensor that made the ob-
servation, the time-stamp of the measurement with seconds and microseconds, the
number of the measurement, and the series of the measurement.
• The mean of the measurement.
• The covariance of the measurement.
• The determinant of the covariance matrix.
• The inverse of the covariance matrix.
• The TAG matrix.
Hardware to software: There are two types of messages send from the hardware to
the software. One is used for the intermediate calculation of the joint data association
probability and the other to report the state of a tracked object.
• The independent data association probability (-1 if not initialized, else sum of
weights).
• The id of the tracker (receiver) and the id of the track (negative if no track assigned).
• The measurement header consisting of: The id of the sensor that made the ob-
servation, the time-stamp of the measurement with seconds and microseconds, the
number of the measurement, and the series of the measurement.
The tracker must also provide an normal probability density function approximating the
state of the tracked object so the software or other superordinate instances can use the
information. In addition to the probability density function the probability that the track
really exists is returned and also the data needed to map the report to the according
object and time.
• The probability that the track exists. This is important for the track management
that relies on this information to decide which track are to be uninitialized.
• The id of the tracker (receiver) and the id of the track (negative if no track assigned).
• A time-stamp including seconds and microseconds that determines the time of the
tracks state estimate in the common time line.
• A normal distribution approximation of the tracks state.
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3.3 Inclusion of Domain Specific Information
A requirement for a general embedded tracking system is that it is easily adoptable
to different application scenarios, and that it can be integrated with minimal support
into existing systems. The inclusion of domain specific or application scenario specific
background information allows the adoption of the general tracking process to specific
tracking problems, and it can enhance the performance of the tracking significantly.
3.3.1 Dynamic Sensor Uncertainty Maps
The uncertainty of sensors is often not fixed for a given tracking scenario, but it changes
depending on the location of the measurement, the object measured, and environmental
conditions that influence the measurement. The following example will explain this effect.
In recent studies on the performance of multilateral (MLAT) position detection [78, 77]
it was found that the accuracy of the measurements decreased as more aircraft were in
the area of the measurement. This may be a possible result of multi path reflections
from the surfaces of the aircraft. Also the uncertainty is depended on the location of the
measurement as the uncertainty plot in Figure 3.29 illustrates. Because of the positioning
of the MLAT transceivers and the location of buildings etc. the uncertainty varies at
different parts of the runway entrance. The plot is based on the original data from the
Narita airport provided by the authors of the above studies. If the tracking does not
consider the local uncertainty the results of the tracking are inaccurate and may even be
misleading.
Another example is from the robotics domain. The authors of a study [74] show that the
uncertainty of measurements used for the localization of a mobile robot are depended on
the position of the robot in its environment. They improved the quality of the localization
by integrating the local uncertainty into the tracking algorithm.
In order to integrate the local uncertainty the hardware needs to support dynamic uncer-
tainty adjustments of the uncertainty of connected sensors. Because the integration of the
representation of the uncertainty map is quite complex under the aspect of concurrency,
the hardware only supports individual uncertainty per measurement, which is sufficient
to allow the insertion of the sensors measurements local uncertainty by software.
3.3.2 Object State Transition Dynamics
Besides the uncertainty of measurements one of the most domain dependent aspects of
tracking is the behavior of tracked objects. The behavior of cars depends strongly on the
road topology, the traffic situation, and other circumstances. Drivers will hardly behave
the same on a parking lot, in city traffic, or at the highway not to mention influences such
as rush hour or traffic jam. Also the physical characteristics of the traffic participants
influence the behavior. A sports car or a motor cycle will accelerate much faster than a
truck.
Robots interacting with humans and autonomously navigating in domestic environments
have to ensure that their movement is no risk to humans. While it might be sufficient to
employ reactive control to avoid collisions with pedestrians in a shopping mall, a robot
moving on the sidewalk will not be able to avoid collisions without a reasonable good
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Figure 3.29: Local uncertainty values of MLAT measurements. The plot shows that the
uncertainty of the measurements increase and decrease in correlation with the location of
the vehicle as it travels along the taxiway.
An interesting application of domain specific dynamics is the derivation of the semantics
of the environment based on the behavior of the tracks. Particle filter can be easily
extended to support domain information by adding a domain field to the probability
density function space, see [100]. The filter then estimates the likelihood of the domain
or a specific behavior/maneuver based on the movement of the vehicle.
Vehicle and Domain specific State Transitions
For these reasons it is recommendable to use vehicle specific state transition matrices
that capture the usual behavior of a vehicle with respect to its physical constraints and
the environment. The most simple support is the hardware support of the update of
the tracked objects state transition matrix. A state transition matrix is description of
the parameters of a state transition function that is implemented in the hardware. By
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changing the matrix, and therefore the parameters, the state transition of the object can
be influenced according to the object type and or domain.
Implications for the formal system architecture
The inclusion of domain specific context in the tracking system requires that the hard-
ware’s algorithms make use of methods that can be tuned to model the circumstances of
specific domains by a set of parameters, which affect the mathematical calculations and
algorithmic behavior of the hardware based tracking of individual objects. Therefore, in
order to support the incorporation of domain specific information, the formal interface
should include the data necessary to update according models on the hardware side during
run time. The details on the realization of the domain specific support are explained in
Chapter 4.
3.4 Summary
This chapter applied the theories, methods, and insights of the previous chapter on em-
bedding multi modal sensor data fusion to the problem of efficiently tracking multiple
objects using hardware and software. The basic formal models, algorithms, architecture,
partitioning, and interfaces for the system were introduced and motivated. While the
rest of the task to be done seems to be an engineering problem, it will quickly become
apparent that this is not the case. As always with engineering problems there are plenty
opportunities to do scientific work and find a new, better way to deal with problems than
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4.1 Introducion
A particle filter is a non parametric implementation of the Bayes Filter. For tracking and
localization in the robotic domain particle filters have a lot of interesting properties, and
many works have been published on the topic of tracking and data fusion with particle
filters [25] [39] [47] [96] [85]. The most interesting property is the ability to approximate
any parametric representation of a distribution using a finite set of samples. This is
very important in robotic applications where tracked objects often do not exhibit a linear
behavior. Also sensor measurements and detected features might have different kinds
of parametric uncertainty distributions, which makes it difficult to apply them to single
parametric probability distribution like a Gaussian distribution in a Kalman filter used for
system state estimation. Nevertheless particle filters can integrate information presented
as closed form parametric probability distributions. This flexibility allows a very efficient
implementation architecture of a distributed tracking system.
4.1.1 State of the Art
There are numerous works on particle filters and their mathematical and algorithmic
properties. The accuracy and error of particle filters is an active field of research. The
performance of particle filters can be estimated in comparison to the optimal filter. The
optimal filter is, except for a very restricted set of dynamic models not expressible in a
closed form. It has been shown that the upper bound on the variance of estimation error
depends on the number of samples M , and has the form c · O(M−1) that is independent
to the number of dimensions of the sample state space, but it has also been shown that
the constant c heavily depends on the state vector dimension [21, 19]. The grow of c is
linear to the number of dimensions with a good importance density respectively proposal
distribution; with a bad proposal distribution the variance of error becomes exponential
to the dimension of the state vector. This “curse of dimensionality” has been experienced
in many practical applications [91] and also applies to robotic applications like tracking or
pose estimation. While tracking stationary objects on a 2 dimensional map requires only
3 dimensional state vector, tracking moving objects in a 3 dimensional volume requires
a 12 dimensional state vector. Therefore a high number of samples is necessary to keep
the error small and enable the robot to achieve its goals when dealing with complex
environments like domestic surroundings. FPGAs have been used to implement particle
filters [118, 45] for various application areas, and it has been shown that some parts of
the algorithm can be executed concurrently, but i have not found publications on the
implementation specialized for small autonomous robots.
4.1.2 The Concurrent PFA
This subsection describes the conversion of the sequential particle filter algorithm Particle
Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt) to an algorithm that supports partial concurrent execution.
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Algorithm Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt):
1 Xt = Xt = ∅;
2 for m = 1 to M do
3 sample x[m]t ∼ p(xt|ut, x[m]t−1);
4 w
[m]
t = p(zt|x[m]t );
5 Xt = Xt + (x[m]t , w
[m]
t );
6 for m = 1 to M do
7 draw i with probability ∝ w[m]t ;
8 add x[i]t to Xt;
9 return Xt;
The idea of a particle filter is to represent the probability distribution of a system state
at time t, with a finite set of samples Xt, where the density of the samples approximates
the probability distribution. In a particle filter the samples are called particles and are
usually denoted as xt ∈ Xt. Each particle is a hypothesis to what the true state of the
system may be at time t. Attached to each sample xt is a weight wt. The weight is
important because it is used to approximate the target probability distribution, using the
technique of importance sampling. The core of the algorithm of the particle filter is shown
in the Algorithm Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt) and works as follows: The particle filter takes
a sample set Xt−1, information about the transition probability ut, the observations zt
and returns a new sample set Xt approximating the probability density function of the
current system state. The first part of the algorithm is analog to the Bayes filter, in
line 3 the transition function is applied and then, in line 4, the observation is applied
by calculating the weight of the sample. In lines 6 through 8 the algorithm draws with
replacementM particles from a temporary set Xt. The probability of drawing a particle is
given by its importance weight. This technique is known as “resampling “ or “importance
sampling”. The interesting part, with respect to a concurrent implementation, of the
filter are the "for" loops. The first loop ,lines 2 - 5, and the second loop, lines 6 - 8,
are well suited for a single instruction multiple data (SIMD) computer implementation.
However the standard architecture models for SIMD computers , the arrayprocessor and
the vectorprocessor, cannot be applied directly to the problem due to the probabilistic
nature of the algorithm that raises some issues requiring special treatment which affects
the architecture.
Concurrency
The timing of the serial computation of the PFA is similar to the one shown in Figure 4.1,
where a single general purpose processor (GPP) is used to execute the operations of the
PFA. While the GPP is seldom idle, the time needed to execute the PFA can, depending
on the number of samples, become quite long.
Basically a custom or semi-custom PLD implementation offers the freedom of imple-
menting multiple single purpose processors (SPP) allowing the concurrent execution of
the different operations in the particle filter algorithm. However due to the nature of
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Figure 4.1: Timing of the serial execution of the PFA by a General Purpose Processor.
the mathematical model the parallel implementation of the resampling has been only
partly successful [87]. The resulting concurrent algorithm is listed in Algorithm Con-
current Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt). The primary difference is the introduction of the
variable K that represents the number of SPP used for the sample update and the cal-
culation of the sample weight. Thus the CPFA algorithm iterates the first loop for M
K
times and does the update and sample weight calculation for K samples in parallel.
Algorithm Concurrent Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt):
1 Xt = Xt = ∅;
2 for m = 1 to M
K
do
3 for m = 1 to K concurrently do
4 sample x[m+k]t ∼ p(xt|ut, x[m+k]t−1 );
5 w
[m+k]
t = p(zt|x[m+tkt );
6 Xt = Xt + (x[m+k]t , w
[m+k]
t );
7 for m = 1 to M do
8 draw i with probability ∝ w[m]t ;
9 add x[i]t to Xt;
10 return Xt;
The second loop is often kept serial for a number of reasons. The most important is
that, because of the nature of the underlying mathematical model, the importance sam-
pling must use the normalized sample weight w[m]t that is only accessible after all sample
weights have been calculated. Therefore there is no published solution to fully integrate
the importance sampling in the update-sample-weight-loop. Another reason is that the
overhead for coordination of the importance sampling grows with K and requires more
resources. Unless there are as many processing units (PUs) as samples , so K = M ,
intermediate storage is required for the samples. In this case samples are stored in RAM
which usually does not support to write data parallel to multiple addresses, which would
effectively serialize a parallel importance sampling. On the other hand, if K = M then
no intermediate storage is required as all samples data is kept in the PUs. The prob-
lem that arises here is to distribute the sample data from one PU to another PU for M
PUs concurrently. While this is theoretically possible for arbitrary sized sample sets, the
resources required for reasonable sized sample set are impractical, because the required
bus needs a bandwidth of (M − 1)2 · size(sample) bit per clock, e.g. A sample set with
500 samples represented by 224 bit requires app. 6800 MB per clk bandwidth, a sample
set with 128 samples still requires app. 440 MB per clk bandwidth. Thus resampling is
mostly done serial and some of the computational units remain idle during the execution
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of the PFL for a part of the time, see Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Timing of the parallel execution of the update and sample weight calculation
with a serial resampling.
Another factor that contributes to the time in which computational resources are not
used is the rate of observations compared to the speed of the concurrent particle filter
algorithm (CPFA). The frequency of sensor observations zt that need to be integrated in
the tracking is, with respect to the speed of the most parallel implementation of the PFA,
comparatively low, but the large number of SPP requires a lot of chip area. Against this
background the pipe lining of the algorithm offers a lot of advantages. Figure 4.3 shows
the timing of a partially pipelined execution of the algorithm where 4 SPP’s dedicated to
the update procedure perform the upgrade of 4 samples concurrently and the resulting
samples are processed by another SPP dedicated to the calculation of the sample weight.
After the completion of the partly parallel pipeline the resampling is done by a SPP
dedicated to the importance sampling.
Figure 4.3: Timeschedule of the particle filter algorithm in a concurrent, pipelined archi-
tecture.
The most important variables that govern the efficient realization of the overall architec-
ture are the total execution time and the total chip area needed. In order to achieve an
optimal implementation one needs to consider the nature of the individual operations of
the algorithm with respect to the chosen mathematical models. All mathematical mod-
els can be broken down into the most basic operations addition, subtraction, division,
and multiplication. The mathematical models that have been introduced in the previous
chapter rely on vector and matrix multiplications for booth sample update and sample
weight calculation. Thus, while the implementation of these steps requires separate finite
state machines for the control, arithmetic, and logic units can be shared.
4.1.3 FPGA Number Representation
In order to achieve a maximum performance and accuracy many samples are needed, the
more the better. For application in small robots logic cell usage, power consumption and
heat dissipation must be kept at a reasonable level.
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When dealing with the design of massive parallel computation hardware the format chosen
for the representation of numbers is an important design decision. One of the more
important factors that guide the decision are the dynamic range and resolution of the
format, with respect to range and precision needed in the computation of the algorithms
in front of the background of the application context. This affects not only the range
of the input and output values of the system, intermediate calculations also need to be
considered. These are discussed in detail in the following Section 4.2. Floating point
representations offer a wider dynamic range and dynamic precision, but the results of
mathematical operations like multiplication, division, addition, or subtraction are not
necessarily sound within the dynamic range. Fixed point representations do not suffer
from arithmetic errors during addition and subtraction if the result remains within the
range of the representation, but the dynamic range is considerably low compared to
floating point representations when using the same number of bits for both formats.
Another point are the cost of the mathematical operations in time, chip area, and power
consumption. Research that performed comparative studies found that on modern FPGA
devices the cost for fixed point addition and subtraction are significantly lower in the above
mentioned terms. The cost for multiplication and division of fixed point numbers are
moderately lower compared to the cost of the same operations on floating point numbers
[37]. Here the time needed for floating point multiplications can be reduced significantly
using pipe lining, but at the expense of chip area. According to the results published in [37]
addition of a 32-bit floating point number requires app. 14 times more chip area than the
addition of 32-bit fixed point numbers and requires app. 6-7 times more energy. Results
for multiplication show that a 32-bit floating point multiplication requires app 2,5 times
more chip area and app 1,3 times more power than a 32-bit fixed point implementation.
These results are shown in a comparative chart in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Normalized comparative chart of the power consumption and chip area needed
for the addition and multiplication of 32-bit fixed and floating point numbers.
The larger amount of time, chip area, and power needed is mostly a result of the computa-
tional overhead required for the floating point operations, particularly the normalization.
This overhead can be reduced significantly in pipelined complex operations like matrix
multiply, where serial aspects inherent to the mathematical algorithm do not allow for a
full parallelism. Therefore some scientist suggest using a mix of fixed and floating point
66
numbers in complex calculations [22]. Given the properties of the concurrent particle
filter algorithm and the application context chip area, power consumption, and heat dis-
sipation are significant design constraints. The advantage achieved through the usage of
fixed point representations was estimated in between 5-10 times more processing units
when using fixed point representations while consuming about only as much as half of the
power at the beginning of the development. The nature of the application scenario and
the mathematical models involved in the necessary calculations also support the usage of
fixed point numbers. Thus fixed point number representations have been chosen for the
FPGA implementation of the particle filter algorithm. For most of the calculations 32 bit
values are used. The interpretation of the numbers depends on the usage, so positions
are interpreted as 22 bit integer and 10 bit fractional part to cover a medium area with
reasonable accuracy. For probabilities almost all bits represent the fractional part. The
fixed point number representation of the numbers involved in the computation intensify
some problems encountered with digital implementations of particle filters and require a
special treatment and an adaption of the particle filter algorithm. As the focus of the
research is on the mathematical and algorithmic aspects of the concurrent implementa-
tion the value size was not optimized in the prototypical implementation due to time
constraints, although this would have led to a better performance as shown later in this
chapter.
4.2 Implementation Architecture
This section describes the architecture of the FPGA particle filter (FPF), based on the
previous discussion of the concurrent particle filter algorithm and the formal implemen-
tation architecture. The section begins with a description of the architecture and the
components and continues mapping the architectures components to the serial PFA and
concurrent PFA, providing an in depth description of the different parts of the hardware
that implement the different parts of the algorithms.
4.2.1 Architecture Overview
The Architecture has two main components: The first component is the NIOS Softcore
Processor with peripheral interfaces, the second component is the particle filter logic
(PFL). The consists of the following VHDL components, the actual layout in on the
FPGA is shown in Figure 4.5:
• pf_top: The top level component that controls all of the other components and is
responsible for the execution of the PFA.
• lfsr_generic: random_component: Generates random numbers. Random numbers
are needed in various stages of the particle filter algorithm.
• sample_weight_processor: SWP_inst: Computes sample weights. This unit com-
putes the weight w of a given sample with respect to a given sensor observation.
• bus_manager: Manages the routing of data between the components of the PFL
according on the state of the PFL. This enables the usage of the same data lines for
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Figure 4.5: A possible layout of the components in the chip planner.
different purposes during the various stages of the CPFA, which results in a smaller
chip area required for the interconnecting signals.
• count_particles: This instance is required for the application in a special airport
traffic surveillance scenario. It counts the samples on either side of a virtual line.
• mean: Computes the - 6 dimensional - mean of the sample set. This functionality
is required to communicate the probability distribution of the samples in a compact
for to superordinate instances.
• particles0-3: particles_inst: These components perform the update and initializa-
tion steps of the CPFA.
• particles_loader: This component is responsible for loading samples from the sample
storage and saving updated samples in the storage.
• resample: Implements the resampling step of the particle filter algorithm.
• serial_to_mem: Stores data received by the serial interface to the PFL memory
and fetches data requested by the serial interface from the PFL memory.
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• single_port_ram: The PFL internal memory (sample storage) where the sample
set is stored.
Figure 4.6: Architecture of the FPGA particle filter implementation.
4.2.2 Representation of Samples
Each sample x[m]t in the sample set Xt represents a point in the state space of the system,
in this case a mobile object. Based on the results during the initial feasibility study [100]
a subset of the state space variables that is sufficient to model movements on a flat map
has been chosen for the prototype implementation. Previous work has shown that errors
induced by barrel projection of airports the size of the Hamburg Airport do not negatively
affect the tracking [100]. A 3 dimensional representation would require a 12 dimensional
sample state space, which is unfavorable due to the properties of the PFA discusses earlier
in this section. The subset is mathematically a six element vector x[m]t = (tx, ty, θ, t˙x, t˙y, θ˙)
that includes:
1. 2D-Translation: tx and ty encode the position of the vehicle on a flat map.
2. Heading: The orientation of the vehicle on the map is stored in θ.
3. 2D-Translation Speed: t˙x and t˙y encode the change in translation over time of the
vehicle.
4. Rotation Speed: The change in orientation over time is given by θ˙.
Each value of x[m]t is stored as a 32-bit number, semantically interpreted as fixed point,
where 10 bits are used for the fractional part and 22 bits are used for the integer part and
sign. On a meter scale this results in a precision of app. 1 millimeter and a map with a
range of +-2097 km in x and y direction.
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Representation of position and speed
Figure 4.7: The speed-position precision problem. The circles mark the discrete positions
representable by a sample. If the translation speed of a sample is to slow - with respect
to the given update rate and the sample position precision - the sample remains at its
position.
This uniform 32-bit representation, which is used in the prototype for the sake of a timely
implementation, is not really needed for many application scenarios. For most application
scenarios the samples do not spread across a wide area and only a limited precision is
needed. For most applications a reasonable area of surveillance is so big that a target
of interest speed limit enables multiple measurements of the target. Therefore the speed
x˙, y˙ requires about 3 bit less for the integer part compared to the integer part of the
position x, y. The size of the fractional part of the speed and the position depends on
the accuracy needed in the application scenario and on the movement update interval of
the samples. If the samples speed is very low and the update interval is high, then the
movement of the target is cut away and the samples stick to their position if the fractional
part is to small. As a rule of thumb, most application scenarios track mobiles that are
either moving with a reasonable speed or not moving at all. A mobile moving very slow
will produce many observations and the movement update can be neglected, because in
such a case the sample set converges on the true position by replacing samples stuck to
the old position with samples stuck to the new position. Therefore the fractional part of
the speed should be chosen such that the reasonable minimal speed of moving mobiles
can be represented1. The fractional part of the position needs to be chosen such that the
samples can move from their current position to the next given the fractional part of the
speed and the update rate during the tracking2. Figure 4.7 illustrates this fact. Another
requirement is that the precision of the position must be chosen in such a way that the
main moment of the probability density function of a sensor measurement spreads across
multiple discrete position points. Also the heading θ requires only a signed 3 bit integer
to cover the interval [-pi, pi] and 12 bit fractional part should be enough for most tracking
1E.g.: Airport Ground Traffic surveillance with meter-decimeter per second.
2E.g.: Decimeter-centimeter for Airport ground traffic surveillance.
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scenarios 3. Except for tumbling target scenarios the rotation speed θ˙ is expected to reside
within the same range as the heading θ.
Representation of the sample weights
Attached to each sample x[m]t is a weight w
[m]
t that represents the quality of the sample
or probability of the state of the sample given the course of observations of the vehicle;
formally: The weight wt of a sample xt in a sample set Xt is determined by the probability
p(zt|xt) of a sensor observation zt given xt. Due to the discrete sampling point nature
of the particle p(xt) is 1 and p(zt|xt) = zt(xt)4. In the prototype implementation the
default interpretation using 22 bit integer and 10 bit fractional part hast been chosen
for the reason of timely implementation. This is not optimal because a, with respect to
the optimal usage of the fixed point representation, reasonable chosen probability density
function (PDF) should have no value equal to or bigger than 1 at any point, and the
fractional part can be reduced appropriate to the PDFs of the sensors in the application
scenario. The fractional part must be chosen in such a way that the resulting discretized
PDF has a main moment that is a stair and not a plateau, which is required to ensure
that the particle filter converges to the true posterior.
Figure 4.8: Influence of the fixed point representation of the weight of the sample on
sensor measurement probability density function discretization. Depending on the unit
of measurement and the uncertainty of the sensor the different representation are not
equally suited to represent the probability.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the difference between the weight wt of a sample xt in a sample set
Xt and the real probability of the system state represented by the sample for a selection of
fixed point number representations. Depending on the distribution of the samples across
the systems state space, the probabilities of the samples given an observation p(zt|xt)
can be very different, and it happens that the weight is not equal to the probability of
the sample given the observation, so wi 6= p(zt|xt). If for example p = 2−34 and only 32
3Most sensors provide a much smaller resolution when detecting the heading of an object.
4This requires a normalization to ensure that the sum of sample weights satisfies the law of total
probability, and treating Xt as a delta distribution. The simplification is not sound for in general, but
only for specific models and algorithms like the particle filter and only under constrained circumstances.
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digits are available for the fixed point representation, then the weight is zero - wt = 0
- because fractional bits representing the number are cut off. This can result in a loss
of information that can be considered a systematic error. Furthermore a sample weight
of 0 is an important case of error, because it can cause arithmetic errors during the
normalization of the sample weights. On the contrary a too limited scale for the state
space of the sample can result in an unreasonable high probability not representable by
the fixed point number, wt > 2maxbit. Both phenomenons require a special treatment to
ensure optimal accuracy and convergence of the particle filter.
Table 4.1: Comparison of the sample representation for different application scenarios.
Scenario Value integer fractional range precision
Prototype x 22 10 +-2097 km millimeter
Prototype y 22 10 +-2097 km millimeter
Prototype θ 22 10 +- 667kpi microradians
Prototype x˙ 22 10 +-2097 km/s millimeter/second
Prototype y˙ 22 10 +-2097 m/s millimeter/second
Prototype θ˙ 22 10 +-667kpi microradians/second
Prototype weight 22 10 2097k 1/1024
Prototype sum 156 70 4497409 km2 millimeter
AGTS x 12 7 +-2048 meter centimeter
AGTS y 12 7 +-2048 meter centimeter
AGTS θ 3 12 +- pi microradians
AGTS x˙ 9 4 +-256 m/s decimeter/second
AGTS y˙ 9 4 +-256 m/s decimeter/second
AGTS θ˙ 3 12 +-pi microradians/second
AGTS weight 0 16 1 1/65536
AGTS sum 48 62 4 km2 centimeter
RoboCup x 5 10 +-16 meter millmeter
RoboCup y 5 10 +-16 meter millmeter
RoboCup θ 3 8 +- pi milliradians
RoboCup x˙ 4 7 +-8 m/s centimeter/second
RoboCup y˙ 4 7 +-8 m/s centimeter/second
RoboCup θ˙ 3 8 +-pi milliradians/second
RoboCup weight 0 12 1 1/4096
RoboCup sum 24 62 1024 m2 millimeter
4.2.3 State Transition Update
The state transition update (STU), shown as boxes labeled “update” in Figure 4.6, com-
putes the line 3 of the PFA (see Algorithm Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt)):
At this point of the PFA the sample state is updated based on the previous sample state
and the state transition probability of the sample state over time. The state transition
update is done in a dedicated hardware entity, because it’s mathematical model and it’s
implementation is, except for the sample representation, a concept orthogonal to the
rest of the concepts of the particle filter. The update only depends on the information
contained in the sample and the time difference between the last sample update time and
72
Algorithm Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt):
1 Xt = Xt = ∅;
2 for m = 1 to M do








6 for m = 1 to M do







the current sample update time. The update procedure may be changed and auxiliary and
background knowledge may be included without the need to change other components of
the particle filter logic.
In the prototype the update is realized as a matrix operation. Here the vector x[m]t−1, which
is given by state represented by the mth sample, is multiplied with the state transition
matrix A∆t that encodes how each of the state variables evolves and affect each other





t−1 · A∆t (4.1)
The equation with the state transition matrix for a plane might look, given that tx, ty, t˙x, t˙y,




















1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
∆t 0 0 1 0 0
0 ∆t 0 0 1 0
0 0 ∆t 0 0 1

(4.2)
Here ∆t is the time difference in seconds. The state transition matrix A can be read
from the bus concurrently by each STU, which allows to switch or modify state transition
matrices by software as needed. The orientation θ requires special treatment during the
extraction of the probability density function, because the values must be normalized into
the interval [−pi, pi) for a sound representation. Usually the PSA requires the addition of
some Gaussian noise to the samples to prevent the duplication of particles. In favor of
computational resources this is not implemented but rather a part of the sample set is
replaced by samples generated from sensor measurements. The details are explained in
the following text.
Process Noise Addition Workaround
The original particle filter assumes the addition of unbiased normal distributed noise
during the sample update. There are two main reasons for this:
1. Normal distributed process noise: For many application scenarios the process model
is influenced by Gaussian distributed noise. The noise results from a large number of
random distributed microscopic influences on the process that sum up to a Gaussian
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distributed influence on the process. A good example is a car driving on a straight
road; the constitution of the road and the car force the route of the car to slowly
deviate from the roads center line. Therefore an appropriate mathematical model
should capture these aspects of the system.
2. Sample deprivation: If the samples are not varied the importance sampling leads to
a duplication of the samples with the highest weights. If no noise is added to the
values of the samples, the variance of the values decreases until all samples share
the same value.
A possible solution to overcome both of this problems is to replace a random subset of the
sample set with samples generated from sensor observations. The samples are generated
by adding equally distributed noise to the mean of the observation. This increases the
variance of the sample set, and at the same time it counters the slower rate of convergence
that is a side effect of the alternative zero weight handling discussed later in this section.
4.2.4 Sample Weight Processor
Figure 4.9: Integration of the sample weight processor (SWP) units into the particle filter
logic (PFL). Single data, which is the same for all SWP operations, is transmitted via an
internal bus. Multiple data like samples are received from a sample storage.
The sample weight processor (SWP) is a central component of the FPF. It contributes the
most to the concurrent computation of the particle filter algorithm (PFA). While the place
and function of the SWP in the architecture with respect to the PFA is straightforward,
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the VHDL implementation of the SWP has to be done under a a lot of constraints.
These constraints result in a violation of the mathematical theory on which the PFA is
based on. The effects of these violations are analyzed and discussed later in this section.
The SWP computes the line 4 of the PFA (see Algorithm Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt)).
Algorithm Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt):
1 Xt = Xt = ∅






t = p(zt|x[m]t )




6 for m = 1 to M do






Here the weight w[m]t of a sample x
[m]
t is given by the probability of the sensor measurement
zt, under the assumption that the vehicles state is given by x[m]t . For sensor observations
a normal distributed error is assumed, where the bias is removed by software before
transmission to the FPGA. Thus zt is made up from a mean vector µ and the covariance
matrix Σ. The probability p(zt|x[m]t ) is then given by the equation 4.3.









The FPGA supports 6 dimensions but sensors do not necessarily provide information
about all the dimensions. Therefore the FPGA must compute the weight with possibly
incomplete information. This would require 26 − 1 dedicated functions for every possible
configuration of sensor inputs. In order to use just one function the following method
has been developed that works as follows: The sensor data is transmitted as vector µ5 of
size m describing the mean of the measurement and a covariance matrix Σ6 of size m,m
describing the error of the measurement and an additional matrix T 7 of size m,m that
indicates which dimensions are actually measured by the sensor. For example a SMR














σtx σtx,ty 0 0 0 0
σty ,tx σty 0 0 0 0
0 12pi 0 0 0
0 0 0 12pi 0 0
0 0 0 0 12pi 0





1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

By multiplying the deviation between the mean µ and the system state x with the matrix
T the same probability can be computed with one function instead of having to use
5µ contains 0 for unknown state variables.
6σ contains 1 for unknown state variables.
7The indexes for T are actually transmitted as a vector, but to save hardware resources the actual
computation uses the matrix multiplication unit that is also used for the other vector multiplications
with matrices.
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individual functions for all possible combination of measured dimensions. The function is
shown in Equation 4.4 and the proof is given later in this section.






t −µ)·T )Σ−1((x[m]t −µ)·T )T
)
(4.4)
This equation is partially computed on the FPGA particle filter and partially on the
software providing the sensor measurements.
1. det(2piΣ)− 12 : The determinant of the covariance matrix Σ is calculated in software
and transmitted to the FPGA. The reason is the computational complexity and the
errors induced by the precision of the number representation.
2. Σ−1: The inverse of the covariance matrix Σ is also computed in software and
transmitted to the FPGA. The reason is the computational complexity and the
errors induced by the precision of the number representation.
3. (x[m]t −µ) ·T : The difference between the sensor observation mean µ and the sample
x
[m]
t followed by the multiplication with T is computed in the SWP.
4. ey: The straightforward computation of exponential function ey is computationally





k! , y ∈ R (4.5)
Therefore a mathematical trick is used. The exponential function is computed on
the SWP by means of a precompiled look-up table that contains 360 values in the
range of [e0, eln(2)], in steps of 0.002. This is possible because the argument y for
the exponential function is always negative which results in a in ey ∈ [0, 1]. The
range of the output function and the reasonable range of the input values allow a
mathematical conversion to approximate the value ey with a minor loss of precision
if we assume that y is the sum of x and z:
ey = ex+z = ex · ez (4.6)
where we can, because of
ey = ey−p·ln(2) · 2p (4.7)
, approximate ez by 2p
ey = ex+z = ex · 2p (4.8)
given that z = p · ln(2) and x = y − z;x ∈ [0, ln(2)], so p most be chosen such that
the condition x ∈ [0, ln(2)] is satisfied.
If y ∈ [0, ln(2)] than p is 0 and ey = ex ∗ 20, but this is always true because y is
always negative. Because y is negative p must also be negative to make x positive.
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of the FPGA exponential approximation to standard floating
point precision. The turquoise line marks the difference between the LUT and the exp
function. The upper bound for the error is about 0.001, but the approximating function
decreases monotonically.
If y ∈ [−0,−ln(2)] than p is -1 and x = y + ln(2) and ey = ex ∗ 2−1.
If y ∈ [(p− 1) · ln(2), p · ln(2)] than x = y− p ∗ ln(2), x ∈ [0, ln(2)] and ey = ex ∗ 2p.
There is no default value pdefault for p that satisfies the condition x = y − p ·
ln(2), x ∈ [0, ln(2)] in all cases, unless a sensor data normalization is performed to
force y to remain in the interval [(pdefault − 1) · ln(2), pdefault · ln(2)]. This could be
done by dividing y by a reasonable factor precalculated in software from the sensor
observations uncertainty that has to be transmitted with each sensor observation.
However this can be hardly done automatically for new sensors. In favor to maintain
the generic processing capabilities of the FPGA particle filter p is determined by an
iterative algorithm that assigns p in such a way that the requirement x ∈ [0, ln(2)]
is satisfied. The algorithmic implementation uses a precompiled values with a range
of [−ln(2), 30 · ln(2)] .
Figure 4.10 shows that the error of the approximating function decreases proportion-
ally to the standard exp function. More important the fixed point approximation of
the exponential function decreases monotonically and does not exceed the floating
point approximation of the exponential function.
SWP error analysis
The error induced by fixed point usage has been analyzed using a simulation of the sample
weight processor. The simulation results show that this error varies for different sensor
types. The marginalized error distributions for surface movement radar (SMR), laser
scanner and universal medium range radar (UMRR) are shown in Figure 4.11. Noteworthy
is the residual 100% error for some sensors. There are a number of causes contributing
to the error.
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Figure 4.11: Error distribution of the fpga sample weight computation of observations
mapped to the cartesian coordinate system.
1. FPGA exponential calculation: The input value to the exponential function may be
rounded in such a way that a part of the fraction is cut away. As the input value is
always negative this causes the result to be different from lower values the flat parts
of the output function shown in Figure 4.10 appear as plateaus in the probability
density function as shown in Figure 4.12
2. Inverse covariance matrix: Values may be rounded down to 0, or overflow in the
negative range or both. Depending on the values in the covariance matrix the
inverse covariance matrix may contain values too big or too small for the fixed point
representation. This results in a wrong input value for the exponential calculation.
3. Normalizer: The normalizers value may be cut away to 0, or overflow in the negative
range or both.
Figure 4.12 shows the difference between the 64bit floating point calculation and the fixed
point calculation. The effects of these errors are :
1. Zero Weights: The weights of the samples may be assigned to a weight of 0. This will
affect the resampling procedure in many ways. In the worst case the procedure will
not be terminating. The solution of this problem is discussed later in this section.
2. Plateaus in the PDF: Because the gradient of the PDF might be encoded in the
fractional part of the fixed point number the bits that hold the information might
be cut away, which results in a more or less coarse stair function. The effect on the
tracking accuracy is not as big as one might expect because the mean value of the
extracted probability density is not significantly influenced.
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Figure 4.12: Error induced by the fixed point computation of polar probability density
functions mapped to cartesian coordinates. The image shows the detailed fixed point polar
and Cartesian probability density as well as the error compared to the 64bit floating point
probability density. For this plot the probability density function has been sampled with
900 data points in an isometric pattern over the interval [µ− 5σ, µ+ 5σ].
3. Unreasonable probabilities: In some rare cases the PDF is complete wrong. The
reasons lie in the insufficient dynamic range and precision of the fixed point num-
ber representation that cannot cope with extreme values in the covariance matrix.
Although this is a systematic error, the noise on the observations usually prevents
a series of this kind of error and the convergence of the CPFA is preserved.
A resolution that addresses all of these issues is the usage of an alternative fixed point
representation. A different uniform representation used for all calculations is the quick
solution. The other solution is the time consuming implementation of fixed point repre-
sentations customized to the needs of each step of the computation. Figure 4.13 shows
the error depending on the distance for different sensors and different uniform fixed point
representations. Apparently not every fixed point pattern is equally suited for each sen-
sor, depending on the characteristics of the individual sensors. Nevertheless the results
suggest that it is possible to work with a 16.6 bit fixed point pattern for both laser
scanner and UMRR sensor, which requires significantly less resources than the 22.10 bit
implementation used for the prototype.
Treatment of Zero Weights
The treatment of zero weights is, for most application scenarios, also possible by the
addition of a negligible likelihood, which can be realized with no computational extra
effort by setting the least significant bit per default. The addition of a negligible likelihood
pn to the weight wt of the samples xt does not only remove the arithmetic errors but affects
the algorithm in multiple ways.
Impact on the Importance Sampling: Importance sampling means to compute an
expectation over a PDF f (given by the sensor observation) from a sample set with a
density of another PDF g. One is interested in the expectation that x ∈ A, where A is
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Figure 4.13: Influence of the integer and fractional part bit length of the fixed point
number representation on the marginalized error induced by the fixed point computation
of polar PDFs mapped to Cartesian coordinates.
an interval A ⊂ dom(X). Using an indicator function I that is 1 if its argument is true
and 0 otherwise, one can express this probability as an expectation over g.
Ef [I(x ∈ A)] =
∑
x∈X









w(x)g(x)I(x ∈ A) (4.11)
= Eg[w(x)I(x ∈ A)] (4.12)
Here w(x) = f(x)
g(x) is a weighting factor that accounts for the mismatch between f and g.
For this equation to be correct we need f(x) > 0→ g(x) > 0. The condition g(x) > 0 is
given because f(x) is only calculated for samples which implies g(x) > 0. As explained
earlier f(x) > 0 is not always true in the FPGA implementation of the particle filter, but
a work around is used to ensure that there are always some samples where f(x) > 0 is
true. It can be shown that the normalized weight mass of the sample set converge to the











After adding pn the approximated PDF is not Ef [I(x ∈ A)] anymore, but a compound
function over the expectations of f and g, where the g is scaled by the negligible likelihood
pn.
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f(x)I(x ∈ A) + ∑
x∈X




f(x)I(x ∈ A) + pn
∑
x∈X
g(x)I(x ∈ A) (4.20)
= Ef [I(x ∈ A)] + pnEg[I(x ∈ A)] (4.21)
The PDF approximate by the weight mass of the samples in the sample set is now tainted















As a consequence some of the samples in the proposal distribution Xt that would not be
included into the sample set Xt by the original algorithm are now included in Xt. Also
during the normalization of the sample weights pn sums up for each sample resulting in
a flatter PDF then during the normalization without the usage of pn. These two effects
result in a slower rate of convergence of the estimated object position to the true object
position. This is not a problem for stationary objects or slow moving objects, but it can
be a problem if the ratio between object dynamics and sensor update rate is too big. The
actual error induced by pn is relative to the quality of the proposal distribution, the better
the quality of the proposal distribution the less the error induced by pn. To counter such
effects the FPGA implementation replaces a small fraction of the compound distribution
with samples generated from measurements after the importance sampling increasing the
density of the function according to f at random points.
Impact on the Data Association: As the sample weights are also used to determine
the independent data association probability, the error induced by the addition of the
negligible likelihood needs to be taken into account during the calculation of the joint
data association probability, which is needed to assign detected features to tracks.
Uniform PDF Calculation
As mentioned earlier in this section, the efficient realization of the computation of the
sample weights, given sensor observations of arbitrary subsets of the samples state space,
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is only possible by an extension of the standard way to calculate normal probability den-
sity functions. This extension requires the sensor observation to include a Tag matrix T
that can be transmitted as a vector due to the nature of the matrix that allows the recon-
struction from the vector. In the following text the proof of the underlying mathematical
model is given.
Proposition: ConsiderM to be an n-dimensional frame referred to as measuring space,
which is a subspace of an m-dimensional frame Z referred to as state space. Further
consider f to be a function that maps the index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} of every dimension in M
to the index j ∈ {1 . . . n} of the corresponding dimension in Z, and so = (v,A) to be a
Normal distribution with the mean v ∈ M and the n, n-covariance matrix A, which is a
sample point in M . Furthermore consider z = (µ,Σ) to be a normal distribution with a
mean µ ∈ Z and a m,m-covariance matrix Σ, defined as an identity matrix divided by
2pi that fulfills Σf(i),f(j) = Ai,j. Now consider T to be a m,m-matrix where all elements
Tf(i),f(i) have the value 1, and other elements have the value 0. Consider x to be a sample
in Z that satisfies the condition xf(i) = si and x/∈f(i) = 0. Than the following equation is
valid:
det(2piA)− 12 e− 12 (s−v)A−1(s−v)T = det(2piΣ)− 12 e− 12 ((x−µ)T )Σ−1((x−µ)T )T (4.24)
Proof: The proof is divided in two parts, one for the front part of the equation and one
for the back part of the equation.
Proof - Part 1: In this part the following equation is shown to be valid.
det(2piA)− 12 = det(2piΣ)− 12 (4.25)
The proof is based on the following well known statements that can be found in mathe-
matical textbooks, e.g. [6]
1. The determinant of a triangular matrix is the product of the diagonal elements
det(M) = m11 ·m22 · ... ·mnn.
2. Every square matrix can be transformed to a triangular matrix using elementary
row transformations, where the multiple of a row is added to another row.
3. The determinant is invariant with respect to the elementary row transformations
from the previous statement. If a square matrix M is transformed into another
square matrix M ′ than det(M) = det(M ′) is valid.
The diagonal elements in Σ that are not connected to elements in A are 1 after the
multiplication with 2pi as in Equation 4.25, all other elements in Σ that are not connected
to elements in A are 0. Therefore these elements do not infer during the computation of
the determinant. The determinant is therefore set only by the diagonal elements in A and
the Equation 4.25 is valid. In conclusion the scaling factor in Equation 4.24, that sets the
maximum value at x− µ = 0, is the same for booth sides of the transformations.
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Proof - Part 2a: The first thing to show is that the elements that are mapped by f
from A to Σ have the same values on booth side of the equation after the inversion of the
covariance matrices, so:
ainvij = σinvf(i)f(j) (4.26)
The rows and columns in Σ do only hold elements from A else the elements are 0 or, on
the diagonal, 12pi . Thus the rows and columns that hold values mapped from A are linear
independent from rows and columns that do not hold elements mapped from A.
During the calculation of the inverse matrix with the Gauss-Jordan-Algorithm linear
independent vectors do not interfere with each other. Therefore the elements is the
inverse covariance matrix Σ−1 are only the result of calculations involving the elements
in Σ that have been mapped from A. What remains to be shown is that the rest of the
elements in the inverse covariance matrix does not affect the argument of the exponential
term in Equation 4.24.
Proof - Part 2b: Here the following equation must be shown to be valid, based on
Part 2a of the proof.
(s− v)A−1(s− v)T = ((x− µ)T )Σ−1((x− µ)T )T (4.27)
For this part of the proof the definition of the elements in x, µ,Σ, and T by the function
f is crucial. Therefore the definition is formally reviewed here.
x = (x11 . . . x1m) (4.28)
v = (v11 . . . v1n) (4.29)
s = (s11 . . . s1n); s1i = x1f(i) (4.30)
µ = (µ11 . . . µ1m);µ1i =
0 i 6∈ f [I]v1f−1(i) i ∈ f [I] (4.31)
σ−1ij ∈ Σ =

1





i, j ∈ f [I] (4.32)
tij ∈ T =
0 i, j 6∈ f [I]1 i, j ∈ f [I] (4.33)
For the proof the intermediate results r, y, l, that follow from the above definitions, are
needed.
r = (r11 . . . r1n); r1i = s1i − v1i (4.34)
y = (y11 . . . y1m); y1i = x1i − µ1i (4.35)




Because of the definition of y and µ the following equation is valid.
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y1i =
x1i − µ1i i 6∈ f [I]s1f−1i − v1f−1i = r1f−1i i ∈ f [I] (4.37)
Using the definition of T , l is:
l1i =
0; i 6∈ f [I]⇒ tij = 0∑m
i=1 r1i = r1i; i ∈ f [I]
(4.38)
Which allows to rewrite Equation 4.27 as:
rA−1rT = lΣ−1lT (4.39)
For the further proof vectors g and h are needed:





















= g1f−1(j) j, i ∈ f [I]
0 j 6∈ f [I]
(4.42)
(4.43)























i ∈ f [I]
0; i 6∈ f [I]
(4.46)
The inverse function f 1 is surjective with respect to the image set f−1[f [I]] and it follows
that:










i1 = (s− v)A−1(s− v)T (4.47)
Because the result of the terms considered in both parts of the proof are equal the results
of both sides of the Equation 4.24 are equal.
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4.2.5 DSP-Usage
Many FPGAs feature embedded digital signal processing resources like multipliers that are
capable of implementing the simple multiplication operation commonly used in typical
DSP functions. Cyclone III devices offer up to 288 embedded multiplier blocks and
support the following modes: one individual 18 − bit × 18 − bit multiplier per block, or
two individual 9− bit× 9− bit multipliers per block, see Figure 4.14. Multipliers can be
cascaded to support wider bit widths. Multipliers can also be inferred directly from VHDL
or Verilog source code. The prototypical implementation uses the multipliers implicit, as
the compiler integrates them to save LEs and for a faster computation of the results.
Figure 4.14: DSP Resource [14]
4.2.6 NIOS Processor
The NIOS processor is a softcore processor provided by Altera as a compilable IP. The
NIOS can be configured with the qsys system builder to provide support for extensive
debugging and additional features.
In the context of this work the most basic variant of the debugging support for the
NIOS has been used, providing only a JTAG target connection, download of software,
and the support of software breakpoints. Although the PFL works with the most basic
variant of the NIOS, in order to support a broad range of peripheral interfaces the most
complex NIOS variant is used, the NIOS II/f. This variant features a single core 32-bit
RISC processor with instruction cache, data cache, dynamic branch prediction hardware
multiply/divide, and barrel shifter.
4.2.7 Memory Controller
The memory controller implements the protocol and bus used by the NIOS processor and
the particle filter logic to exchange data. On side of the NIOS the data of the bus is
readable at a specific memory address that can be accessed conveniently using C-Macros
generated by the Altera System Builder as shown in Listing 4.1.
Because the particle filter logic is much faster then the software execution on the nios,
a handshake protocol, see Figure 4.15, had to be implemented to ensure the correct
transmission of the data between the nios and the particle filter logic. The handshake
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Listing 4.1: NIOS c-code to write data. This code-snippet is part of the main routine
executed by the NIOS.
// send data to bu f f e r_ou t ( to t h e l o g i c )
IOWR_ALTERA_AVALON_PIO_DATA(DATA_BASE, n ) ;
// data_enab l e =1 to i n d i c a t e to t h e l o g i c t h a t a new va l u e i s a v a i l a b l e
IOWR_ALTERA_AVALON_PIO_DATA(DATA_AVAILABLE_BASE, 1 ) ;
while ( ! end ) { // i t remains some data to send
while ( !IORD_ALTERA_AVALON_PIO_DATA(DATA_READ_BASE)) ; // wa i t u n t i l da ta has been read by th e FPGA
// u s l e e p (2000000) ; // wa i t 0 .1 s
// data s en t by n io s has been read by FPGA
IOWR_ALTERA_AVALON_PIO_DATA(DATA_AVAILABLE_BASE, 0 ) ;
n = s t r t o l (p+1, &p , 10 ) ; //10 = base
//no more va l u e a v a i l a b l e :
i f ( ’ \n ’ == ∗p) {
end=1;
}
// send data to bu f f e r_ou t
IOWR_ALTERA_AVALON_PIO_DATA(DATA_BASE, n ) ;
IOWR_ALTERA_AVALON_PIO_DATA(DATA_AVAILABLE_BASE, 1 ) ;
}
protocol works in the following way. When the PFL want’s to transmit data to the NIOS
it sets a data available signal and puts the data on the bus. The NIOS reads the data and
acknowledges that it has read the data by raising the data read signal. The PFL reacts
by lowering the data available signal, which in turn causes the NIOS to lower the data
read signal. If the NIOS sends data to the PFL the protocol works the same way.
Figure 4.15: Memory controller bus protocol except [14]
4.2.8 Input Memory
The input memory is needed to store the sensor data transmitted to the FPGA in such a
way that the data is easily accessible from the particle filter logic. Values stored here are:
• Tag Matrix: Unless the Tag matrices for every possible measured subset of the
estimated state space are stored in hardware, or implement the complex and resource
consuming generation algorithm in hardware, a software realization must be used to
compute the matrix. For these reasons the matrix is communicated with the sensor
observations messages.
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• Determinant: The calculation of the determinant must be only done once and is not
dependent on the track. Also the calculation requires a rather complex algorithm.
Therefore it is computed by software and transmitted with the sensor observation in
order to avoid unnecessary redundant computations and save power and hardware
resources.
• Inverse Covariance Matrix: As for the determinant, the computation of the inverse
matrix is complicated and would require a lot of hardware resources. Also the
Matrix is independent of the tracks. It is, like the determinant, transmitted with
the sensor observation in order to avoid unnecessary redundant computations and
save power and hardware resources.
4.2.9 Sample Storage
Unless all samples are stored in the PUs, as in the case of full parallelization, a the storage
for the samples is needed. Each sample x[m]t in the sample set Xt requires 7 · 32 = 224
bit for 6 state space variables and the sample weight w[m]t . The table shows the storage
capacity required for different sample set sizes. The LE usage estimation and memory
cell usage estimation are based on the compilation results of the prototype on an Altera
Cyclone III FPGA. Because the samples are stored in the M9K memory units there is no
direct LE usage by the samples. Additional LE usage not shown in the table results from
the logic needed to load and store samples. Embedded memory structures as featured
by the Cyclone III device family are a common concept to satisfy the memory needs of
embedded designs in FPGAs, without sacrificing the more versatile LE resources for such
a single use task.
Type of Sample Number of samples Sample set size LE usage estimation Memory Cell Usage Estimation
uniform 128 28627 bit 0 (38k) 4 M9K
uniform 256 57344 bit 0 (76k) 7 M9K
uniform 512 114688 bit 0 (153k) 14 M9K
uniform 1024 229376 bit 0 (307k) 28 M9K
uniform 2048 458752 bit 0 (614k) 56 M9K
uniform 4096 917504 bit 0 (1229k) 112 M9K
RoboCup 128 11008 bit 0 (14k) 2 M9K
RoboCup 256 22016 bit 0 (28k) 3 M9K
RoboCup 512 44032 bit 0 (56k) 6 M9K
RoboCup 1024 88064 bit 0 (112k) 11 M9K
RoboCup 2048 176128 bit 0 (224k) 22 M9K
RoboCup 4096 352256 bit 0 (448k) 43 M9K
Table 4.2: Memory usage for different sample set sizes. The LE usage estimation value
in brackets shows the estimated LE usage if no internal memory blocks are available.
An alternative solution would distribute the samples to an input cache and output cache
and an RAM external to the FPGA. During the partially serial calculation of the sample
weights the input cache will be refreshed from the RAM and the output cache will be
written to the RAM. This solution requires only a fixed amount of memory cells or LEs
at the cost of addition resources used for the RAM interface and the additional control
logic to ensure the memory consistency. The primary advantage of this solution is the
ability to implement particle filters with sample set sizes that require more memory than
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available as memory cells. Additional benefits result in the ability to concurrently access
the sample set by software, for alternative computations like visualization or analysis.
4.2.10 Control by Finite State Machine
The top level control is done by a finite state machine (FSM), that controls the interaction
of the processes of the components, based on its own state, the input given from the
outside and the output of the components. Thus it realizes the execution of the Algorithm
Concurrent Particle Filter (Xt−1, ut, zt) and governs the execution of the algorithms by
the subordinate components that perform the low-level computations of the particle filter.
4.2.11 Resampling
The resampling or importance sampling is the part of the algorithm that allows the usage
of a limited number of samples to estimate the probability density in arbitrary large
spaces. The algorithm condenses the samples in the sample set to the, given the available
background and sensor information, regions of the system state space with the highest
probability density. These are encoded in lines 6-8 in the particle filter algorithm:
Algorithm Particle Filter (Xt,Wt):
1 Xt = Xt = ∅











6 for m = 1 to M do
7 draw i with probability ∝ w[i]t
8 add x[i]t to Xt;
9 return Xt
For implementations under real time constraints one has to consider that the straight-
forward implementation of line 7 requires to loop for possibly a very long time over the
sample set and compare the weights with random numbers. This drawback of the al-
gorithm led to a number of real time capable alternative resampling algorithms. From
these the low-variance sampler algorithm had been selected for the implementation of the
resampling. The low-variance sampler has three advantages. First, the complexity of the
low-variance sampler is of O(M) for M samples. Second the space of samples is covered
more systematically than by the random sampler. Third if all samples have equal weights,
all samples are kept.
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Algorithm Low Variance Sampler (Xt−1, ut, zt):
1 Xt = ∅
2 r = random(0;M-1)
3 c = w[1]t
4 i = 1
5 for m = 1 to M do
6 U = r + (m− 1) ·M−1
7 while U > c do
8 i = i + 1
9 c = c + w[i]t
10 add x[i]t to Xt
11 return Xt
The algorithm requires random numbers that are generated by a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR). The LFSR is fed by its own state, driven by the exclusive-or (xor) of
some bits of the overall shift register value. Figure 4.16 illustrates the function of the
register.
Determined by the deterministic working of the LFSR the stream of random numbers
produced is deterministic and the same for the same initial value. Therefore the regis-
ter will produce a cyclic output sooner or later. However a carefully designed feedback
function can produce a very long sequence of values that appear to be random. The
LFSR is used during the resampling step as well as during the generation of samples from
measurements.
Figure 4.16: A 16 bit linear feed back shift register. The register is used to generate long
sequences of pseudo random numbers [14].
4.3 Performance
This section discusses the performance of the PFA with respect to the speed, accuracy, and
power consumption of the prototypical implementation. The analysis of the performance is
done with the goal to make a cautious assumption about the benefits a specialized tracking
hardware, similar to a GPU or a mathematical coprocessor, might offer to embedded
systems that depend on tracking to monitor their environment. Therefore the comparison
is done based on the implementation of a general purpose processor (GPP), the NIOS
II/e, and an implementation of the concurrent particle filter algorithm (CPFA) on the
Cyclone III FPGA. The GPP executes a software implementation of the particle filter
algorithm that is compared with the execution of the hardware implementation of the
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CPFA in terms of speed, resource requirements, power consumption, and heat dissipation
of the system. To compare the performance with that of a highly optimized GPP the
software implementation has been tested on a laptop with an intel I7 3537U processor
running on battery at 750MHz.
4.3.1 System Setup
The system was tested using data recorded in a RoboCup environment and simulated
sensor data from an airport environment. The RoboCup environment data where posi-
tions of moving robots detected by a ceiling camera above a RoboCup soccer field. The
airport environment data where simulated Surface Movement Radar (SMR) measure-
ments and Universal Medium Range Radar (UMMR) measurements of moving vehicles.
The dynamic scaling was not implemented for the test but the addition of the negligible
likelihood was.
The particle filters used for the analysis has 128 samples. Each sample has 6 variables
representing the state of the sample and 1 variable for the weight of the sample. Although
the software implementation is roughly equivalent of the hardware implementation there
are some differences between the two implementations which affect the order of execution
and the representation of numbers.
The software implementation of the particle filter algorithm is a serial implementation of
the basic particle filter algorithm with a low variance resampling. The essential dimensions
of data types are the same as in the hardware implementation of the CPFA. Relevant
numbers for the important calculations are represented by the float data type, which is -
from the author’s experience - the most common approach for software implementations of
particle filters. The software was compiled in release mode with the standard optimization
options from the NIOS II software tools and Visual Studio 2013.
The NIOS II/e is the most basic variant of the NIOS II processor. It is a 32bit RISC
processor that has no dedicated hardware for mathematical calculations, no branch pre-
diction, no instruction cache, and no data cache. Because the NIOS II/e is a very simple
processor, the software implementation has also been tested on a Lenovo Yoga 13 laptop,
on one core of the Intel I7 3537U processor running on battery power at 750 MHz.
The CPFA implementation uses 4 units to generate samples and compute sample updates
(see 4.2.1 particles_inst) , 1 unit to compute the sample weights (see 4.2.1. SWP_inst),
and 1 unit to do the importance sampling (see 4.2.1 resample). The algorithm is executed
in a partial concurrent pipeline as shown in Figure 4.17. The importance sampling on
the hardware is done only if needed, and is executed concurrently to the update and
calculation of the sample weights. Using 2 alternating sample sets, a sample is selected
just in time from the old set, updated, weighted and stored to the new set. In the next
observation update the new sample set becomes the old sample set.
4.3.2 Data Acquisition
Speed
The speed of the most time consuming operations, the initialization of the sample set
from an observation, the calculation of the sample movement update, calculation of the
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Figure 4.17: Timing of the pipelined concurrent execution with interleaved resampling of
the PFA as implemented by the CPFA implementation.
sample weights, and the importance sampling have been measured using the Quartus-
Signaltap tool. The Signaltap allows to record the state of selected registers and pins,
after a previously set trigger condition is met, in real time for a limited amount of time
or number of signal changes. In order to measure the time needed reliable and accurate,
additional clock signals, with clock cycles of 0.1 MHz and 0.01 MHz, had to be defined and
linked to dedicated output pins. The main clock was 50 MHz during the data acquisition.
The time needed for the execution of certain functions by the software was measured by
setting the state of dedicated output pins that have been added to the NIOSII VHDL
entity for the communication with external hardware or other VHDL entities. The ac-
cording pin was set to 1 as the first instruction of the respective function body and set to
0 before return instructions of the respective function body. Either edge in the pins signal
was set as a trigger condition and the time needed by the functions was then calculated
from the above mentioned dedicated extra clock signals and signal of the pin used to
signal the functions state.
On the laptop functions from the chrono package of the c++ stl were used to estimate
the average execution time from thousands of tracker updates.
The VHDL entities of the CPFA implementation has dedicated control signals to coor-
dinate the components that use a strobe-protocol. The time needed for the operations
mentioned above was measured using these signals as triggers and monitoring them, and
also monitoring the dedicated extra clock signals.
Accuracy
To determine the accuracy of the CPFA implementation and the software solutions the
output has been compared against a MatLab simulink implementation of the algorithm.
Resource Usage
The source of the data about the used resources is the Quartus software that provides
detailed reports about the resources used by each VHDP entity and each IP. Information
on the I7 3757 U and similar devices are provided by Intel [51].
3.3 Energy Consumption and Heat Dissipation
Accurate values for energy consumption and heat dissipation could not be obtained by
measurement during the development of the CPFA. Therefore the discussion of these
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parameters is based on simulation results, and the clock frequency and resources needed
by the different solutions to compute the particle filter algorithm at the same speed, which
is estimated from the data processing speed and resource usage. On the laptop the power
consumption was estimated using the Joulemeter software from Microsoft Research.
4.3.3 Prototype Test Results
Speed
Timing simulation result of the particle filter logic indicated that the particle filter could
integrate features at a rate of 5MHz with maximal parallelization. Since this update rate
is not needed for most applications, the computational architecture has been adapted
to support partial parallelization of the particle filter algorithm with 4 to 1024 samples.
Still the analysis of the time needed for the operations show that there are significant
differences in the time needed to compute the various parts of the algorithm between the
NIOS II/e and the CPFA implementation. Depending on the operation the speed up
factor may range from 196 to 3600. The most relevant factor is the speed up during the
update of the tracker which is the most common operation. Here the CPFA is app. 3000
times faster.The Intel I7 3537 is about 2.6 times faster than the CPFA implementation
when performing the update of the tracker. The measurements do comply with by the
specifications of Intel and Altera that estimate the NIOSII/s at about 7-8 MIPS at 50
MHz and the I7 series at about 200k MIPS at 3 GHz [51].
Operation / System NIOS II/e CPFA SU CPFA I7 SU I7
Init tracker 0834.0 ms 0.3000 ms 2780 0.11 ms 2.7
Update tracker 1340.0 ms 0.4500 ms 2978 0.175 ms 2.56
Init single sample 0008.0 ms 0.0030 ms 2666 - -
Weight single sample 0009.0 ms 0.0025 ms 3600 - -
Update single sample 0000.5 ms 0.0005 ms 1000 - -
Upd. + weight single sample 0009.5 ms 0.0030 ms 3166 - -
Importance sampling 0074.7 ms 0.4400 ms 169 0.084 ms 52.6
Table 4.3: Execution speed of hardware and software tracker implementations. SU CPFA
denotes the speed up factor from NIOSII/e to the CPFA i implementation, and SU I7
denotes the speed up factor from the CPFA implementation to the particle filter software
executed on the I7.
Not included are the times needed for the communication with superordinate instances,
which strongly depend on the communication protocol and other factors that vary for
the different application scenarios. To estimate the performance when tracking multiple
objects software simulations of the FPGA implementation had to be used. The FPGAs
where simulated on different PCs and connected via Ethernet. It was found that the speed
did not significantly decrease when tracking up to 4 targets. A test for more targets was
not possible because of the administrative effort needed to install the software on more
computers.The time needed for one complete execution of the distributed multiple object
tracking algorithm in the lab took 15ms including the time for Ethernet communications.
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Accuracy
The error of the position estimates of the CPFA implementation and the software imple-
mentation was in the same order of magnitude as the error of the MatLab model in the
RoboCup test scenario. The impact of the addition of the negligible likelihood on the
accuracy of the CPFA implementation to approximate the true position of the object, was
negligible.
In the airport test scenario the system had sometimes problems integrating the very accu-
rate simulated UMMR sensor data. The reason is the fixed point number representation,
causing all particles to have the same weight, even when the probability of the samples is
slightly different. Thus the importance sampling failed because of the missing gradient.
Resource Usage
The CPFA implementation needs more resources than than the NIOS II/e. Since the
NIOS II/e uses no DSP Elements the increase has been estimated by comparing it to
a CPFA implementation that also uses no DSP Elements. The CPFA implementation
requires between 6 to 19 times the resources of the NIOS II/e implementation. The total
required resources of the CPFA can be estimated to be around 7.5 times the amount of
resources used by the NIOS II/e. The I7 3537U has 1,400,000,000 transistors according
to data sheets from Intel [51], but these are hardy comparable to the logical elements
of the Cyclone III FPGA. In the FPGA only a fraction of the transistors perform the
implemented logic, while most of the transistors support the logic implementation.
Operation/System NIOS II/e CPFA Increase Factor
DSP Elements 0 98 -
DSP 9x9 0 0 -
DSP 18x18 0 49 -
LC Combinationals 929 9642 (17849) 10.3 (19.2)
LC Registers 510 6887 13.5
Memory Bits 9216 55472 6.0
Total 10655 72001(80208) 6.76 (7.5)
Table 4.4: Resource usage of hardware and software tracker implementations. The num-
bers in parenthesis denote the CPFA implementation without DSP-Elements. Increase
Factor denotes the additional resources needed by the CPFA implementation when com-
pared to the NIOS II/e.
Power Consumption and Heat Dissipation
A simulation analysis showed that the particle filter logic itself consumes about under full
load 61 mW. Computationally similar complex tasks require between 300 mW - 900 mW
[8] when executed on embedded processors like those used in mobile phones. So GPP’s
require between 5 - 15 times more power. However the processors used in [8] may not
be able to reach the 2 KHz tracker update rate possible with the CPFA implementation
under full load. Given that the CPFA is app. 3000 times faster than the NIOS II/e but
requires about 7.5 times more resources, an implementation on a NIOS II/e would require
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about 400 times more power to process the same amount of data in the same time. The
Intel I7 3537U requires approximately 1.3 W of additional energy during the execution of
the particle filter algorithm software, which complies to the findings of the authors of [8].
This dynamic power is in addition to the static power consumption of the I7 3757U of 17
W at 2.0 GHz thermal design power (TDP) according to Intel[51].
4.3.4 Performance Comparison
The accuracy is similar for all tested solutions. The I7 3757U is the fastest option, but
also the one using the most power and the most resources. The NIOS II/e is to slow.
Performance estimates from Altera indicates that the 2 other NIOS II variants would be
also to slow, when they are implemented on the same Cyclone III as the NIOS II/e and the
CPFA Implementation. The software solution is also the most flexible solution as far as
modifications of the particle filter algorithm are concerned. From a first look on the results
a software implementation on the I7 or a similar processor seems to be a good solution,
but the results of the prototype test support the usage of the CPFA implementation
nevertheless. First the software solution does almost fully load 1 core of the I7. The
use of the CPFA implementation does not only free the CPUs of a system requiring
tracking capabilities from computational load. It also reduces the power consumption
also significantly, which is a benefit for all systems with limited power supply. The CPFA
implementation does not produce a significant amount of heat and does not need any kind
of additional cooling8 which enables tracking systems to be smaller, more robust, and more
energy efficient. Also the speed up advantage of the I7 is not that significant. The software
particle filter on the I7 is only 2-3 times faster than the CPFA implementation, while the
power consumption of the CPFA implementation is about 20 times lower. By using a
bigger FPGA more sample processing units can be used in the CPFA implementation.
Since FPGAs are available with speeds and LE capabilities more than twenty times of that
of the one used for the prototype, the number of samples and the speed can be increased
significantly. Also the basic algorithm of the particle filter does not need to completely
flexible for a vast range of tracking scenarios. The ability to adopt the particle filter
to application scenario constraints depends mainly on the ability to scale between serial
and concurrent execution of the algorithm and the accuracy needed in the application
scenario. These characteristics directly determine the LE and memory block usage of the
particle filter. The FPGA for the implementation should also contain integrated memory
blocks to store the samples. If there would be no memory blocks the samples would
require a huge amount of LE. Since the prototype realization fits into a very small, low-
speed, and economically priced FPGA, better performing prototypes can be realized using
more expensive FPGAs providing a higher speed and more programmable logic resources.
Given the estimated speed of the CPFA implementation it should be possible to extend
the CPFA to handle multiple tracks. In order to do so the sample storage must be used
as a cache for the sample sets of the tracks that are stored in a RAM connected to the
FPGA. In this way it is possible to store the state of multiple tracks in the RAM and
track a number of objects that is limited by the sensor observation update rate.
Based on these findings a migration of the CPFA implementation from a FPGA to an
8The prototype has been run in a permanent loop for days on a development board without the need
for a heat sink.
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ASIC that acts as a tracking coprocessor could be considered interesting, as the migration
is expected to reduce the power consumption of the CPFA about 50% while increasing
the processing speed.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter mathematical models and adaptions of the particle filter algorithm that
allow an architecture for an efficient concurrent hardware based particle filter are in-
troduced. The soundness of the adaptions and the underlying mathematical models is
discussed, and their appropriateness for the task is shown by means of error analysis and
comparison to straight forward methods. The performance of the prototype implementa-
tion shows that the developed hardware achieves, together with the developed software,
the research objectives related to embedded tracking systems. A part of the results is
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Initial research on this topic started in as part of the RollMops project that is part of the
WFF Project of the BFMI. The project aimed to increase runway safety through the use
of local sensors and new embedded data fusion algorithms. In this context the following
objectives shall be reached.
1. Show the feasibility of runway incursion prevention systems based on localized
surveillance.
2. Develop a design for an experimental runway incursion alerting system (XL-RIAS)
based on local sensors and signals.
3. Realize a prototype of the system design using the HWPPTS.
At first glance may seem trivial to design a tracking system capable of monitoring the
ground traffic at airports with sufficient accuracy to detect runway incursions in time. A
closer look reveals that the circumstances encountered in the airport environment strongly
restrict the space of possible solutions. Therefore, in order to reach the above research
objectives, first a feasibility study was made that determined the possibilities to apply
state of the art sensors and algorithms to the problem and determine configurations that
satisfy theoretically desirable performance requirements. The results showed that it is
most likely possible to reach the desired accuracy and speed that determine the lower
bound of the runway incursion detection and alerting performance, with state of the art
hardware and software [97]. Than an extensive survey of approaches to reduce runway
incursions was made, see [99]. The performance of these approaches has been compared
to the estimated performance of the developed system, and it has been shown that the
system outperforms currently deployed technological solutions in some relevant aspects
and is able to handle runway incursion scenarios that cannot be handled by the deployed
systems. Concurrently the design of the new system has been developed, under the
following constraints.
1. The system has to fulfill at least SIL 1 requirements.
2. The system needs to be integrated in existing infrastructure with minimal effort as a
standalone solution or to enhance the performance of already installed surveillance
systems.
3. The system should be made from of-the-shelf hardware components, as far as pos-
sible.
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For a better readability the chapter is not organized to reflect the different task involved
and the time line of the project but to provide systematic introduction into the topic as
a basis and then discuss the technical details of the system.
The chapter is thus organized as follows: The chapter starts with an introduction to run-
way incursion systems in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 covers the theory of runway incursion
prevention systems and their embedding in the airport environment. Technological re-
sponses to the runway incursion, including the solution developed in this work, tread are
introduced in Section 5.3, and their performance is compared based on the results of a
simulation study in Section 5.4. The rest of the chapter deals with the design process1,
the design of the system, the architecture of the system and its integration in the airport
environment as well as with the R&D prototype implementation. The chapter finishes
with a concise summary.
5.1 Introduction
Runway incursions are occurrences at an aerodrome that involve the incorrect presence
of an aircraft, a ground vehicle, or a person on the protected area designated for the
landing and take-off of aircraft. The growing traffic volume has kept avoiding runway
incursions on the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) “Most Wanted” list for
safety improvements for over a decade [82]. In the past, runway incursions have led
to accidents with significant loss of life. The worst runway incursion accident was at
Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain, in 1997, where two Boeing 747 collided. Recent incidents
[90, 81] show that runway incursions are still a problem. Although the number of runway
incursions that result in an accident is small, the number of runway incursions has not
significantly declined over the last decade. Statistics and results from simulation studies
strongly indicate that the number of runway incursions increases much more rapidly than
the traffic volume. Depending on the airport topography, an increase of 20% traffic volume
may result in a 140% increase of runway incursion potential for a single runway [52].
5.1.1 Definition of Runway Incursions
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) definition that has been adopted
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 2007 [33] of a runway incursion is the
following [49]:
“Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, ve-
hicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off
of aircraft.”
Runway incursions are classified in relation to the severity of the incident, with clas-
sifications A - E, as shown in Table 1. The most relevant classifications for Runway
Incursion Prevention and Alerting Systems (RIPAS) are A and B, where time is critical.
1Since the system is safety related the design process had to be modified in such a way that it requires
a more detailed explanation.
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Severity classification Description
A A serious incident in which a collision is narrowly avoided.
B
An incident in which separation decreases and there is significant potential
for collision which may result in a time-critical corrective/evasive response
to avoid a collision.
C An incident characterized by ample time and/or distance to avoid a collision
D
An incident that meets the definition of runway incursion, such as the
incorrect presence of a single vehicle, person or aircraft on the protected
area on a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but
with no immediate safety consequences.
E Insufficient information or inconclusive or conflicting evidenceprecludes a severity assessment.
Table 5.1: ICAO severity classification scheme [49]
Classifications C and D should also be detected by RIPAS but do not require immediate
action.
5.1.2 Causes for Runway Incursions
The FAA and ICAO both classify runway incursions according to the following types of
causes that lead to the incursion: “Pilot Deviations” (PD), “Operational Errors/Devia-
tions” (OE), and “Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation” (VPD ).
Pilot Deviations
Pilot deviations are actions of a pilot that violate any Federal Aviation Regulation. For
example, a pilot deviation occurs when a pilot crosses a taxiway hold line, entering a
runway for which the aircraft has not been authorized by an air traffic controller (ATCO)
to enter. For a detailed description of such a case, see the reports [90, 81] of the NTSB
and the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU).
Operational Errors / Deviations
Operational errors / deviations are actions of ATCOs that result in either less than the
minimum separation between two or more aircraft and vehicles or an aircraft landing
or departing on a runway that is closed to the aircraft. For example, an ATCO could
commission an aircraft to land on a runway that is already in use. The report in [84]
provides good insight into such a situation.
Vehicle / Pedestrian Deviations
Vehicle / pedestrian deviations include pedestrians, vehicles, or other objects that interfere
with aircraft operations by movements that have not been authorized by air traffic control
(ATC) and/or APRON controllers. A serious runway incursion occurs when, for example,
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Figure 5.1: Initial situation of the category A incident that happened at Charlotte Douglas
International airport on May 29, 2009.
service technicians enter a runway unauthorized, a taxiing Boeing 747 nearly causes a
collision, or when a service car left on the runway collides with a landing aircraft.
5.1.3 Runway Incursion Examples
For a more vivid impression two examples of runway incursions are given, both repre-
senting the type of incursion that is particularly targeted by the RollMops project. The
fist incident was reported to the FAA and conditioned by the FAA, it happened on May
29, 2009. For the details of the incident refer to [81]. The second incident was examined
by the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU). Both incidents
can be classified as category A, a real dangerous situation. The first incident was the
result of an operational error (OE), the second incident was caused by a pilot deviation
(PD).
ADSE-X
Figure 5.2: Situation at the time of alert of the category A incident that happened at
Charlotte Douglas International airport on May 29, 2009.
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The initial situation is shown in Figure 5.1. Flight JIA390 a commercial airliner is cleared
by local control east (LCE) to take off from Runway 18L full length. At the same time
a general aviation aircraft Flight N409DR was cleared by LCE to taxi into position and
hold on Runway 18L.
Apparently LCE was not aware that flight N409DR was not lined up behind Flight JIA390
but rather planned to begin its take off roll from the intersection downfield. Flight JIA390
begun its take off roll while Flight N409DR was proceeding to its holding position.
When Flight N409DR entered the runway, Flight JIA309 had already rolled about 1600
feet on the runway and had accelerated to approximately 227 feet per second. The situ-
ation is shown in Figure 5.2. At that time the ASDE-X system deployed on the airport
raised an alarm. It took a few seconds for LCE to communicate the alert to Flight JIA309
which had already spotted Flight N409DR and initialized an evasive maneuver while de-
celerating. Flight N409DR became aware of the situation a few seconds later and began
an evasive action.
Figure 5.3 gives a good impression of the outcome of the incident. Booth aircraft came
to halt with a horizontal separation of approximately 10 feet. The full recording of the
incident can be found at http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/videos/.
Figure 5.3: Outcome of the category A incident that happened at Charlotte Douglas
International airport on May 29, 2009.
BFU
This incident happened on May 3, 2004 at the Munich International Airport. The involved
parties were air traffic control (ATC) and two commercial air liners. The incident was
investigated by the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation and an
investigation report was published in February 2009 [90].
The situation was caused due to a misinterpretation of the situation by the pilots of Flight
AT45 that mistook a departing flight A321 as the landing flight B733 it was supposed
line up behind. Figure 5.4 illustrates the situation. Initially Flight AT45 had clearance
to line up behind the next landing and Flight A321 was cleared for take off. Flight A321
took of and was mistaken by Flight AT45 as the landing flight it was supposed to line up
behind. The left image in Figure 5.4 shows the situation during the take off roll of Flight
A321; the right image shows the situation a few seconds later when the landing Flight
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B733 passed the runway threshold. Flight AT45 has already moved some distance and is
proceeding towards the runway.
Figure 5.4: Inital situation, radar images from [90].
Flight B733 became aware of the dangerous situation immediately after touchdown on the
runway. The left image in Figure 5.5 shows the radar print of the situation at touchdown;
Flight AT45 is still about 40m from the runway centerline. The right image shows the
situation when Flight B733 became aware of the situation. The pilots used reverse trust
and max. auto brake to steer clear of Flight AT45 which was still unaware of the situation.
Figure 5.5: Development of the initial situation , radar images from [90].
A few seconds later Flight B773 passed Flight AT45 at a distance of a few meters with a
speed of approximately 110 knots / 205 kmh with a horizontal separation of a few meters
as perceived by the crews of the two aircraft. A radar print is given in Figure 5.6. The left
image of the print shows the most dangerous situation when Flight B733 passed Flight
AT45. The right print shows the situation after the airplanes have passed.
Figure 5.6: Near collision and outcome of the incident, radar images from [90].
Interestingly the Runway Incursion Monitor (RIM), a part of the Airport Surface Move-
ment Radar (ASMR), did raise an alarm related to the incident but the notification was
turned of at the workstation of the air traffic controller. The reason was that the system
did generate to many false alarms.
5.1.4 The Role of General Aviation
General aviation (GA) accounts for the majority of runway incursion incidents, including
those that involve air carrier operations. Air carriers and large airports are usually better
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suited to be outfitted with technology that is related to runway incursion prevention. The
technical and financial constraints for most of the general aviation aircraft and smaller
airports limit the use of runway incursion prevention technology. In particular, the use
of transponder systems and electronic flight bag (EFB) equipment poses a problem, and
this will be discussed in Section 5.3.
5.1.5 Runway Incursion Hot Spots
Runway incursions occur on hot spots, which are defined by the ICAO as “A location
on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential risk of collision or runway
incursions and where heightened attention by pilots/drivers is necessary.” [49]. To avoid
runway incursions, the ICAO demands that explicit runway crossing clearance is required
to cross holding positions. Typical examples of hot spots are shown in Figure 5.1.5.
Clearance usually is given via radio telephony (RTF) and, if applicable, by signals at hold
lines.
For several reasons, a common cause for runway incursions is that aircraft proceed beyond
their holding position onto the runway without clearance or are cleared to enter a runway
that is already in use. These scenarios are among the most dangerous situations because
a plane on the runway that is too slow to take off and too fast to stop has almost no
option to respond to the situation, an opinion shared by other studies [49, 9]. Currently
deployed runway incursion detection systems need in between 2 and 6 seconds to detect
such a situation. An earlier detection would enable warning the vehicle on the taxiway,
which, because of its slower speed, is better suited to react to a situation during its early
stages of development.
5.1.6 Runway Incursion Statistics
In Europe, 600 runway incursions were reported in 2005, but the European Organization
for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) stated that the reporting culture is
ineffective and that not many reports are made because of judicial and cultural barriers.
The number of reported runway incursions increased in the EUROCONTROL Statistical
Reference Area (ESRA) to nearly 1000 in 2008 [30, 31] . This increase partly reflects
a better reporting culture[32], e.g., the “Runway Safety Report 2008” of Zurich airport
[120] provides a detailed analysis of the runway incursion developments at the airport since
2000. Notable is the high number of category A and B incidents in ESRA, which reached
a peak in 2006 at 63 incidents; the annual number of incidents has not changed much since
2003. For major airports (e.g., Heathrow), up to 30 runway incursions per year have been
reported [16]. For the USA, more detailed information is available, which is summarized in
Table 5.2. Between 2003 and 2010, the FAA registered a total of 6.989 Runway incursions.
Apparently, these incursions are only for towered airports; incidents that were classified
as runway incursions at untowered airports from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and NTSB database cannot be found in the FAA database [15].
For this total number, only category A and B incidents are considered to have a significant
potential of evolving into an accident. According to the FAA, the number of runway
incursions of category A and B have been decreasing since 2003. Most notable is the
significant decrease of these events in 2009 and 2010, which is a trend that the FAA
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Figure 5.7: Hot spot examples from ICAO manual on the prevention of runway
incursions[49]; the map shows hot spot locations at an airport. For each hot spot, advice
for pilots is provided. Confusing taxiway crossings of the runway at 3 hot spots cause
pilots to stop on the runway in search of the taxiway or to miss the taxiway, forcing them
to travel on the runway. The difficult topography at the northern hot spot may mislead
pilots into entering the wrong runway, and the hold line at E6 is so close to the runway
that aircraft holding short of the runway beyond the hold line may easily collide with
landing aircraft.
attributes to its program for runway incursion prevention.
A study found that the assignments to categories have changed from 2009 on, and that
similar events that have been considered severity category A or B before 2009 are now
categorized as C. In a survey of the incidents of 2010, only 5% of 174 pilots, including 75
airline pilots, agreed with the severity that was assigned by the FAA [15]. The assignments
given by the pilot survey group would apparently raise the number of A and B incidents
to a total number of 28.
The majority of runway incursions results from PD and VPD. However, a closer look at the
FAA statistics reveals that the OE and PD make up the major part of the serious runway
incursions of types A and B (see Figure 5.1.6). Therefore, runway incursion prevention
technology should address PD and OE with priority. The ratio of runway incursions that
result in a collision can be estimated at 1 collision in 300 runway incursions [120].
104
Year RI-FAA RI/M.Ops A,B A,B Comm. Total Ops(arir06)
2003 7842(323) 12.5(5.1) 32 10 (62.783.048)
2004 7922(326) 12.5(5.2) 28 9 (63.124.797)
2005 779(327) 12.3(5.2) 29 9 63.104.415 (63.108.846)
2006 816(330) 13.4(5.4) 31 10 61.076.341(61.334.693)
2007 892(3671) 14.6(6.04) 24 8 61.133.748
2008 1009(4151) 17.2(7.04) 25 9 58.562.343
2009 951(3911) 17.9(7.3)/14.9(6.14) 12 2 52.928.3165/63.774.3003
2010 966(3971) 18.9(7.75)/13.9(5.74) 6 ? 51.249.4765/69.450.3003
Total 6.989 181(187) 575 503.009.100
Table 5.2: FAA runway incursions overview. The second column lists the total number
of runway incursion incidents, the numbers in brackets refer to the old FAA runway
incursion definition. The third column shows the ratio of runway incursion per million
operations. The fourth column lists the total number of category A and B incidents. The
fifth column lists the total number of category A and B incidents involving commercial
airliners. The last column contains the total number of airport landing and take-off
operations.1 Estimate based on the number of FAA incidents. 2Estimate based on the
number of incidents according to an old FAA definition (before 2004). 3Estimate based
on the FAA traffic forecast. 4 Calculated from estimated incidents. 5 New numbers from
[84].
5.2 Theory of Runway Incursion Prevention Systems
Runway incursion prevention technology is based on protecting measures against causes
that lead to a runway incursion and providing alerts during the cause of a runway incur-
sion. For example, safety logic could prevent Air Traffic Control (ATC) from commis-
sioning more than one aircraft to use the same runway, thus providing protection against
this type of Operational Error (OE). To achieve this runway incursion protection requires
removing the human from the loop as much as possible. Thus, the general architecture of
runway incursion prevention technology looks like the architecture shown in Figure 5.2.
The primary input to the system is given by information from various sensors and from
traffic information service networks. This information is usually fused by multi sensor
data fusion, integrating background information such as maps and movement models into
tracks describing the movements at the airport. This description is evaluated, and ATC
commands such as route information are integrated to assess the traffic situation, to pre-
dict conflicts and to detect runway incursions. Information about the traffic situation is
given to ATC, pilots and vehicles via a human machine interface (HMI), e.g., an Elec-
tronic Flight Bag (EFB) if available, and signals at the airport or via radio telephony
(RTF) are from an Air Traffic Controller (ATCO). The fact that the architecture commu-
nication of the distributed components belongs to the technology is important because a
communication infrastructure to support high speed data transfers from/to sensors and
signals distributed across the airport is not always available. For example, the opera-
tion of intelligent signals on serial circuits requires the use of power line communication
technology with sophisticated algorithms to ensure real-time constraint compliance.
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Figure 5.8: Runway incursion types in numbers and as type ratios. For runway incursion
prevention technology, the distribution among categories A and B are of interest. Oper-
ational errors and pilot deviations contribute substantially to the most dangerous types
of runway incursions, while vehicle/pedestrian deviations result in only a few serious in-
cidents.
5.2.1 The Importance of Situational Awareness
Previous and current studies on this topic agree that situational awareness is a key to
runway incursion avoidance and the safe handling of runway incursions. Almost no flight
crew intentionally taxis active runways. In [119], the authors estimate a reduction rate
of 80% from experiments to be reachable by enhancing the situational awareness of flight
crews and ATCs. Current installations of Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal
(FAROS) and Runway Status Lights (RWSL) have been found to reduce runway incur-
sions by 70% at the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW). The success of the
installation at DFW, even though it is below the estimated reduction rate from the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) study [119], is likely related to its
ability to help flight crews avoid runway incursions. Basically, there are two approaches
to prevent runway incursions: avoiding entering a runway in use and detecting an im-
minent runway incursion as early as possible and resolve the situation. The abilities to
prevent a runway incursion directly depend on the surveillance system that provides the
input for the systems or persons dealing with this problem. The importance of a reli-
able, effective and accurate surveillance system with a coverage of the maneuvering area
of an airport cannot be understated; this opinion is supported by other research reports
[119, 102, 103, 48, 104]. The integration of Runway Incursion Prevention and Alerting
Systems (RIPAS) into the work flow of the ATC also depends on the reliability of the
surveillance technology [104]. In the following, the approaches and their dependency on
the accuracy of the surveillance system is discussed.
Runway Incursion Avoidance
The ability of a flight crew to avoid inadvertently entering an active runway is called
avoidance. Young and Jones [119] distinguish between 3 influential factors: Own Ship
Position Awareness, Route Awareness and Route Deviation Detection. Other authors
also include Runway Activity Status as an influential key factor [49, 102]. For a better
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Figure 5.9: The basic formal architecture of a runway incursion prevention system. The
primary input to the system is provided by sensors and traffic information services and
is input from Air Traffic Controller (ATCO) and pilots via a Human Machine Interface
(HMI). From this information, the system assesses the traffic situation and provides warn-
ings or alerts to pilots and ATCOs via airfield lighting signals or HMIs.
understanding of the downstream text, a short description of these terms is provided.
1. Own Ship Position Awareness: The ability of a flight crew to estimate the position
of their own aircraft on the aerodrome, for vehicles without the means to determine
their position directly via Global Positioning System (GPS) and Map; an accurate
surveillance system enables ATCs to inform traffic participants of their position.
2. Route Awareness: The ability of a flight crew to map the routing instructions given
by ATCs to the topography of the aerodrome. With sufficiently accurate surveil-
lance, routing information could be directly and automatically given to the pilots,
via visual inputs, i.e., following the green paradigm.
3. Route Deviation Detection: A frequent cause for runway incursions is the devia-
tion of aircraft from their designated route. ATCs can inform flight crews if they
leave their designated route. Because of the topology of the airports, the specified
requirements appear to be sufficient at first glance; however, a currently deployed
system could detect a vehicle leaving a taxiway and crossing a runway at a high
speed but not as fast as desired.
4. Runway Activity Status: Runway status signals that show the activity status of
the runway work much like traffic lights for road traffic. If the status of a runway
is clearly visible to traffic participants, then they are unlikely to enter a runway
that is designated for use for another aircraft, even if they do not know where they
are. This feature does not depend heavily on the accuracy of the surveillance if the
signals are set by ATCs as soon as the runway is designated to another aircraft. If
the signals are set only by the detection of runway traffic, then accuracy becomes
more important for preventing conflicting situations.
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Runway Incursion Detection
The ability to detect a runway incursion enables the involved parties to respond accord-
ingly and to prevent, or at least minimize, the damage. Three key factors appear to
contribute to the ability to detect a runway incursion.
1. Traffic Position Awareness: The accuracy and delay of the surveillance do directly
determine the quality of the traffic position awareness. This consideration is im-
portant because the accuracy of the traffic positions directly affects the delay from
the incursion to the alert. During their research, the developers of the Runway
Incursion Prevention System (RIPS) found that, in scenarios that involve a landing
plane [119], the six second delay needed to inform the pilots of the landing aircraft
could be the time needed to prevent a fraction of the accidents.
2. Own Ship Position Awareness: The ability of a flight crew to estimate the position of
their own aircraft allows it to notice that they are about to enter an active runway,
or that the runway they are on has just been designated to another plane, given
that the flight crew has access to the runway activity status. If their own position
awareness and traffic position awareness is good, then an imminent runway incursion
can be detected easily. The accuracy of the surveillance determines the ability of
the flight crews to observe the actions of other traffic participants, i.e., to determine
whether a plane is holding short of a runway or entering the runway.
3. Runway Activity Status: Because the definition of a runway incursion is based on the
activity of the runway, the activity status of a runway is very important information.
Regarding surveillance accuracy, the same constraints apply as for runway incursion
avoidance.
5.2.2 Good Runway Incursion Technology
RIPAS should enhance own position awareness, route awareness and traffic position aware-
ness of both ATC and traffic participants. The runway activity status should be known
to all of the traffic participants and the ATC. RIPAS should react immediately to route
deviations and runway incursions and provide direct and immediate information to both
the flight crew and the controllers [119, 102, 103]. If RIPAS satisfies these requirements,
then the following would happen:
1. Decrease the probabilities for events leading to a runway incursion, thus leading to
a reduced runway incursion ratio.
2. Decrease the severity of the outcome of runway incursions and prevent accidents
The general idea behind this assumption is that the traffic depends on a series of decisions
by humans. Both false and insufficient information can lead to poor decisions. Figure 5.10
shows how RIPAS affects the safety of airport operations. By providing reliable sufficient
information by means of technology, poor decisions will be minimized. The remaining
poor decisions will be noticed by surveillance and control technology and, depending on
the situation after a poor decision, a warning or an alert will be issued. RIPAS technology
can be installed in vehicles, aircraft, and at the airport. Many different technologies by
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Figure 5.10: A simplified view on the impact of RIPAS technology on airport operations.
False or insufficient information (in gray) leads to poor decisions (such as crossing a closed
hold line), which result in dangerous operations. RIPAS attempts to provide reliable
information that is sufficient for good decisions (such as showing the status of a hold line
by signals). The remaining poor decisions should be detected by RIPAS, and a warning
should be issued to prevent dangerous operations. If dangerous operations occur anyway,
then the system shall issue an alert so that the operation can be canceled and a status of
safe operation can be obtained.
different vendors can operate in parallel to maximize the safety net effect. Thus, RIPAS
should provide a standard interface to communicate its data to other RIPA Systems.
A rather abstract mathematical model of the influence of such technology is shown in
Figure 5.11. Here the operation of the airport is modeled using a Markov model. Most
time the airport is in the mode safe ground traffic, but there is a slight chance of an
imminent runway incursion that may slip the notice of the involved parties. This imminent
runway incursion develops to a runway incursion.
Figure 5.11: Airport operation without RIPAS.
Most runway incursions resolve into an incident without consequences and the airport
returns to the safe ground traffic mode. In the unlucky case the runway incursion re-
sults in an accident, nevertheless the airport resumes normal operation afterward. The
equilibrium probabilities are given per operation in this Markov model, and have been
computed with an arbitrary precision number libraries. Probabilities per hour or year can
be calculated from these based on the number of operations per year. For major airports
this may result in between 10-30 runway incursions.
The model in Figure 5.12 shows the influence of a RIPAS. Transition probabilities are the
same, but two new nodes and some new edges are in the model. The RIPAS influence
begins when a runway incursion is imminent. The RIPAS detects the imminent runway
incursion with a high probability. For the detection probability SIL 1 is assumed for the
RIPAS which is not met by any currently deployed system but is a desirable reference.
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Figure 5.12: Airport operation with RIPAS.
If an imminent runway incursion is detected the alerting functionality of the system will
very likely enable the involved parties to resolve the situation without an accident. The
likelihood for preventing a runway incursion based on alerting systems has been estimated
from NASA studies. Even if the situation cannot be resolved and develops into a runway
incursion, the involved parties are much more aware of the dangerous situation which
will result in a better ability to react accordingly. So even at this stage there is a high
probability to resolve the situation and prevent an accident. The Markov model analysis
show that the probability for an accident is 20 time lower compared to the model without a
RIPAS. The probability of an undetected runway incursion is about 106 times lower than
without a RIPAS. The model can be refined to reflect OE, PD, and VPD occurrences
and local circumstances at individual airports, but this was not done because of time
constraints on the project.
Based on these model one could argue that a RIPAS that only detects half of the im-
minent runway incursions would also increase the safety of the airport significantly and
therefore there is no need to make a RIPAS very reliable. This is not the case because
unreliable technology is turned of or ignored by the people running the airports as well as
by pilots. Both parties require reliable equipment to work with and have refused to work
with unreliable systems in the past. There are several runway incursion incidents where
unreliable RIPAS where turned off because of the high rate of false alarms.
The probabilities show another problem. The HMI must be very clear in its meaning if
there is a runway incursion, because runway incursions do not happen that often in the
live of a ATCO or pilot and therefore an unclear HMI message might be ignored. This
has happened in several runway incursion incidents in the past, where RIPAS issued an
alert, but the personnel was not able to understand the meaning of the rather abstract
alerting signal.
5.2.3 Runway Incursion Prevention Key Technologies
To realize a system with the general formal architecture or a part of it, key technologies are
used. These provide the basic components from which RIPAS can be build. Often proven-
in-use equipment is the first choice when new RIPAS are developed. The following text
introduces the most important key technologies related to runway incursion alerting and
prevention, especially surveillance sensors, traffic information networks, human machine
interfaces and algorithms for tracking vehicles and assessing the traffic situation, including
the detection of runway incursions.
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Surveillance Sensors
Surveillance sensors provide information about their environment, which is usually pre-
processed into a compact meaningful representation by the sensor. They can be part of
an airport infrastructure or part of an aircraft and/or other mobile units. Not all cur-
rently available sensors are equally suited for runway incursion prevention. With respect
to airport traffic surveillance, cooperative and non-cooperative sensor technologies can
usually be distinguished. Cooperative sensor technology requires that a part of the tech-
nology be installed in the aircraft or vehicle that the sensor is measuring, for example,
active transponders. In contrast, non-cooperative sensor technology does not need any
part on the other side but instead usually requires more complex and often less robust
methods to provide meaningful information. Global sensors cover most of the area that
is under surveillance while localized sensors measure only a part of the area. As a result,
localized sensors usually provide more accurate information at a high update rate, while
information from global sensors is less accurate and has a slower update rate. However,
localized sensors have the drawback that, unless they have their own tracking and situa-
tion assessment functionality on board, they need to transmit the sensor data to ATC for
further processing, which requires up to many kilometers of new cables. Limitations in
the bandwidth of power line communications usually do not allow the sensors to transmit
all of the sensor data via a power line, especially if there is more than one sensor.
Traffic Information Service Networks
Traffic information service networks (TISN) provide information on the local traffic situ-
ation. This information can be the position of an aircraft that tracks its own movement
via GPS and is sometimes supported by inertial sensors or tracks from an airport traffic
surveillance system. A runway incursion prevention technology based only on TISN has
the drawback that it does not consider mobiles that do not participate in the network,
unless they are under the surveillance of an airport participating in TISN. Additionally,
TISN could suffer from communication errors or might be entirely shut down for security
reasons.
Tracking Algorithms
Tracking algorithms integrate information from different sources, such as sensors and
TISN, to generate tracks that represent an aircraft or vehicle. Filtering provides a means
of interpolating or predicting the state of the tracks in the time between the sensor up-
dates. Popular tracking algorithms are particle filters and Kalman filters. These methods
encompass a wide variety of techniques that are adapted to specific purposes and that have
been applied, with great success, to airport traffic surveillance. However, even the best
tracking algorithms cannot compensate for inaccurate sensor information when detecting
rare events such as runway incursions.
Situation Assessment Algorithms (SAA)
Because of the complexity and the dynamics of airport traffic operations, both the ATC
and traffic participants cannot be fully aware of dangerous situations even when they have
full information that is provided by a reasonable HMI. Situation assessment algorithms
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(SAA) analyze a set of tracks, background information, such as airport maps, and auxiliary
information, such as routing information, to assess the traffic situation and to detect
possible conflicts such as runway incursions. Situation assessment algorithms can also
provide predictions about the usage of runways and taxiways in the near future, supporting
ground handling and movement control (GMC) and ATC. SAAs work well as long as the
traffic data are accurate, timely, and reliable [10]. However, this scenario is usually not the
case, and sensor data are often unreliable, suffering from systematic and random errors
that cause the wrong detection of non-existing conflicting traffic situations (false alerts)
or a late detection of truly existing runway incursions [119, 10, 110, 53].
Human Machine Interfaces and Signals
All of the information would be of less use if it were not available to the appropriate
involved parties. Human machine interfaces, such as intelligent interactive airport maps
for ATC, GMC or as part of the EFB for pilots, are well suited for this purpose but often
require a retrofit of the cockpit or workstations and a communication infrastructure in
the airport. The alternative is to have signals that indicate important information to the
traffic participants, e.g., the runway activity status or runway incursion alerts. However,
the installation of signals is a costly process. If airports do not want to install kilometers
of cable, then existing power lines must be used to communicate with signals.
5.3 Available Systems for Runway Incursion Avoid-
ance and Detection
Most of the currently operating or proposed Runway Incursion Prevention and Alert-
ing Systems (RIPAS) use standard technology components. An overview of the different
technological implementations of the functionality that were introduced in the previous
section as well as RIPAS systems is given. In the following full scale systems supporting
runway prevention are introduced. These systems strongly rely on readily available stan-
dard key technologies. Readers unfamiliar with airport technology such as traffic signals,
sensors and human machine interfaces like airport surface traffic displays may refer to
the Appendix A for details on these systems. Another crucial part of these systems are
the underlying algorithms. Most of these algorithms follow the same basic ideas that
are explained first before the section continuous with a concise description of full scale
RIPAS.
5.3.1 Runway Incursion Detection Algorithms
Runway Incursion Prediction and Detection Algorithms (RIPDA) are algorithms that
detect runway incursions in their early stages or predict them before they really happen.
In the following text the basic theory of the detection and prediction of runway incursions
is introduced.
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Figure 5.13: Important zones for the generic runway conflict detection algorithm. The
most important area is the runway, including the runway entrance area to the hold lines.
At speed test areas on the taxiway in front of the hold line, a vehicle is checked for whether
it is approaching a closed hold line at high speed. Approach Detection Zones are used to
automatically determine whether an aircraft is about to land on a runway.
Generic Runway Conflict Detection:
The generic runway conflict detection approach is to track only traffic participants inside
a designated area around a runway. This approach is used by PathProx, Runway Safety
Monitor (RSM), and Basic-Runway Safety Net (B-RSN) algorithms. Often dedicated
volumes on the airport surface and on the final approach paths are used to determine
specific variables needed for the detection of a runway conflict. To clarify the following
explanation of the different zones Figure 5.1.5 provides a simplified view of these volumes.
Depending on the topographic position the following volumes can be distinguished.
Runway Area: The runway itself is a very important area for runway incursion pre-
diction and detection. Depending on the traffic situation on the runway and in the air, a
runway can be active or inactive. It is possible to determine the runway activity status
automatically given traffic surveillance equipment with reasonable accuracy.
Final Approach Detection Zones: Final Approach Detection Zones (FADZ) are ar-
eas extending from the runway threshold to about 2nm along the corridor used by aircraft
for the final approach on runway. They are used to detect aircraft that are about to land
on the runway or taking off from the runway.
Speed Test Areas: Runway Incursion Speed Test Areas (RISTA) are areas on the
taxiway in front of a hold line. The algorithm tries to predict, based on the estimated
speed of the vehicle, if the vehicle is to overrun a hold line/stop bar. To avoid nuisance
alerts the algorithm should be informed about the status of the stop bar and/or the
activity status of the runway. RISTAs can be used by both cockpit and airport based
systems.
Virtual Stop Bars: Virtual Stop Bars are hold lines under surveillance. If a vehicle
crosses the line without clearance a stop bar violation is detected. Because estimated
positions of vehicles, tracked with primary surveillance equipment, moving at low speeds
may jump backwards, just testing for the crossing of a line might result in false alerts.
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Algorithms based on secondary surveillance equipment can be used for a more reliable
surveillance of virtual stop bars. Virtual stop bars are used mostly by airport based
RIPAS.
Restricted Areas: The areas around positions dedicated for aircraft to wait for their
take-off roll can be defined as restricted areas. These areas can be used to determine
the activity status of the runway or detect traffic without proper clearance. They are
particular useful together with digital Air Traffic Control (ATC) routing and clearance
information. If such information is available and the tracked vehicle is labeled, either
manually or by the use of a cooperative transponder, the algorithm can detect deviations
between route, clearance and vehicle position. However manually labeling has been found
to be prone to false identification in operational test [53].
Scenario Based Runway Incursion Detection: Prediction and detection can be
done based on traffic scenarios e.g.: PathProx distinguishes over 40 runway incursion
scenarios. The course of runway incursions often follows a similar pattern. By matching
the movement of the traffic near the runway to these patterns it is possible to detect
situations that may evolve into a runway incursion and detect runway incursions. This
approach allows the use of two stage alerting systems, particular suited for cockpit use.
If a traffic situation can evolve into a runway incursion a warning is issued to draw the
attention of the pilots to the dangerous situation. In case of a runway incursion an alert is
issued. However some of the more serious incursion incidents happen in normal situations;
e.g. if an aircraft, that was waiting at a hold line, taxis onto an active runway because of
a wrong clearance or a deviation of the pilot. These scenarios can pose a problem because
a warning is inappropriate for a normal situation like an aircraft waiting at a hold line
next to an active runway.
Runway Activity Status Detection: The activity status of a runway can be de-
termined automatically, manually by ATC or using a mixture of both approaches. The
automatic detection has the advantage that it can support Air Traffic Controllers (ATCO)
during their work, acting as a safety net. It can also be used to activate stop bars and
set signals automatically, e.g. Runway Status Light System (RWLS) and Final Approach
Runway Occupancy System (FAROS) with Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model
X (ASDE-X) input switches RWLS and FAROS components according to the runway ac-
tivity status. Runways become active if they are used for take-off or landing operations,
regardless of the status of the runway as supposed by ATC. The automatic detection of
the runway activity status works also for wrong runway landings or take offs. Algorithms
for the automatic detection of the activity on the runway have been applied with suc-
cess during ASDE-X and Advanced - Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
(A-SMGCS) tests. Because it is not recommended to set the runway activity status to
active whenever there is some vehicle on the runway, the following criterion can be used
to determine the activity status of a runway.
Final Approach The detection of aircraft on their final approach to a runway is done
by checking the path of aircraft that are not on the ground. If the aircraft is within
the approach corridor of a runway for some time and the trajectory of the aircraft is
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converging on the runway, the algorithm assumes that the aircraft is on its final approach
on the runway. The runway activity status of the runway is set to active. This algorithm
works for technology on the side of the approaching aircraft as well as for airport based
systems.
High Speed Traffic: The runway activity status is set to active if there is traffic on
the runway that exceeds a certain speed limit and is traveling along the runway. Setting a
runway active when a vehicle is crossing but not traveling along the runway when following
its taxi route or during take-off or landing is not recommended. Because non cooperative
aircraft do not send their positions via Automatic Depended Surveillance - Broadcast
(ADS-B) cockpit based systems may not be able to detect all traffic unless they are using
Traffic Information Service - Broadcast (TIS-B) from airports.
Stationary Traffic: The status of a runway can be set to active if there is moving or
stationary traffic at the end of a runway. If an aircraft remains long enough in a restricted
area the runway activity status is set to active. The assumption behind this is that an
aircraft on this position is about to begin the take-off roll or not exiting the runway after
a landing.
Stop Bar Violation Detection: Stop bar violations are often very dangerous situa-
tions, they happen whenever a vehicle crosses a hold line while entering an active runway
from the taxiway. Stop bar violations are detected using different approaches. If tracking
data is available the algorithm determines if the position of the vehicle moves across the
stop bar. Due to the accuracy of the primary surveillance equipment this may lead to
false alarms or missed alarms. False alerts can be minimized by using a margin around
the stop bar that the vehicle must leave before an alert is raised. Short and medium
range sensors like Universal Medium Range Radar (UMMR) or cameras, can be used to
provide a reasonable surveillance accuracy at stop bars allowing the timely detection of
stop bar violations. Alternatively some airports use inductive loops, microwave barriers or
magnetic field sensors to directly detect stop bar violations. To determine the direction of
traffic often at least two sensors are used, although some sensor provide vehicle signatures
that can used to identify type and direction of travel of a vehicle. Both approaches may
be combined, in such a configuration, usually the secondary surveillance system overrides
the primary system, e.g. if a stop bar violation is detected by inductive loop sensors, while
the information from the Surface Movement Radar (SMR) still indicates that the vehicle
is likely still in front of the stop bar, an alert is issued based on the information from the
inductive loop sensor. Unless the SMR detects the aircraft clearly behind the hold line,
no alert will be issued if the inductive loop sensors give no indication that the aircraft is
passing the hold line. Depending on the performance of the surveillance airports require
pilots to stop their aircraft at least some meters before stop bars to avoid false alerts.
Stop Bar Violation Prediction: It is also possible to predict the violation of a stop
bar if the position and speed of a vehicle can be estimated with sufficient accuracy. If a
vehicle is approaching a hold line to an active runway or a closed (virtual) stop bar with
such high speed that it cannot stop in front of the hold line the violation of the stop bar
can be predicted before the violation happens. Often dedicated speed test areas are used
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for this purpose. Note that the accuracy of primary surveillance equipment is often not
as good as desirable for a reliable and timely detection if the speed of the vehicle is not
very fast. Secondary surveillance equipment can be used to counter such problems.
Route Deviation Detection: To reliable detect route deviations an algorithm needs
at least to know the routes assigned to each vehicle and the surveillance equipment must
be able to identify the observed vehicles. If a vehicle is too far from its route a route
deviation is detected. Route deviations are more difficult with non-cooperative vehicles
where no id is available, especially if more than one of these vehicles are concerned.
While it is still possible to define any taxiway and runway part that is not on the route
as restricted area and detect a route deviation if a vehicle moves there, a vehicle may still
move on the route of another vehicle. If routing information given via Radio telephony
(RTF) is not conform to the route entered into the RIPAS nuisance alerts may result. A
solution is the digital transmission of the route to the aircraft, but changes in the route via
RTF can still occur. Although nuisance routing alerts are correct from a technical point
of view, they disturb the work of ATCOs and may cause them to turn off the system.
Conflicting Clearance Detection: A RIPAS can detect or prohibit conflicting clear-
ances e.g. it can refuse to open a stop bar leading to an active runway or prevent the
different ATCOs from giving different aircraft clearance for take-off on intersecting run-
ways. Of course ATCOs may still override RIPAS decisions via RTF.
Runway Incursion Detection Algorithms:
A range of algorithms have been developed in the past, and some are currently under
development. Among these are:
AMASS: This early algorithm is not recommended for use by some studies [57]. Other
sources found that AMASS generates alerts much slower than RIAAS or RIM [9]. AMASS
has been found to be unreliable under certain conditions [102], and too slow to prevent
runway collisions [80]. Given the constraints applied by surveillance and computational
equipment available at the time AMASS was developed, the algorithm could not be ex-
pected to perform much better.
ASDE-X Safety Logic: The safety logic of the ASDE-X system is a set of algorithms
that uses ASDE-X surveillance data as input to predict and detect conflicting traffic
situations. The algorithms can also be used to control automatic warning and alert signals
at the airport. ASDE-X has issued timely alarms in some runway incursion incidents.
RIAAS: The Runway Incursion Advisory and Alerting System (RIAAS) algorithm is
designed for cockpit based operations to detect runway incursions involving the own air-
craft. It generates two types of alerts, analogous to the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoid-
ance System (TACAS) approach. Runway Traffic Alerts (RTA) should caution the flight
crew of a potential dangerous situation while runway conflict alerts (RCA) require the
pilots to take immediate action to avoid a collision. The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) published a description of the system in 2005 [9].
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RSM: A description of the Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) algorithm used for the detec-
tion of runway incursions was published in January 2002 by the NASA [59]. Interestingly
RSM relies strongly on a preprocessing of the data of the various sources and the first
version could only handle 1 non cooperative traffic participant in a runway incursion area.
PathProx: PathProx is an aircraft based incursion alerting algorithm designed to han-
dle over 40 different runway incursion scenarios [11]. It is the commercial Version of the
RIAAS developed by the NASA in a commercial cooperation. A description of PathProx
/ RIAAS was published in May 2005 by the NASA [9]. The applicability of the algorithm
in scenarios without sensor and transmission errors has been shown in a Monte-Carlo
simulation.
RIM: The Runway Incursion Monitor (RIM) denotes algorithms used by the Deutsche
Flugsicherung (DFS). After an incident in 2004 where the RIM had been disabled by ATC
because of its unreliability, the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation
(BFU) recommended that the DFS should improve the RIM to give reliable indications.
This shows that European aviation administration had similar problems as the FAA with
early RIPAS.
B-RSN: Basic Runway Safety Net (B-RSN) is a term for technology detecting runway
conflicts based on A-SMGCS Level 1 and Level 2 information. PRIMA is a B-RSN class
algorithm evaluated during the EMMA2 Project. Except for a few simulations runs where
the traffic surveillance created phantom tracks resulting in nuisance alerts, the algorithm
worked as expected. Further information on B-RSN and PRIMA can be found in an
A-SMGCS Test Report [12].
A-RSN: An Advanced Runway Safety Net (A-RSN) is an improvement of B-RSN mak-
ing use of A-SMGCS Level-3 services like electronic flight strips (EFS). Using this in-
formation route deviation detection is possible allowing an early resolution of a possible
conflict. It can be considered as an add-on to B-RSN systems detecting aircraft in Runway
Protection Areas (RPA) that do not behave compliant to the instructions given by ATC
[12, 53, 32]. It has also a protection against operational errors that prevents the input of
conflicting clearances. Due to establish best practices implementation of A-RSNs should
be minimal with respect to the necessary rule set [32]. FISSA is an A-RSN class algorithm
evaluated during the EMMA2 Project. Further information on A-RSN and FISSA can
be found in an A-SMGCS Test Report [12].
XL-RIAS-Algorithm: Runway-Incursion-Prediction-Detection-Algorithm: This algo-
rithm uses runway incursions zones similar to the RSM algorithm. The algorithm uses
information from ATC as well as traffic surveillance data from local sensors to determine
the activity status of a runway. The algorithm also performs an analysis of the speed and
distance to the hold line to predict stop bar violations.
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5.3.2 RIPAS systems
In the past, a number of solutions for runway incursion avoidance and detection were pro-
posed, including the Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS), the Airport Surface
Detection Equipment - Model X (ASDE-X), the Runway Status Light System (RWSL),
the Airport Movement Safety System (AMASS), the Final Approach Runway Occupancy
System (FAROS), The Runway Incursion Monitoring, Detection, and Alerting System
(RIMDAS) and the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
SMGCS). Of these, only A-SMGCS and ASDE-X in conjunction with RWSL and FAROS
have been deployed at a significant number of major airports.
• RIMCAS: The Runway Incursion Monitoring and Conflict Alert System (RIMCAS)
uses vector calculations to predict possible conflicts between aircraft or other objects
• RAAS: The Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) was developed by
Honeywell.
• RIMDAS: The Runway Incursion Monitoring, Detection, and Alerting System is
a design for an inexpensive local surveillance system that provides audible alerts
to involved flight crews. RIMDAS is not comparable to existing technology solu-
tions because it is based on some strong assumptions about the performance of
experimental sensors and data fusion algorithms.
• AMASS is a system that was originally designed by the FAA for runway incursion
detection. It failed its expectations because of bad prediction and a high frequency
of false alarms. The focus has shifted to runway collision prevention [102], but 2005
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that AMASS does not
provide alarms early enough to prevent runway collisions .
• RWSL provides a means of protection by automatically setting the lighting of the
runway in such a way that flight crews will notice whether a runway is occupied
or not. Depending on the sensors that are used, the system could be too slow
to react immediately and will thus prevent only some of the runway incursions.
According to the specifications of the FAA, the RWSL uses traffic data from the
ASDE-X as primary input [3]. RWSL is currently deployed to 23 U.S. airports.
More Information can be found online at [65].
• FAROS is a system based on light cues to warn flight crews and ATCs during a
final approach of a runway if the runway is or becomes occupied. FAROS require
input from a surveillance system to determine the status of a runway. Experimental
setups have been using inductive loop sensors embedded in the runway. The Version
at DFW uses the ASDE-X system to monitor the entire runway surface.
• ASDE-X is a Fusion of SMR, Multilateration Radar and ADS-B that provides en-
hanced HMI to ATC. This system achieves a better resolution in time and space
as an SMR-based system as well as a better accuracy of position reports. However,
depending on the airport topography, a complete coverage of the airport surface is
seldom possible, and problems have been found with non-cooperative aircraft and
ground vehicles. ASDE-X Safety Logic (AXS) is expected to enhance the situational
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awareness of ATCs by detecting possible collisions early and provides visual and au-
dible alerts to controllers. ASDE-X installations are expensive, and its surveillance
of hot spots is not as reliable and accurate as systems using localized sensors could
be.
• RIPS was developed at NASA in 2001. This system relies on algorithms that are
applied to the traffic situation, as observed by the traffic surveillance of airports.
Thus, its performance depends heavily on the performance of the tracking and
surveillance equipment that is available. For most airports, these instruments that
provide data for immediate reactions consist of long range sensors with a limited
resolution in time and space. Additionally, the system provides input via a heads
up display that requires a retrofit of most cockpits, making it extremely expensive.
• PathProx is a system that is developed from RIPS. It provides runway incursion
warnings and runway incursion alerts to flight crews who are equipped with Path-
Prox. PathProx relies on ADS-B and TIS-B as input to its algorithms.
• A-SMGCS is an improvement of the SMGCS. Although studies on the Surface
Movement and Guidance Control System included localized sensors already in 1998
[75], the current installations of A-SMGCS require only SMR, Multilateration and
ADS-B for operations but can also integrate other sensors. A-SMGCS installations
are expensive, and the surveillance of hot spots is not as reliable and accurate as
systems using localized sensors could be. A-SMGCS has four levels of operation:
surveillance, monitoring, planning, and guidance and control.
• XL-RIAS is an experimental localized runway incursion alerting system that focuses
on the detection of planes entering a runway from a taxiway. This system can be
used as a standalone solution, to enhance the sensor accuracy at hot spots, and to
provide sensor coverage in blind spots.
• RunwayGuard is based on the integration of micro magnetic field sensors into AS-
MGCS; using only passive sensors, it has interesting capabilities compared to in-
duction loops and other localized sensors.
• Mobile Application Based Systems (MABS) are software solutions for hand held de-
vices with built-in GPSs. However, the accuracy of the dynamic position estimation
of such devices is often not as good as required, and there are open issues regarding
the safety and security of this approach. Still, this approach could be an interesting
solution for GAs.
5.4 Performance Simulation Study
This section addresses the performance of the available runway incursion systems. It is
strongly based on the results of several studies on the performance of Runway Incursion
Prevention and Alerting Systems (RIPAS) that have been published [9, 119, 104, 10, 109,
53, 59, 23, 110, 12, 55]. Because of the different setups of the incursion scenarios, these
are seldom directly comparable. Data on the performance of Airport Surface Detection
Equipment- Model X (ASDE-X), Runway Status Lights (RWSL) and Final Approach
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Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) is published in the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Annual Safety Report. The Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control
System (A-SMGCS) concept has been tested in comparative setups during European Air-
port Movement Management by A-SMGCS (EMMA) and European Airport Movement
Management by A-SMGCS 2 (EMMA2) projects. The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) has published studies on Runway Incursion Prevention System
(RIPS), RIAAS and RMS. These studies assume the availability of Automatic Dependency
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and data links, so incursions with non-cooperative traf-
fic participants are hardly covered. In some cases, independent studies on surveillance
technology [77, 78] have been used to estimate performance parameters where no detailed
information could be found in the RIPAS studies. Missing data have also been supple-
mented by the simulation of a runway incursion scenario with different sensor setups that
are typically used for ASDE-X and A-SMGCS, for cooperative and non-cooperative traf-
fic participants. To evaluate the performance of a runway incursion system, it is useful
to begin with the causes of runway incursions. As mentioned in the previous sections,
Pilot Deviations (PD) and Operational Errors (OE) contribute the most to class A and B
Runway Incursions. Therefore, the focus is on the measures of protection against faults
leading to runway incursion. It is useful to distinguish between the measures of pro-
tection for the prevention of runway incursions and the performance when addressing
runway incursions that happen despite the operation of warning systems, i.e., the alert-
ing performance. These functionality depends on the surveillance function of the system.
In the study from NASA, all of the false alerts and missed detections could be traced
back to sensor and data transmission errors [119]. Similar findings during the EMMA2
project [110] and other studies on A-SMGCS [62] support the position that the reliability
of the surveillance is of utmost importance. Apparently, the maturity of the surveillance
technology and the local circumstances set limits for the operational performance of the
runway incursion prevention technology.
5.4.1 Surveillance Performance
For ASDE-X and A-SMGCS, requirements have been specified by the FAA and the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). With respect to accuracy, these require-
ments determine the minimal performance of the system for determining the position,
orientation, speed and identification of the vehicles at the airport. Similar requirements
can be assumed for cockpit-based systems. Both the ASDE-X and A-SMGSCS require-
ments are meant as a lower bound for the surveillance performance; a better performance
is recommended. In the EMMA2 project, it was found that no technology currently fielded
can satisfy some of the requirements for A-SMGCS systems and that the specifications
should be reconsidered in some points.
Nevertheless, technical solutions for both systems are available for cockpit based, A-
SMGCS and ASDE-X systems. For both systems, the surveillance of cooperative mo-
bile units is, in general, much better than the surveillance of non-cooperative mobile
units. It will, therefore be distinguished between the surveillance of cooperative and
non-cooperative mobile units.
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Indicator ADS-B SMR(i) MLAT
Req.position accuracy Sigma4 m Sigma+bias 5.9 m/6.5 m Sigma+bias 6.5 m/7.5 m
Emp. position accuracy Often>4 m Sigma+bias 12-15 m Sigma+bias 7.4 m/11 m
Req. probability of detection 0.995 0.9 0.92/0.999
Emp. Probability of detection 0.995 0.9 1.0/0.998
Req. Probability of false detection n.a. 0.00001 0.02
Emp. Probability of false detection n.a. 0.00001 0.02
Req. Target report update rate 1 Hz 1 Hz 2 Hz
Emp. Target report update rate 1 Hz / 0.1 Hz 1 Hz 2 Hz
Req. Delay 0.25 s 0.25 s 0.25 s
Emp. Delay 0.25 s / 2.0 s 0.25 s 0.25 s / 0.5 s
Table 5.3: Airport Surface Movement Performance Requirements for Sensors. Sigma is
calculated from the Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU) or the Horizontal Figure of
Merit (HFOM), assuming a circular uncertainty ellipse. Lines beginning with req. show
the requirements for (ASDEX/ASMGCS). Lines beginning with emp. show the perfor-
mance experienced in field studies (ideal experiment/ working conditions experiment)
[109, 77, 78, 2].
Performance Requirements
For ASDE-X and A-SMGCS, the performance requirements for the surveillance system
are quite similar. ASDE-X specs also provide requirements for the sensors systems used;
for A-SMGCS, the sensors are required to perform at least to the general surveillance re-
quirements; there are also Minimal Operational Performance Specifications (MOPS) for
the sensors that are available [29]. Dedicated functionality of cockpit-based systems, e.g.,
on-board guidance, have much higher requirements than airport-based systems. These
requirements are assumed to be sufficient to detect and prevent most runway incursions.
Because the required accuracy/uncertainty is often given in different measures for differ-
ent sensor subsystems, the accuracy/uncertainty in the following text is given by sigma
deviation assuming a bivariate normal distribution of the position estimates, as calcu-
lated from the requirements. Table 3 provides an overview on the sensor requirements for
the ASDE-X and A-SMGCS systems. However, the dedicated functions of A-SMGCS or
ASDE-X may have deviating requirements, e.g., A-SMGCS specs assume 20 m accuracy
as sufficient to detect runway incursions in time. This result should, however, not be
considered as sigma 20 m but, rather, should be considered to be reliable information
for reducing false alarms and detecting runway incursions in a timely fashion. At runway
incursion rates of 16 (FAA) to 60 (European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL)) RIs per million operations, even an accuracy of sigma 5 m would
lead to a high number of false alerts, given the calculation basis in the A-SMGCS Manual.
Surveillance of Hot Spots
Given the definition of hot spots, the surveillance of hot spots should satisfy higher re-
quirements than general surveillance. In hot spots, movements on the taxiway and the
runway could lead to a conflict in a short time, where general surveillance requirements
are not sufficient to detect conflicting situations as quickly as desired. While the ASDE-X
and A-SMGCS do not explicitly require a better surveillance of hot spots, bigger airports
employ localized surveillance technology in hot spots, particularly for the surveillance of
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hold lines.
Surveillance of Cooperative Mobiles
For A-SMGCS and ASDE-X equipment, the surveillance of cooperative mobiles, which
include humans and vehicles equipped with active and/or passive transponder technology,
is more reliable and accurate. The reason is that, in addition to the data from the
Surface Movement Radar (SMR), the data from the cooperative sensor systems can be
used to acquire information that is competitive and complementary to the data from the
SMR, resulting in an increase in timeliness, certainty, accuracy and completeness of the
surveillance data. A remaining problem is the position of the Multilateration Mode S
Radar (MLAT) antennas on the aircraft. The antennas are usually not positioned at the
center or nose of the aircraft, resulting in a systematic error of the estimated position
of the vehicle. While this error could be negligible for vehicles such as cars, it can be a
problem for larger aircraft. In addition, antennas are frequently not working or turned off.
With ADS-B, other problems exist. The first problem is that most aircraft equipment that
provides the information transmitted via ADS-B does not comply with the requirements
of A-SMGCS or ASDE-X specifications with respect to the accuracy of the data. The
second problem is the loss of data during transmission. Nevertheless, surveillance accuracy
of MLAT, ADS-B and Surface Movement Radar Improved (SMRi) systems has been
shown to satisfy A-SMGCS and ASDE-X requirements under ideal circumstances, e.g.,
with a special test vehicle at midnight on an otherwise empty airport. Under working
conditions, it was found that the requirements were often not satisfied, especially under
disadvantageous circumstances. Table 5.3 summarizes some of the findings of the field
studies.
Surveillance of Non-Cooperative Mobiles
For the surveillance of non-cooperative mobiles, data from the SMR is often not reliable,
timely or accurate enough for the implantation of the runway incursion technology that
Air Traffic Controllers (ATCO) rely on. The insufficient accuracy of such systems leads
to a high number of false alerts and missed alerts. Consequently, the systems have been
turned off by ATCOs. The required probability of detection pd for a SMRi is 0.9, thus
the probability of missing the same target for 2 seconds or longer is 0.019. For a reliable
detection of runway incursions by non-cooperative targets, local surveillance sensors must
provide the necessary accuracy and reliability when dealing with non-cooperative mobiles.
Recent advances in the development of automotive radar sensors made inexpensive sensors
well-suited to such tasks widely available. Systems based on thermal and high resolution
cameras that are well-suited to monitor runway entrance areas and to hold lines are also
available.
For the FAA, the surveillance of non-cooperative targets could become less pressing in
the future because all aircraft in the USA will be required to equip ADS-B transponders




A simulation study of the surveillance performance was done to provide an independent
comparison of the different sensor technologies that are used by RIPAS. Data fusion
is performed with a particle filter, to estimate the position, heading and speed of the
traffic. The study examines 2 vehicle movements at a taxiway / runway intersection with
8 different sensor setups. The setup of the scenario is shown in Figure 5.4.1. The location
of the setup is representative for this class of runway incursions, the pilots may not be able
to see the approach and the runway threshold as they are facing the opposite end of the
runway during the approach and the hold line is close to the runway. The circumstances
in the simulated setting are similar to those encountered in the two runway incursion
examples in Section 5.1 and many other category A and B runway incursions.
Figure 5.14: The setup of the simulation experiment. Left: Schematic map: The small
red triangle marks the position of the vehicle that follows the green marked way points.
The two green polygons indicate the boundaries of the pre hold line area and the post
hold line area that are used to determine the distance of the vehicle to the hold line. The
hold line is located at the intersection of the two areas. The reddish arcs mark the fields
of view of the two local sensors. Right: The setup as perceived in the simulator. The
aircraft is approaching the hold line with the illuminated stop bar.
In the first traffic scenario, a vehicle approaches the hold line from the taxiway, decelerates
(app. 1.2 m/s2) approximately 35 m before the hold line until it is approximately 7 m
from the hold line, and comes to a complete stop approximately 3 m in front of the hold
line. It stays there for approximately 30 seconds; then accelerates (app. 2,5 m/s2) to a
speed of app. 40 km/h and continues its way on the runway. In the second scenario, a
vehicle approaches the hold line from the taxiway, crosses the hold line and continues its
way on the runway without stopping or significantly slowing down. There are no phases
of high acceleration or deceleration in the immediate vicinity of the hold line .
These two scenarios are typical examples of the interfering traffic movement encountered
during a runway incursion from the taxiway and the non-inferring traffic encountered
during normal operations. The setup of the sensors and the vehicle movement provide
a good starting point to analyze the information basis for RIPAS alert decisions and
situation assessments.
The sensor setup for both scenarios consist of the combination of MLAT, ADS-B and
SMR, as favored by A-SMGCS and ASDE-X (Baseline Surveillance (BSurv)), and the
same combination extended by UMRR sensors (Extended Surveillance (ESurv)). The
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Figure 5.15: A representative example of surveillance performance results from simulation
for traffic scenario 4, with sensor performances according to requirements specifications.
The line dthl plots the true distance of the vehicle to the hold line and the line dthl plots
the estimated distance to the hold line (EDTHL) with Baseline Surveillance (BSurv) and
a cooperative target. The line ncdthl plots EDTHL for BSurv and a non-cooperative
target. Typical for these approaches are the overshoot when the vehicle brakes and the
lag when the vehicle accelerates again. The line rdthl plots the EDTHL for Extended
Surveillance (ESurv) and a cooperative target and the line rncdthl plots the EDTHL for
ESurv and a non-cooperative target.
first two sensor setups simulate BSurv and ESurv with a cooperative target, and the next
two simulate Bsurv and ESurv with a non-cooperative target. For these four settings,
the sensor performance satisfies the requirements of ADSE-X and A-SMGCS. The last
four setups are the same as the first four, but the sensor performance has been adjusted
to reflect the findings of field studies regarding sensor performance. Figure 5.15 shows a
typical outcome for the first 4 sensor setups and the first traffic scenario.
The primary finding of the simulation study was that, in the second traffic scenario, all
of the configurations follow the movement of the vehicle quite well. However, in the first
traffic scenarios, BSurv configurations usually follow the vehicle during deceleration and
acceleration not as well as during continuous movements. This scenario results in an
overshoot when the vehicle stops at the time window 20-30 seconds (see Figure 5.15).
This overshoot makes it difficult to distinguish between a vehicle stopping directly in
front of the hold line and one that crosses the hold line for a few seconds immediately
after the vehicle stops or crosses the hold line. The BSurv configuration also lags behind
the position of the vehicle once the vehicle begins to accelerate and crosses the hold
line at the time window of 50 to 60 seconds (see Figure 5.15). During the hold of the
vehicle, the estimated distance to the hold line fluctuates a few meters around the true
distance to the hold line. These findings apply specifically to the non-cooperative target
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setup. The ESurv configuration, in contrast, has no overshoot and immediately follows
the accelerating vehicle. The consequences for the alerting performance are discussed in
Section 5.4.3.
5.4.2 Prevention Performance
The primary task of a RIPAS is to work better than humans, who rely on technology that is
available at a specific time. Therefore, it appears reasonable to measure the performance
of RIPAS on the decrease of runway incursion severity and frequency. Based on the
statistics of the FAA ASDE-X, RWSL and FAROS installations at Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport (DFW) reduced the number of runway incursions by approximately
70%, showing that even though the technology does not satisfy the requirements under
all of the circumstances, the increase in safety is measurable. Notably, these systems
work by increasing the situational awareness of the traffic participants on the runway
and taxiway by providing information about the runway activity status and the status
of hold lines. A EUROCONTROL study found that the use of stop bars for 24 hours
resulted in an increase in safety [86]. Prevention performance can be further increased
by integration of Electronic flight Strips (EFS), routing and clearance information, as
EUROCONTROL studies show [5]. A major current problem appears to be with the
ATC - HMI. Experimental Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) have been experienced as
difficult by ATCOs, especially concerning automated routing functions; also, under some
working conditions, ATCOS prefer the view out of the window and need haptic feedback
interfaces because they do not want to look down on the airport map display to change
a stop bar state or to perform a similar operation [86].
Cockpit-based systems have been shown to prevent runway incursions by detecting route
deviations and by warning the pilot of converging traffic. They also show the locations of
hold lines and other operational topographic points relative to the aircraft. This enhanced
situational awareness has its maximum effect under conditions of limited visibility. The
performance degrades with non-cooperative traffic because this traffic is accessed through
Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) and with less accuracy. Still, Electronic
Flight Bag (EFB) can afford to provide warnings in such situations without creating a
nuisance to the pilots because take-off and landing operations usually make up for only a
small part of the overall flight time.
5.4.3 Alerting Performance
This section covers the performance of RIPAS in case there is an incident in which a run-
way incursion has already happened. The main goal of the RIPAS is to predict or detect
the incident as fast as possible and to provide an immediate alert to the involved parties.
Because evaluation studies are not totally comparable, a simulation was conducted to
estimate some of the performance parameters for a selected runway incursion scenario.
Performance estimated from Evaluation Studies
Quantitative performance measures frequently encountered in evaluation studies are the
increase in the separation distance, the number of missed alerts, and the number of false
and nuisance alerts. In some studies, actual runway incursion incidents or accidents are
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analyzed in simulations and field tests, with no RIPAS and different RIPAS configurations.
The findings of these studies show that the maximum effect is given for cooperative targets
and low visibility conditions. It was found that, for some runway incursion incidents, it
was not possible to avoid an accident without the use of a RIPAS because of the insufficient
situational awareness of the pilots, even under good visibility conditions. The separation
distance was increased by several hundred feet for many runway incursion scenarios. An
overrun of hold lines could be shortened by airport-based systems and could be reduced
even further by cockpit-based systems. However, most of the simulation studies assumed a
surveillance that outperforms the requirements, and field tests were often performed with
very good equipment. Performance evaluations under real operating conditions revealed
that the equipment found on aircraft or vehicles is not comparable to the equipment used
in the field test and that the performance of the surveillance does not necessarily meet the
specified requirements. The results of such system evaluations are, therefore, an example
for ideal conditions, assuming better surveillance technology in the future.
Simulation Performance
RIPAS evaluation studies are not directly comparable because of different test setups,
environmental conditions and other factors. Thus the alerting performance was estimated
by simulations, which allows for a comparison of different test setups. To characterize the
alerting performance, the following evaluation criteria are introduced:
1. time to detect conflict tdc: The time that passed from when the runway conflict
occurred until the system reliably detects the incident. Generally, an increase in tdc
can make up for a lack of accuracy in the surveillance with respect to the probability
of missing an alert pma due to insufficient space for a safe separation of vehicles.
2. total time to alert ttta: The time until the alert has arrived at the involved parties.
3. probability of missed alert pma: The probability of missing a runway incursion alert
strongly depends on the airport topography, especially the distances between hold
lines on runways and the accuracy of the surveillance equipment.
4. probability of false alert pfa: The probability of creating an alert without a con-
flicting situation. This probability strongly depends on the airport topography,
especially the distances between hold lines and runways and the accuracy of the
surveillance equipment.
For most systems, the performance in each of these criteria depends strongly on the
surveillance/tracking performance of the system and is different for the various runway
incursion scenarios that are indicated by many authors [9, 10, 59]. Therefore, the alerting
performance of the systems is determined based on the results of the simulation in section
5.1.
The primary finding was that, with sensors performing in accordance with the require-
ments, missed alerts did not occur but false alerts and late alerts could occur. Missed
alerts occurred and the number of late and false alerts increased for simulation Scenario 1
with sensor performance as gained during field studies, where the sensor performance was
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Figure 5.16: Distance to hold line based algorithm. The algorithm generates an alert
when the tracked position of a vehicle moves over a threshold value beyond the hold line.
not as good as required. This result is caused by the degradation in the surveillance per-
formance, resulting in an increase of the overshoot and the lag during tracking, increasing
the effects shown in Figure 5.15.
To determine the results, a distance to the hold line-based algorithm was applied to the
surveillance results from the simulations as well as from different setups for the notification
of the involved parties. This algorithm raises an alarm if a vehicle travels beyond a
predefined distance over a stop bar. The primary findings are that the time to detect a
runway incursion tdc and the probability for a false alert pfa were closely correlated; thus,
at the expense of tdc, pfa can be decreased to an acceptable margin. This result can be
achieved by raising the alert threshold distance to a distance to the hold line that is based
on an algorithm or requiring the target to persist at least for some time at a position
beyond the hold line. Figure 5.21 shows this relationship. Before discussing this finding
in detail the results from the two traffic scenarios will be discussed and compared two
each other.
Figure 5.17: Statistical evaluation of the influence of the alert threshold, based on the
distance to the hold line. An alert is issued once the vehicle’s distance from the hold
line exceeds the threshold. The chart show tdc for the first traffic scenario, with a non-
cooperative target and SMR only tracking for the surveillance of the hold line.
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Scenario 1: For both scenarios the setup of the simulated environment is the same,
see Figure 5.4.1 for details on the setup. The first scenario represents a situation every
RIPAS should be able to cope with . A vehicle approaches a hold line and holds before
the hold line awaiting clearance to proceed onto the runway. It stays there for app. 30
seconds, then continues on the runway. There are two challenges for the RIPAS: The
first challenge is that no false alarm should be raised while the vehicle is waiting. The
inability of many previously and currently deployed RIPAS to do so has caused ATCOs
to turn of the RIPAS notification. The decision of the ATCOs is quite sensible as a
false alarm would direct the attention of the ATCOs to the wrong places and evasive
maneuvers that may be triggered by the false alarm are often risky. The second challenge
is to detect a runway incursion as soon as possible, once the vehicle is moving beyond the
hold line. According to representatives of the NTSB, a total time to alert of more than
a few seconds it to much []. Figure 5.17 shows the statistical distribution of the alerting
times for distance to hold line thresholds (DTH) between 0 and 29 meters. Notable is
that, although the vehicle stops approximately 4-5 meters in front of the hold line, the
standard sensor setup, top chart in the figure, raises a false alert at DTH 0m and -1m in
almost every simulation run. The reason is the overshoot of the vehicle when it stops at
the hold line, see Figure 5.15. With respect to the tdc DTH -2m to DTH -19m is about 3-4
seconds, a stable trend is visible only below DTH -12m. The reason is the high number
of false alerts at DTH between 0m and -11m, leaving not enough results for the statistical
evaluation. Not shown here are the missed alerts, where the system took more than 30
seconds to detect the runway incursion.
Figure 5.18: Statistical evaluation of the influence of the alert threshold, based on the
distance to the hold line. An alert is issued once the vehicle’s distance from the hold
line exceeds the threshold. The chart shows tdc for the first traffic scenario, with a non-
cooperative target and additional use of localized sensors for the surveillance of the hold
line.
When using localized sensors the alerting performance of the system increases significantly.
Figure 5.18 shows the statistical distribution of the time to detect conflict tdc. Notable
is the visible trend through all DTHs and the low variance of detection times. There
where no missed alerts encountered during the simulation runs. There is a number of
outliers but none of these are than 2 seconds later than the mean detection time of the
corresponding DTH. Compared to the standard sensor setup the detection time when
using localized sensors is much lower, between 0 to 4 seconds, compared to 2 - 5 seconds
without localized sensors.
Notable is the line of outliers that raises from DTH -11 to DTH -29 about two seconds
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below the mean detection time. A reason for the outliers may be particle deprivation.
A particle deprivation happens when too few particles are in the vicinity of the true
system state. This has been observed visually in the HMI. The cause is the inaccurate
tracking by the SMR before the vehicle enters the area under surveillance by the localized
sensors. The very accurate feature observations provided by the localized sensors cannot
be associated with the particles of the track, causing the system to abandon the track
and reinstate a new track. The problem can be fixed using a higher number of particles,
but this approach was too slow to run thousands of simulation runs.
Scenario 2: In the second scenario the vehicle follows the way points at steady speed
without phases of significant acceleration or deceleration. The main challenge to the
tracking is the rapid change of heading in the intersection areas before and after the
vehicle moves across the hold line, see Figure 5.4.1 for details on the setup.
Figure 5.19: Statistical evaluation of the influence of the alert threshold, based on the
distance to the hold line. An alert is issued once the vehicle’s distance from the hold line
exceeds the threshold. The two charts show tdc for the second traffic scenario, with a
non-cooperative target and SMR only tracking.
Figure 5.19 shows the detailed results for the standard sensor setup. Compared to the
first traffic scenario the runway incursion detection performance is better. There is a
visible trend through the whole DTH range because there are fewer false alerts and fewer
missed alerts. The time needed to detect the runway incursion is also reduced, but due to
the relative high speed, compared to the first traffic scenario, the proportional increase in
separation distance after an alert is less than the proportional decrease of the detection
time. Also the higher speed results in the vehicle crossing the DTH thresholds earlier.
The performance of the sensor setup using localized sensors is comparable to the perfor-
mance in the first traffic scenario, the reduced alerting times are just caused by the fact
that the vehicle has a higher speed and thus reaches the DTH threshold earlier. Notice-
able is the fact that there are fewer outliers, an evidence that supports the observation
that the inaccurate tracking before entering area under the surveillance of the localized
sensor results in a particle deprivation.
The chart in Figure 5.21 shows that tdc, pma and pfa directly correlate with the threshold
distance. Even with localized sensors, there is always a probability for a false alert,
although no missed alerts occur. Thus, the localized sensor setup reaches a reasonable
pfa = 0.02 with a threshold of -10 meters; the ASDEX/ASMGCS sensor setup reaches
the same pfa with a threshold of -19 m. At this point, the value of tdc is approximately
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Figure 5.20: Statistical evaluation of the influence of the alert threshold, based on the
distance to the hold line. An alert is issued once the vehicle’s distance from the hold
line exceeds the threshold. The chart shows tdc for the first traffic scenario, with a non-
cooperative target additional use of localized sensors for the surveillance of the hold line.
Figure 5.21: Statistical evaluation of the influence of the alert threshold, based on the
distance to the hold line. An alert is issued once the vehicle’s distance from the hold
line exceeds the threshold. The graph shows pfa and pma for these setups. The blue and
magenta line are the pfa for SMR, only tracking (blue) and localized sensors (magenta);
the red line is the maximum missed alert probability for SMR only, tracking in both
scenarios.
2 seconds with localized sensors, respectively, 4-5 seconds without localized sensors. The
localized sensor thus has an advantage of 2-3 seconds in tdc and a much lower pma.
However, an increase of tdc directly increases ttta and could limit the number of usable
signals. For example, a non-cooperative target traveling with 15 m/s over a hold line may,
with an insufficient update interval and an alert threshold of 20 m, have traveled 40 m
before the detection of the alert situation. Delays from the signal command transmission
and the reaction time of the signals require at least 0.5 s, usually more, until the signals
at the runway entrance can be activated. Depending on the distance between the hold
line and the runway, the pilot may be unable to see any alert signals. An alert notification
via RTF to the pilot will require additional time because the ATCO needs to react to
the alert and inform the pilots. Estimating 1 second ATCO reaction time, and 2 seconds
for communication, the difference in ttta between a localized sensor with localized signals
and a standard ASDEX/ASMGCS setup without signals might be as much as 6 seconds
on average. The values in Table 5.4 show that the distance covered in both scenarios
until the pilots responds to the situation is for the first acceptable DTH 15m/36m for the
localized sensor setup, an 84m/105m for the standard setup. The advantage in horizontal
separation distance of the localized sensor is 63m/69m. The advantage is correlated to
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sensors signals DTH tdc tcd tr ttotal pfa pma dhl valid
standard voice 0m -/1 - - - 1 0 - no
extended local 0m 0/0 0.5 1 1.5s/1.5s 0.5 0 1m/23m no
standard voice -5m -/2 - - - 0.9 0 - no
extended local -5m 1/0.5 0.5 1 2.5s/2.0s 0.1 0 2m/30m no
standard voice -10m 3.5/2 2 2 7.5s/6.0s 0.5 0.02 70m/90m no
extended local -10m 1.8/0.9 0.5 1 3.3s/2.4s 0.02 0 15m/36m yes
standard voice -15m 4/2.5 2 2 8s/6.5s 0.1 0.03 77m/98m no
extended local -15m 2/1.3 0.5 1 3.5s/2.8s 0.02 0 20m/42m yes
standard voice -20m 5/3 2 2 9s/7s 0.025 0.03 84m/105m yes
extended local -20m 2.5/1.6 0.5 1 4s/2.9s 0.01 0 32m/44m yes
Table 5.4: Alerting performance comparison, probabilities are given per operation. In
columns tdc, ttotal, and dhl the first number is for traffic scenario, 1 the second number for
traffic scenario 2. ttotal is the time in seconds until the pilots response. dhl is the distance
traveled across the hold line towards the runway center line.
the speed of the vehicle, 15m/s was chosen as a sensible measure, but speed has often
been reported to be much higher during taxiing.
5.5 System Architecture - Safety Based Approach
The superordinate goal of the airport research project RollMops was to increase runway
safety. Therefore a safety based approach is necessary. In the consequence safety is
a major aspect of the system design and places hard constraints on the design, from
the mathematical models and algorithms to the realization. While the available project
resources did not allow the realization of a certified prototype, the design process and the
formalisms have been extended to support a safety based approach where needed. This
section discussed the systems design with respect to safety and reliability of the system,
with varying system boundaries. While safety and reliability are different concepts they
overlap at some points, and while the two concepts are not completely orthogonal it is
often appropriate to treat them as if they where, see Figure 5.22.
The section starts with an introduction to engineering safe systems and introduces the
systems setup at the airport and the embedding into the existing airport infrastructure.
The safety and reliability of the system with system boundaries of the surveillance and
control of a single hold line are then discussed. The results are then integrated to show
the estimated impact on the runway safety for airports of different sizes.
5.5.1 Safety Driven Engineering
A critical part of safety driven engineering is the safety analysis that becomes the central
part of the engineering process. Safety analysis are done in all stages of the engineering
process, with different goals, scope and limits. Because of the capabilities and responsi-
bilities of the TIS Research Group during the project the scope of the analysis is limited
to scientific and technical aspects of the design and the design process, see Figure 5.23.
The responsibility of the TIS Research Group was focused on the development of a Lo-
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Figure 5.22: Two visions on safety and reliability. Left: Safety and reliability are overlap-
ping but not identical. The reliability of a system, or parts of the system can affect the
safety of the system. Right: A gun is an example for a reliable yet unsafe device. The
airport traffic control systems as they are now are quite reliable but the safety could be
enhanced if the RIAS is part of the airport traffic control system.
cal Intelligence Unit (LIU) that should integrate the sensor data from localized sensors
and ATC to control traffic lights at hot spots. The project partner ADB-Siemens was
responsible for the remaining aspects of the system. The goals, scope and limits of the




















Figure 5.23: Scope of the safety analysis in the lufo project. Parts grayed out cannot
be addressed. When considering only the Local Intelligence Unit (LIU) , to the left ,
that is responsible for the sensor data fusion and situation assessment more topics can be
addressed than possible when considering the XL-RIAS, to the right, because the design
and development of the LIU is, while subject to the constraints given by the specifications
of ADB-Siemens, work of the TIS Research Group. The XL-RIAS includes factors that
cannot be assessed by the TIS Research Group but are only accessible by ADB-Siemens.
Goal of the Analysis
The goal of the safety analysis depends on the stage of development. The stages are
conceptual development, design, development, operations, and deployment. During the
stages conceptual development, design and development the goal is the assessment and
identification of possible hazards, and the elimination or control of these hazards. Also
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the safety integrity level (SIL) is to be assessed, with respect to the hazards, risks an
reliability of the system. In the operation stage the goal is to analyze data gathered
during the operation of the deployed systems to identify problems that did not emerge
during the previous stages of the process and put things right.
Scope of the Safety Analysis:
The scope of the analysis depends on the application scenario that sets the system bound-
aries to be considered during the analysis. With the goal to identify hazards the analysis
usually starts with the system itself and its intrinsic potential for possible hazardous be-
haviors, e.g.: A industrial plant might release toxins into the air. The next step is to
increase the boundaries to include the immediate environment of the system, like the
neighborhood of an industrial plant and the relations between the immediate environ-
ment and the system, as well as the interactions between humans and the system. Finally
hazards that pose a threat to the remote environment of the system must be identified,
e.g.: A failure in a power plant might result in traffic accidents.
Limits of the Safety Analysis:
As for all logical or mathematical analysis the safety analysis is prone to errors induced
by the gap between the real world and the formal and mathematical models that can only
approximate the real world. The analysis is by no means a verification that guarantees
that the systems behavior will be in the scope determined by the analysis. The reasons
for this are that many requirements related to the personnel and tools used during the
design process, as well as demands on the design process cannot be satisfied in the context
of an academic research project. The analysis rather shows how existing formalisms and
methods can be extended to support the engineering of safety systems, and estimates the
reliability and the impact on the airport operation safety.
Approach
Since there is no absolutely safe system, approaches design safe systems aim to build
systems that are reasonable safe with respect to a given application scenario. The safety
of a system can be measured by its SIL that determines the risk a system poses in its
application scenario. The classification into a SIL is done based on the reliability of the
safety related functionality of the system, and the corresponding risk to the environment
of the system. The hazard analysis is considered the central point of a safety analysis by
Leveson [67] and Douglas [27] that distinguish between:
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
PHA is used in the early life cycle stages to identify critical system functions and
broad system hazards. This term introduced by Leveson is roughly equivalent to
the term “Initial Safety and Reliability Analysis” used by Douglas.
• System Hazard Analysis (SHA):
SHA begins as the design matures and involves detailed studies of possible hazards
created in the interfaces between subsystems or by the system operating as a whole,
including potential errors.
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• Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA):
SSHA starts as soon as subsystems are designed in sufficient detail. The purpose of
SSHA is to identify hazards associated with the design of the subsystems. Software
Hazard Analysis is a type of SSHA.
• Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA):
OSHA identifies hazards and risk reduction procedures during all phases of system
use and maintenance.
Douglas summarizes the most relevant steps in a hazard analysis as:
1. Identify the hazards
2. Quantify the hazards in terms of likelihood and severity
3. Compute the risks(likelihood x severity)
4. Perform an initial safety analysis with Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
5. Perform an initial reliability analysis with Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
6. Identify safety and reliability control measure requirements
7. Create the initial hazard analysis
8. Update the requirements to include safety and reliability requirements
Thus the hazard analysis is an ongoing process that does not only include the design of
a system but also its whole life cycle. Some parts of the analysis can only be done when
a certain point of the design or development is reached, because preliminary information
for these parts is not available before, see Figure 5.24).
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
According to Leveson the goal of the PHA is to ensure that the conceptual design is
safe, as flaws in the conceptual design that are discovered in later analysis stages can be
impossible to fix [67] . Also it is often much easier and more efficient to ensure the safety
of a system at the conceptual level. For example if one builds a car and then finds out
that brakes are required, it will be very hard to integrate the brakes in the optimized car
design and including brakes in the car concept and restart the development from that
point will lead to a much more efficient and reliable solution.
Identification of Hazards
The assessment of the safety of a system begins with the identification of the hazards. This
approach is supported by the extensions of the Hardware-Software-CoDesign formalisms
developed in the project.
The analysis on the system level is hindered by missing long time studies on the behavior
of airport personnel and aircraft crews to traffic signals the reliable indicate the status of
a runway or a runway incursion alert. Based on the experience with ASDE-X and RWLY
equipped airports the following assumptions are made.
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Figure 5.24: Stages of safety analysis mapped to a systems life cycle as in Leveson [67]
1. ATCO’s rely on the alerting function of the XL-RIAS and react accordingly to a
runway incursion alert.
2. Pilots also rely on the alerting function of the XL-RIAS and will react accordingly
to the traffic signals.
Based on these assumptions the consequences of a failure of the XL-RIAS are determined.
As with road traffic lights where a failure of a traffic light leads to a wrong decision and
a possible accident of the traffic participants, a failure of the XL-RIAS is expected to
result in a Pilot Deviation (PD), Operational Error (OE), or Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation
(VPD).
In the following the hazards of the XL-RIAS are classified into the classification scheme
proposed by Douglass [27] which distinguishes between five fundamental classes. From
these fundamental classes only the following three are relevant in the XL-RIAS context.
1. Release energy: The systems components are electrically connected with the airport
infrastructure, therefore the system must not release harmful amounts of energy into
the airport infrastructure. The system may be physically placed in an environment
containing explosive liquids, such as aircraft fuel, in considerable amount. Therefore
the system must be well insulated. The radar beam of the radar sensors must not
interfere with other technology in the environment. Also exposed components like
the radar may transmit energy absorbed from the environment like in case of a
lightning strike.
2. Supplying misleading information to safety personnel or control systems: The XL-
RIAS provides a alerting function, false alerts pose a significant tread to the safety
of the airport.
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3. Failure to alarm when hazardous conditions arises: If the system fails to alert in case
of a runway incursion the risk of an accident is very high, especially once ATCOs,
aircraft crews and ground personnel relies on the system.
In each of these categories the XL-RIAS poses multiple hazards to the environment 2.
These where identified and the following text provides a listing of the hazards in each
category.
Hazardous release of energy: As a electrical system the XL-RIAS is most likely to re-
lease or transmit electrical energy that could damage the environment or cause secondary
reactions that damage the environment.
• Release of hazardous amounts of electrical energy.
• Release of hazardous radar beam.
• Transmission of hazardous electrical energy.
• Transmission of hazardous physical energy.
• Not giving way if hit by something, like aircraft tires or a lawn mower.
Supplying misleading information to safety personnel or control systems: In
case of a malfunction or tracking error the following failures of the system may follow:
• Failing to notify ATC / Aircraft crews in case of a system failure.
• False runway incursion alerts.
• False stop bar overrun warnings.
• Missing detection of vehicles in the area under surveillance.
• Inaccurate position information on vehicles in the area.
• Showing the wrong traffic signal.
Failure to alarm when hazardous conditions arises: To alarm in case of a haz-
ardous situation is the primary purpose of the XL-RIAS. The inability of the system to
alarm can be caused by failures of the systems components. If the system is not single-
fault-tolerant every component failure will leave the system unable to raise an alarm in a
hazardous situation.
• Failure to notify ATC in case of a runway incursion.
• Failure to notify ATC in case of a stop bar overrun.
• Failure to trigger the alerting traffic signals in case of a runway incursion.
• Failure to trigger the alerting traffic signals in case of a stop bar overrun.
2While the XL-RIAS is supposed to be a safety enhancing system, unreliability might result in a
decrease in safety. Without the XL-RIAS the traffic participants an airport authority are responsible for
the safety. Therefore it is to be shown that the XL-RIAS performs better.
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Quantitative Hazard Assessment
Some of the identified hazards where countered by appropriate changes in the conceptual
design, e.g.: The housing of the components had to comply to standards that have been
proven to be appropriate for the environmental conditions encountered at airports. Other
hazards are closely coupled to the reliability of the methods, algorithms and hardware
used for the system. To assess these quantitatively the formalisms of the Hardware-
Software-CoDesign where extended - details are discussed in Section 5.5.2 - to support
the assessment of the reliability of the system design. This enables an approach different
to Leveson hierarchical approach that requires dedicated System Hazard Analysis (SHA)
ans Sub-System Hazard Analysis (SSHA). SHA and SSHA are accomplished in similar
ways, but the goals are different, SSHA examines how individual component operation or
failure affects the overall safety of the system, whereas SHA determines how normal and
failure modes of the components operating together can affect system safety(see [67] pp.
153ff). In the unified Hardware-Software-CoDesign approach where system and subsystem
hazard analysis is supported at the same stage of development, this distinction is not made.
Another step recommended by Leveson is the Operating and Support Hazard Analysis
(OSHA) that identifies risk reduction procedures during all phases of system use and
maintenance. It especially examines hazards created by the Human Machine Interface
(HMI). The OSHA has not been explicitly tackled during the project, but rather the
standards based on the results of the OSHA of similar systems have been used to counter
typical hazards.
Risk Assessment
The results of the quantitative hazard assessment were combined with the severity the out-
come of a hazardous situation to assess the risks the XL-RIAS poses to the environment.
The approach was to develop another extension of the Hardware-Software-CoDesign ap-
proach, based on an expert system that semi automatically analyzed the architecture
graphs and the problem graphs to compute the effect of environmental influences on the
system - e.g. a lawn mower overrunning a sensor - as well as intrinsic failure probabilities
inherited from the nature of the components of the system - e.g. a ventilation failure
leading to a emergency shut down of overheating components - and the resulting hazards
- like over current and fire as a consequence of a lightning strike. While the basic algo-
rithm was tested successfully on a limited set of events including fire, lightning strike, or
physical demolition the database, that covers all reasonable incidents needed to compute
a full analysis, could not be implemented during the project. Many risk are already min-
imized because the system needs to comply to various industrial standards that aim to
minimize risks by enforcing the usage of interfaces, protocols and compliance to reliability
and safety requirements.
5.5.2 Hardware-Software-CoDesign Extension
As a safety related system, safety and reliability played a major role during the design
process. The Hardware-Software-CoDesign approach can be extended to support safety
and reliability related engineering. The details of this approach are beyond the scope
of this work, thus only a sketch of the approach is provided. The approach combines
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elements of safety and reliability analysis into a integrated procedure and requires the
following steps.
1. Extension of the formalism: The nodes in the architecture graph are extended
to include numbers required for reliability and safety related calculations. These
include variables like MTTF as well as maintenance intervals and repair durations.
For nodes in the architecture graph all failure probabilities are marginalized into
the following classes:
The following set of states was chosen - based on the recommendations of IEC 61508
- to model the systems behavior.
(a) Running no hw failure (RU) - In this state there a no problems, every part of
the system is up and running and all safety critical functionality is available.
(b) Running with undetected hardware failure (RUDF) - One or more components
of the system have broken down but all safety critical functionality is available.
The self diagnostic capabilities of the system have not notice the breakdown.
(c) Running with detected hardware failure (RDF) - One or more components of
the system have broken down but all safety critical functionality is available,
but the self diagnostic functionality of the system noticed the breakdown and
can initialized repair/maintenance actions.
(d) Fail safe state (FS) - The system is broken down and the process that relies on
the systems safety critical functionality is stopped.
(e) Undetected failure (UF) - Due to hardware breakdowns unnoticed by the sys-
tem the safety critical functionality is not fully available.
(f) Detected failure (DF) - The systems safety critical functionality is not fully
available but the system is aware of the problem. The system can initialized
repair/maintenance actions and enter a fail save state if possible.
Figure 1 shows the transition scheme for the availability states. The scheme is used
during the generation of the markov models explained later in this section.
2. For a system problem graphs of safety related functions are generated. From the
mathematical model the probability of a fault free execution of the problem graphs
can be calculated using a Markov model generated from the problem graphs. This
is the theoretic boundary for the reliability and safety of the system with perfect
infallible hardware. The Markov models exploit the hierarchy of the architecture and
problem graph by starting at the top level, constructing recursively Markov models
for refined nodes. From the bottom of the recursion probabilities calculated from
the model can be transferred to - and used by - the superior Markov models during
the recursive ascend. Alternatively MTTF’s for the refinements of architecture
graph nodes can be estimated from the refined nodes components MTTF’s assuming
undetected failure, for the individual components and requiring all components to
be running. This alternative approach always underestimates the reliability of the
system because redundancy inherited from nodes in refined graphs is ignored.
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Figure 5.25: Transition scheme for architecture graph hardware availability states. These
states are used to construct the Markov models for the Markov equilibrium analysis.
3. Based on the architecture graph nodes attached to each of the the problem graph
nodes in the binding the chances for a hardware failure during the execution of the
operations defined in the bound problem graph nodes are calculated.
4. A logic rule set performs a hazard analysis to estimate the probabilities of failure
from risks beyond the immediate system boundaries. The probabilities of these
failures can be integrated into the failure probabilities to build a compound failure
model composed of system intrinsic and system extrinsic failure probabilities.
This approach allows the determination of the systems reliability and calculations of the
probabilities for system failures. A subsequent hazard analysis allows the determination
of the system’s safety integrity level. In this scenario fail safe states play an important
role. A fail safe state allows the system to recover from failure, or to be repaired while
the operational processes that rely on the safety function of the system are on hold or
the processes are moved to another part of the system. An example in the context of
the XL-RIAS is that a failure of the sensor, that would compromise the systems safety
function, would be signaled at the stop bar by turning on the stop bar and flashing the
runway entrance light as an indication to vehicle crews as well as notifying ATC and
GMC. The affected taxiway entrance would be closed and the traffic directed to other
taxiway entrances. By deploying a set of safety related component monitoring functions
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that put the system in a fail safe state, critical failures, such as losing the ability to
detect runway incursions without notification, can be minimized. The final calculation
of the system’s state distribution over time and safety level is done by Markov model
equilibrium state analysis, where the system is either up, down, or in fail safe mode.
Figure 5.26 shows the system level availability analysis Markov model graph of a non
redundant XL-RIAS design - see Section 5.6 for details - combined with the results of the
equilibrium analysis. The model includes all states that have can be reached with a non
negligible likelihood (p > 10−12). Edges are color coded to highlight state transitions
with significant likelihood (p > 0.1) and the size of Nodes codes the likelihood of the
according state. The leftmost node marks the state where the system is up and running.
Although the numbers are hardly readable at this scale the model graph shows that the
system is most likely running (p = 0.9999) per hour. The remaining time (p = 0.0001)
per hour the system is in on of the fail safe states and under repair. The blue edges from
all fail safe state to the running state indicate that there is a significant likelihood for the
system to be repaired.
Figure 5.26: System level availability analysis Markov model graph of a non redundant
XL-RIAS design.
5.5.3 SIL
To design a RIPAS that reaches at least the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 was one of
the research an project objectives. The estimates from the Hardware-Software-CoDesign
extension developed during the project strongly indicate that the XL-RIAS - as defined
in the following Section 5.6 - is satisfies the requirements of SIL 1 as a standalone design.
The estimation is supported by the results from the alerting simulations study, see Section
5.4.
The analysis of the impact of the deployment of multiple XL-RIAS on a "dangerous" big
airport like. e.g. Heathrow , that, in the opinion of many pilots, operates on an unaccept-
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able safety level, using a Markov model of the airport landing and take-off operations -
similar to the one introduced in Section 5.2.2 -found that it is possible to raise the airports
safety to a commonly accepted level and reach SIL 1.
5.6 System Setup
Although the system is designed to locally track vehicles in a small areas of the airport
surface, particularly hot spots, the system is design to incorporate arbitrary sensor mea-
surements with ease and can be scaled for the reliable surveillance of ground traffic on a
major airport, integrating sensor data from SMR, MLAT, ADS-B and other sensors into
a single consistent view of the airports traffic situation. The following text’s subject is the
architecture of the surveillance of a single hot spot with proven of the shelf components,
where the system is plugged into the existing airport infrastructure of a major airport.
Figure 5.27 shows the supposed operational scenario of the system, where the system
monitors the position of the aircraft and controls the local traffic signals according to the
aircraft’s movement and the clearances from air traffic control (ATC). The system level
architecture of the XL-RIAS is shown in Figure 5.28. The nodes in the architecture graph
are:
Figure 5.27: Lead on Lights at Dawn (Simulation)
1. Node Sensor:
A functional architecture graph node. A sensor observing a hot spot area, generating
sensor observations of objects in the area.
2. Node internal can bus:
A communication architecture graph node. A CAN bus used for communication of
the Local Intelligence Unit (LIU) with the sensors.
3. Node LIU:
A functional architecture graph node. A Local Intelligence Unit (LIU). The local
intelligence unit provides the data fusion functionality and has the responsibility to
raise an alert in case of a runway incursion. The prototype LIU’s architecture is
similar to the one introduced in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
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4. Node external can bus:
A communication architecture graph node. A CAN bus used for communication of
the LIU with the IO-Remote. The LIU receives information from ATC and feeds
tracking data and alert signals to the AGLAS for distribution to ATC and traffic
signals.
5. Node io.r.:
A functional architecture graph node. An IO-Remote. The IO-Remote is a special
interface to the AGLAS that is used to safe interface non AGLAS technology.
6. Node powerline:
A communication architecture graph node. A power line that is used by the AGLAS
to transmit internal information. The information is mainly used to monitor and
control runway lighting and signals.
7. Node FRL:
A functional architecture graph node. Fast Reaction Lights that form a traffic signal
embedded in the runway/taxiway. The signal is set depending on the state of the
system e.g. in case of an runway incursion alert the traffic signal might be flashing
red.
8. Node AGLAS:
A functional architecture graph node. An AGLAS with power line communication.
The AGLAS is a system that allows the upgrade of airfield lighting to intelligent
self monitoring LED technology by reusing existing infrastructure and serial power
line circuits.
Figure 5.28: The architecture graph of the XL-RIAS on system level. For the explanation
refer to the text.
5.6.1 Embedding into the Airport
The system may be embedded into the airport in many ways. It’s primary purpose is
to increase the runway incursion detection and alerting performance of existing solutions
at hot spots. The performance of the systems already existing at the airport is boosted
in such a way that they are able to handle a range of scenarios that cannot be handled
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by this systems by now. But the system can also be deployed as a standalone solution
that monitors the traffic on smaller airports or even untowered airports. The Hamburg
Airport will serve as a demonstrator for this purpose. There are about 20 locations where
the system would increase the safety of the airport. Each hot spot requires an unique
sensor and signal configuration, so for the purpose of this explanation only 2 locations
were chosen, see Figure 5.29. The locations were chosen because they are suited very well
for the explanation due to the following reasons:
• Topographic Layout
• Visual Observability
• SMR Observation Quality
Topographic Layout: Hot spots are characterized by the local topography. A taxiway
entrance is not automatically a hot spot. Additional topographic features make many
taxiway entrances to hot spots.
Figure 5.29: Location A and Location B at the Hamburg Airport. The tower is app. 3km
to the left.
• Location A: The location is a taxiway entry. The entry’s topography forces aircraft
that enter the runway, and wait at the hold line to face away from the runway
threshold. Thus the crew can hardly see landing aircraft or might confuse aircraft
taking off with landing aircraft, which is a cause for runway incursion incidents, see
[90]. The hold line is very close to the runway shoulder, so there is almost no safety
margin in case of a runway incursion and aircraft that are landing or taking off have
difficulties to determine if the aircraft on the taxiway is behind the hold line or not.
• Location B: Here the taxiway entry is directly at the runway threshold, and the
aircraft is facing the runway when positioned at the hold line. The disadvantageous
topographic feature is the closeness of the hold line to the runway. As at Location
A, here is almost no safety margin in case of a runway incursion.
Visual Observability: The visual observability of the location from the tower and
starting or landing aircraft is also important for the risk in case of a runway incursion.
If the visibility is not good, pilots have to rely on traffic information services and ATC
for guidance. If these sources of information do not alert the parties in case of a runway
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incursion, aircraft crews will lose valuable time for the execution of evasive maneuvers.
In case of a false alert unnecessary evasive maneuvers pose a risk and disturb the airport
operations.
Figure 5.30: Simulated visibility of Location A (left) and Location B (right) under adverse
weather conditions from the view of an approaching aircraft. The aircraft at the taxiway
is hardly visible.
• Location A: This location is too far away from the tower for accurate visual surveil-
lance, especially under adverse environmental conditions. The location is also so far
from the runway threshold that landing planes can’t verify if the aircraft at the taxi-
way is waiting at the hold line or moving onto the runway until the landing aircraft
has touched down. This makes the location extra risky since the landing aircraft is
very restricted in its capability to perform evasive maneuvers and the aircraft on the
taxiway is facing away from the landing aircraft and will most likely not notice the
imminent danger. Therefore it will miss the opportunity for an evasive maneuver.
• Location B: The location is very far from the tower so a visual surveillance is not pos-
sible. The visibility from a landing aircraft is good, nevertheless the short distance
between hold line and runway makes the distinction between an aircraft waiting at
the hold line and one moving slowly onto the runway difficult.
SMR(i) Observation Quality: The quality of the sensor observations from the SMR
are a very important factor as the SMR is, at many airports, the only global sensor capable
of detecting non cooperative vehicles. The the big uncertainty of SMR measurements on
the runway incursion detection poses a real problem because of the low update rate of
app. 1Hz. The 1 second duration forces tracking algorithms to increase the uncertainty
of the objects state between the measurements. This results in a suboptimal tracking
performance that is not sufficient to reliable detect runway incursions.
• Location A: The location has a distance from the SMR that is frequently encountered
at major airports and therefore is representative for many hot spots. The location
is about 2.5 km from the main tower where the SMR(i) is positioned but has a clear
line of sight. Due to the distance a visual verification of the position of aircraft
positioned at the hold line of the taxiway entrance is not possible. The distance
leads to a significant uncertainty of the sensor observations.
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Figure 5.31: Overlay of the PDF of a SMR measurement at Location B. The numbers
at the side denote the relative distance to the tower in meter. The color denotes the
probability of a measurement at a certain area.
• Location B: The location is far away from the SMR which has a significant effect
on the angular accuracy of the sensor observations. Figure 5.31 shows an overlay
of the probability density function of a SMR observation at the taxiway entry. The
overlay shows that it is not possible to accurately track a vehicle with the SMR at
this location of the airport.
5.6.2 Sensors
The RIAS supports the inclusion of any sensor data that can be converted into the com-
mon representational format (CRF) within a sensible mathematical error range. These
sensors include most currently available sensors commonly employed for airport surface
monitoring. The position of the sensors in the architecture graph is shown in Figure 5.32.
Localized Sensors: As localized sensors universal medium range radars sensors from
the automotive field have been chosen. Their characteristics according to the technical fact
sheet of the producer have been validated by some examples and the characteristics have
been used for the simulation. The sensors support a CAN bus and have been approved
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Figure 5.32: Left: Localization of the sensor in the architecture graph. Right: Setup of
the sensors at Location A. The sensor beam area is marked by a reddish hue. The field
of view of the third sensor is not shown.
for unrestricted usage by appropriate German governmental institutions. For the usage in
the airport environment a few modifications are recommended, for example the inclusion
of 3D acceleration sensors to detect collisions with aircraft or lawn mowers.
Figure 5.33: Radar sensor schematics: Left: The outdoor proven housing of the sensor is
compact. Right: The field of view is sufficient for most surveillance applications.
Sensor Setup: The setup of the sensors depends on the topography of the location and
the available infrastructure. In the optimal case multiple sensors cover the area in front of
and behind the hold line. Competitive to the sensors used for tracking an additional sensor
must be positioned directly at the hold line to ensure SIL 1+ requirements compliance.
This additional sensor is positioned so that its broadest field of view axis is positioned
vertically along the hold line. While this sensor has limited use for tracking it provides
accuracy and reliability at the right place. Using an error correcting approach it is possible
to detect unauthorized crossings of the hold line with very high reliabilities, the details
will be explained in the following Section 5.6.5. The sensor setup is demonstrated at
Location A. Figure 5.32 shows a schematic of the location including the sensors field of
view, indicated by a reddish hue. The hold line is positioned at the intersection between
the two green polygons. The runway is at the top of the image, the taxiway at the lower
part. The taxiway entrance connects the runway and the taxiway.
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5.6.3 Signals
To indicate alerts to pilots traffic signals made from groups of Fast Reaction Lights (FRLs)
that are embedded in the runway and in the taxiway are used. These groups receive their
control command via the AGLAS. The control commands are fed into the AGLAS by the
LIU via the IO-Remote, see Figure 5.34 for the locations of the traffic signal control in the
architecture graph. The setup of the signals is explained using both locations. Location
B is used to explain the general setup, while Location A provides a vivid impression of
the signal operation in case of a runway incursion.
Figure 5.34: Components related to the control of the traffic signal in the architecture
graph.
Embedding into the airport infrastructure: The traffic signals consists of groups
of individual signal lights, as introduced above. The signals form logical groups that allow
the usage of the same lights for different signals. Figure 5.35 shows the different signals
at Location B.
Figure 5.35: Setup of the signals in the Flight simulator environment. The setup consist
of 9 intelligent multicolored LED Signal. The left picture shows the lead on signal that
indicates that there is a clearance to enter the runway. The middle image shows the
runway entrance lights that indicate that it is not safe to enter the runway, and clearance
is canceled. The right picture shows the stop bar that indicates that there is no clearance
given to enter the runway.
The first signal is the stop bar status, a hold line illuminated by red lights signals that the
stop bar/ hold line is closed and their is no clearance given to proceed over the hold line
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as in the right image on Figure 5.35. The lights are positioned at a distance of 3 m along
the hold line, although there are indications that a distance on 1.5m might be better to
prevent a blend with the runway lighting.
The second signal , the runway entrance light, is shown in the middle image in Figure
5.35. Red lights indicate that it is not safe to enter the runway because of a runway
incursion. The lights run from the hold line along the taxiway center line to the runway
center line.
The third signal is shown on the left image in Figure 5.35. The lead on lights indicate
that an aircraft has explicit clearance and is requested to cross the hold line and proceed
onto the runway. These lights also run from the hold line along the taxiway center line
to the runway center line.
Operational Usage: Location A will serve to demonstrate the operational usage of the
signals, the images in Figure 5.36 are taken from a demonstration video of a simulated
runway incursion scenario. The first image shows the aircraft at the closed stop bar,
indicated by the red signal lights. As the aircraft proceeds over the hold line a runway
incursion alert is raised and the runway entrance lights are turned on. The signal is clearly
visible to the crew of the aircraft and indicates that it is not safe to enter the runway and
that a runway incursion just happened.
Figure 5.36: Operational embedding of the signals. Left: An illuminated hold line. Right:
Red lights along the center line of the taxiway/runway indicate a runway incursion.
5.6.4 Data Fusion
The data fusion algorithms have been discussed in depth in the previous chapters. Here
the realization of the architecture is discussed. Figure 5.38 shows schematic proposal of
a possible setup of a single XL-RIAS. A key part for the embedding is the IO-Remote
that is the physical and logical interface between the AGLAS system and the data fusion
hardware and software or local intelligence unit (LIU). The IO-Remote makes it possible
for arbitrary hardware to communicate with the AGLAS-Master via power line commu-
nication using a simple interface. During the course of the project the proposals for the
integration of the LIU into the airport infrastructure has changed. In the beginning of the
project the LIU was supposed to be placed in an underground service room near the hold
line, later it was supposed that it would be best to integrate the LIU Hardware into the
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IO-Remote. Through the integration into the IO-Remote the integration into the airport
becomes much easier, as well as the maintenance.
Figure 5.37: The components related to the data fusion process in the architecture graph
at system level.
The reliability and safety analysis are also much easier as the analysis on the AGLAS
system with respect to environmental and other external factors is already available and
one can focus on the algorithms and mathematical methods. The integration into the IO-
Remote has a direct influence on the actual hardware supposed for the realization of the
design. Apart from the relative small volume available for the hardware, the standards of
ADB apply some server constraints on the hardware. Some of the more important are:
• Environmental conditions: huge temperature fluctuations, lying into small pits to-
gether with current transformers and high voltage cabling, partially or complete
immersed in dirty water containing a lot of chemicals
• Operating Temperature: - 40 to +75 ◦C
• Vibrations: 10g from 20 to 2000Hz
• MTBF > 100.000 hours
• Availability at least 99.99%
Although these constraints rule out most hardware the abstract architecture is not affected
as much as one would expect. The proposed PC plus FPGA architecture does not create
a too big heat dissipation, and the components are available for extreme environmental
conditions. The availability of the non custom components of the IO-Remote require
the usage of two or more IO-Remotes and failure resistant - with respect to the alerting
context - signal control bus to ensure the safety integrity level of the system, but this does
not affect the general architectural approach.
5.6.5 Additional Hold Line Surveillance
To further enhance the detection reliability of the system the third sensor is used to
monitor the hold line. Because it’s field of view is restricted to the area directly behind
the hold line the sensor is immune to influences from outside this area. While this has
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Figure 5.38: Left: Architecture graph with LIU refinement. The architecture has addi-
tional hardware for the independent line surveillance function performed by the additional
sensor. Right: Integration of the data fusion as proposed by ADB during an intermediate
stage of the RollMops-Project . The LIU is integrated into the IO-Remotes, four sensors
are used for extra reliable hold line surveillance. The integration of the LIU into the
IO-Remotes simplifies the integration into the airport infrastructure.
only a limited effect on the general tracking performance of the system it enables the
independent detection of objects within the area directly behind the stop bar. This
functionality is implemented in the FPGA-LS-Node in the refined architecture graph, see
Figure 5.38
However a straightforward approach using a sliding window and the most likely cause for
a series of measurements to determine if there is a vehicle or not is not going to work
since the length of the sequence is bound by the maximum delay from begin of an event
to system notification, which is supposed to be 100ms, and the sensor update rate is
supposed to be 10ms-30ms which makes a maximum window size of ten measurements.
The probability for a failure in determining if there is a vehicle in the sensor beam or not,
using a window size from one up to 10 is 0.001 - 0.0001, which is not enough to build a
SIL compliant system.
This limitation can be overcome by the use of an error correcting code, treating the
measurements as a bit stream, and using a situation based model to define the words of
the code.
Challenges
Because probabilistic methods are to some part model based the algorithms mentioned
above rely on a sensor model and a state transition model. The sensor model is given
by the specifications of the RIAS draft. The transition model is more complicated as it
is given by the possible movement of a vehicle trough the sensor beam. It is of course
possible to learn the transition model for each runway incursion area, but this would
require a dedicated training setup or data of the airport traffic of the past.
The error correcting code also needs an alphabet and a framing procedure to work prop-
erly.
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Proposal for a transition model: For the transition model one must deduce, by the
size of the possible vehicles, their possible movements given the topography of the area
and the characteristics of the vehicles and the sensor update rate, a transition model that
is partly reasonable.
This transition model will be sufficient because the system do not need to detect what
kind of vehicle is in the area, but just if there is a vehicle or a part of a vehicle in the
area, and the model is sound for the first part of a vehicle as well.
The transition model assumes that a vehicle passing the sensor beam will cause at least
nv measurements and at most mv measurements. That is because no vehicle is going to
stay in the beam forever and every vehicle needs some minimal time to pass the sensor
beam. The model further assumes that there is at least some space between two vehicles
passing the sensor beam so there will be at least nnv measurements where no vehicle is
inside the sensor beam and at most mnv since there is always a following vehicle.
The most interesting numbers are the measurements that are at least influenced, since
they imply a transition probability of one to remain in the current state for the at least
nv or nnv measurements, while assuming a 13 transition probability to change the state
for the measurements afterward until the next state change. This assumption is based on
the fact that most of the time slow, big vehicles at a moderate traffic rate will influence
the sensor, and not high speed traffic of small cars.
Using the transition model to build a code based model
The transition model also implies that a state change will cause a series of at least nv and
at least nnv readings, and vice versa. This can be defined as a start and a stop sequence
(message). Intermediate messages are any number of consecutive positive readings or
consecutive negative readings. From this model a error correcting code can be derived.
Error correcting code approach The error correcting and error detecting properties
of a code depend on the Hamming distance. The Hamming distance is the number of
positions in which to codewords differ. To detect d errors a Hamming distance of d + 1
is needed. To correct d errors a Hamming distance of 2d + 1 is needed. The Code has a
number of words for vehicle and no vehicle of mv − bnv2 c and mmv − bnnv2 c. The shortest
words have bnv2 c and bnnv2 c digits. The system is not interested in the word itself but
in the class of the word. The distance between the words of two classes is at least the
length of the longer word since the word differ in every position. Assuming nv = nnv and
mn = mnv, there is always a word of the same length from the other class so the minimum
distance between the two classes given any word is the length of the word.
The system can however not wait for the whole word. For this reason a message for a
class consists of two words, the shortest word of the class followed by any other word of
the class. Once the first word has been processed the system can assume that a vehicle
has entered the sensor beam or has left the sensor beam.
The number of errors necessary to prevent the code from correcting the error is half the
length of the word minus one.








0.001n · 0.999length−n (5.1)
The minimum number of readings is assumed to be nv = 10 = nnv, so the length of the
shortest words is 5 which is also the Hamming distance between the two first words of







0.001n · 0.9995−n = 0.99999999 (5.2)
The probability that all start or stop messages in one hour are correctable depends on the
maximum traffic rates which is assumed to be 500, 100 and 30 for example calculation.
If all messages are correctable than no false detection will occur and no vehicle will be
missed. These probabilities are:
• 0,99999002 for 500 vehicles per hour
• 0,999998 for 100 vehicles per hour
• 0,9999994 for 30 vehicles per hour
So the code as such is SIL 2 compliant for up to 30 vehicles per hour, and SIL 1 compliant
for up to 500 vehicles per hour.
The challenge in this approach is the framing. The framing is the attempt to break up
the stream of measurements into packets. In this case this can be done by start and stop
flags signaling the beginning or end of a message. The state changes of the sensor beam
can be used as start and stop flags, and can be detected using the Viterbi algorithm.
An interesting property of the flags is that in this case the flags also contain information
about the type of the word.
Given the conditional probabilities one can compute the likelihood for any sequence of
length nnv+nv2 to be a start or stop flag. The upper bound for the number of start and
stop flags is given by the rate of traffic.
The probability to miss a flag when there is one is low, but not low enough. The ham-
ming distance from a start to a stop flag and vice versa is in this case 10, the minimum
distance to a intermediate sequences is 6 and the distance to continuous states is 5, so
at least 2 errors are needed to miss a flag when there is one. The probability for less
than 3 errors in a flag generating event is 0.99999045. That means that the system can
satisfy SIL 1 requirements only if the traffic is no more than 40 vehicles per hour. The
probability to detect a flag when there is no flag is somewhat higher. The chance for a
sequence containing more than two errors has been estimated by simulation as about 0.3
per hour.The analysis of the long term equilibrium distribution resulted in a probability
of 0.043 per hour for the appearance of a sequence containing more than two errors. The
big difference results most likely from the fact that the simulation counts each appearance
from 7 to 1 time, depending on the sequence of the errors. Assuming these probabilities
are equally distributed to start and stop flags this leaves a probability of a detecting a
false start flag of about 0.15-0.10 per hour.
To lower this probability one can choose a higher value for nnv and nv. The assumed
sensor update rate sets the upper bound to be 20 because it implies a delay of 100ms
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from the begin of the event to notification. The probability to miss a flag is now so low
that the acceptable traffic rate is thousands of vehicles per hour. The hamming distance
from flags to continuous states is now 10, so 5 or more errors in a window are necessary
to cause a false flag detection. The probability for 5 or more errors in a sequence of 20
measurements is much lower than that for 2 or more errors in 10 measurements. The
probability of detecting a false flag is then about 0.0001 per hour which is still to much.
If one accepts only messages as flags that have a hamming distance of three to the flags.
The hamming distance from such a sequence to a continuous state is now 7, and the
resulting probability for a sequence containing 7 or more errors3 is less than 0.000001.
The probability to miss a flag is now still so low that the system can handle up to 2000
vehicles per hour while remaining SIL 1 compliant. Using this approach the system could
satisfy SIL 1 requirements. In fact if one is only interested in the system state changes
than just using a sliding window and treating consecutive flags as one, the flag detection
can be implemented as a look up table , using the sequence in the sliding window as input.
5.7 Impact on the Runway Safety
The XL-RIAS is supposed to significantly enhance the runway safety of airports by means
of runway incursion detection and alerting. The results from the performance simulation
study show that the system can handle situations that are intractable by many currently
deployed systems considered to be state of the art. The results of the safety and reli-
ability analysis of the design strongly indicate that the system is compliant with SIL 1
requirements. Based on these results a mathematical estimation of the impact on the
airport safety yielded results that indicate that the deployment of XL-RIAS at hot spots
on airports significantly increases the safety of the airport. The system can reliable detect
runway incursion and directly indicate the incident to the involved parties, thus reducing
the probability of an accident. New unpublished results of a simulation study strongly
indicate that the XL-RIAS can predict runway incursions even before they happen based
on maneuver models appropriate for the movement of aircraft at runway entrances.
Besides the runway incursion detection and alerting capability the XL-RIAS has additional
safety related benefits. Depending on the level of integration into the surveillance system
of the airport the XL-RIAS can enhance the situation assessment of commonly deployed
airport traffic surveillance system, by providing better estimates of the vehicle movements
at hot spots and eliminate unreasonable movement estimations at hold lines where XL-
RIAS are installed. The better assessment of the situation makes it easier for super
ordinate instances like ATCOS or A-SMGCS to estimate the consequences that might
arise from the traffic situation giving them more time to react in case of a runway incursion
incident.
5.8 Prototype
A prototype has been realized for research and development. The formal architecture of
the prototype is shown in Figure 5.39. The prototype features an additional camera for
37 errors or more are needed to transform a sequence of 20 consecutive positive or negative sensor
readings to a sequence that is 3 errors away from a flag sequence.
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visual inspection of sensor data. Camera images are recorded concurrently to the radar
data. The video data allows the inspection of difficult cases during tracking. The CAN-
Bus interface node and the Camera node can be moved to a separate PC in the local area
network and transmit sensor data via Ethernet. Software trackers that substitute FPGAs
to emulate the behavior when tracking multiple targets. There is also an interface to
capture data from a flight simulator and trigger signals in the simulator. An additional
GUI is available to interface the tracking system via network and visualize or control
different aspects of the system. The prototype’s design is more complex than the system
design for a number of reasons which include but are not limited to:
• Greater Flexibility: The prototype XL-RIAS can be run with simulated or real input
data. The simulated input enables experiments where ground truth is a necessity.
Also comparative empirical studies that require exactly the same conditions are
possible. Furthermore setups of multiple systems that are not possible because of
limited resources and restricted access to airport facilities can be simulated. Because
the FPGA tracker can replaced by a software simulating the FPGA’s behavior, the
effect of changes to the mathematical models and algorithms implemented in the
FPGA tracker can be evaluated much faster than it would be possible with the
FPGA only. The analysis of the dynamic development of the implemented particle
filter is also better supported by the software simulation of the FPGA because the
internal state is fully accessible.
• Desktop Development: The prototypes architecture allows to run the whole archi-
tecture on a single standard desktop PC including the simulated environment. Thus
research and development is much faster and convenient than it would be possible
if the prototype were an installed embedded system.
• Distributed Development: The prototypes software architecture allows the com-
ponents to be distributed across a local area network. This way it is possible to
position the sensors at a suitable location work in the office and keep the bulky
AGLAS installation in a laboratory in the basement.
Software components
The formal architecture as in Figure 5.39 is distributed to a number of programs. The
main software components are the LIU, the Fake FPGA, the LIU GUI, the RadarSensor-
Interface, the Simulator and the FSX Interface.
LIU: The LIU program is a network of data fusion and interface nodes including the
LIU-Software node, software trackers and interface nodes required to interface the simu-
lated and real FPGA tracker. The programming language is C++.
Software FPGA Tracker: A small program that simulates the behavior of the real
FPGA Tracker. Useful for testing, and debugging of the LIU and the FPGA algo-
rithms.The programming language is C++.
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Figure 5.39: The formal architecture of the prototype, including a camera. All soft-
ware parts can be run an industrial pc104 or a desktop PC. The gray parts are software
substitutes for missing hardware and used for the tests of algorithms and interfaces.
LIU GUI: A tool for the visualization of the output of different data fusion nodes in
the LIU program. The programming language is C++.
RadarSensorInterface: An interface to the radar sensor. Collects the observations
that the sensor sends via CAN-Bus and provides a TCP-Server to distribute the collected
data. The programming language is C#
Camera Interface: A camera is attached to the radar sensor to enable the visual
inspection of the area under surveillance.
Simulator: Simulates sensor behaviors in a virtual environment. Microsoft Flight Sim-
ulator X (FSX) can be used as an input via the FSX Interface program. The simulated
sensors output is accessible via TCP. The programming language is C++.
FSX Interface: An interface to the Microsoft Flight Simulator X, providing traffic data
to the Simulator program. The traffic is detected by simulated sensors in the simulator.
The programming language is C#. An interface were information can be feed back to the
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simulator to control simulated traffic lights was developed but has not been integrated in
the prototype by now.
5.8.1 FPGA Tracker Prototype
The FPGA prototype implementation of the particle filter, as discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 4, has been done on an “Altera Cyclone III Nios II Embedded Evaluation Kit” with
a 50MHz Clock. For peripheral interfacing the NIOS II soft core CPU with an Ethernet
interface has been used, consuming about 60% of the 25.000 LEs on the FPGA. The NIOS
II connected the prototype via Ethernet to the superior software. The actual particle filter
logic (PFL) reads has been implemented using the remaining 40% of the available LEs.
The PFL reads and writes the data to the NIOS II via custom bus system. The NIOS II
communicates with the rest of the tracking system via Ethernet.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter it is shown how the embedded architecture introduced in the preceding
chapters can be used to design a system that is applicable to a significant real world
problem, the prevention of runway incursions. The systems performance in the context
of the airport environment in front of the background of the detection and prevention
of runway incursion has been examined in detail and compared to existing solutions.
The impact on the airport safety has been evaluated using an extension of Hardware-
Software-CoDesign formalisms and mathematical analysis of the airports landing and
take-off operations with respect to the detection and prevention of runway incursions.
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6.1 Summary
In this work an architecture for embedded multi sensor data fusion is proposed that allows
the application of tracking algorithms in scenarios that do not allow for software solu-
tions, because of constraints that apply from the embedding context. Especially tracking
applications in the areas of airport ground traffic surveillance, autonomous driving, driver
assistance technology, small autonomous robots, and indoor pedestrian tracking require
an efficient reliable hardware tracking solution. In front of this background research goals
were defined with respect to the state of research in the affected fields, and a good deal
of them has been reached.
The general objective of the integration of the support of domain specific concepts into
the hardware has been partially reached, the tracking hardware developed in this thesis
supports the usage of domain specific state transition probability density functions as well
as domain specific sensor characteristics. These can be transmitted to the hardware in
addition to sensor data to enhance the performance in terms of accuracy of the results
computed by the hardware. The result has been reached by deriving suitable general
applicable mathematical models that allow the usage of domain specific concepts such
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as the movement of a vehicle through the parametrization of the mathematical models.
Domain specific concepts are further supported through the modular formal architecture
and its VHDL implementation, which allow to change parts of the computation without
the necessity to change the whole formal model or VHDL implementation. The objectives
related to the more specific research topics embedded tracking, RoboCup, and airport
traffic surveillance have been reached almost completely. The following text provides a
concise listing of the status of the objectives.
6.1.1 Embedded Tracking
Embedded Tracking - Objective 1:
The objective has been reached. A hardware architecture for a particle filter based track-
ing system was developed. A working prototype has been realized as a proof of concept.
However the formal framework for the semiautomatic parametrization of the hardware
for common application scenarios could not be finished in time.
Embedded Tracking - Objective 2:
A distributed hardware software architecture for tracking of multiple objects has been
developed. The architecture supports the embedding of the particle filter based tracking
system into superordinate systems from the robotic, automotive, and airport domain.
The system is made up of a template based C++ library.
Embedded Tracking - Objective 3:
As part of the distributed hardware software architecture a formal interface for easy usage
of the hardware has been developed. The formal interface allows the convenient integra-
tion of the hardware in superordinate hardware and software systems. The provision of
a Ethernet interface by the hardware and the formal communication interface allow the
seamless integration into a wide range of systems using common programming languages
like Java, Python, C++, or LISP.
6.1.2 Airport Ground Traffic Surveillance
Airport - Objective 1:
It has been shown that it is feasible to build a runway incursion alerting system based
on localize sensors and localized signals. Experience from ASDE-X and RWLS systems
installed by the FAA on major airports in the USA strongly support the conceptual design
of the system. It has been shown that runway incursion alerting systems based local
surveillance can handle a wide range of runway incursion scenarios but need additional
data sources to incorporate information about landing aircraft to provide full cover of
reasonable runway incursion scenarios. It has been shown that it is possible to push the
functional safety level of airport taxi, landing, and take off operations with respect to
runway incursions to a safety integrity level (SIL) of at least SIL 1.
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Airport - Objective 2:
Show the superior performance of a runway incursion system based on localized surveil-
lance. A comparative simulation study based on the performance of sensors from the
automotive field and off the shelf components showed that it is possible to significantly
boost the performance of systems that strongly depend on global sensors by the integra-
tion of local sensors. The significance of the performance boost is shown by the range of
new runway incursion scenarios that can be handled. The performance has been demon-
strated by applying the system to real runway incursion incidents that happened in the
past.
Airport - Objective 3:
The superior performance encouraged the development of a design for a local runway
incursion alerting system based on local sensors and off the shelf components. The design
combines a tracking and a line surveillance approach to achieve optimal reliability and
maximum safety through a synergic effect by the fusion of the approaches on the level of
object assessment.
Airport - Objective 4:
A prototype of the system design using the particle filter based tracking system has been
almost completely developed for the airport environment. At the time of writing the
prototype is still missing a component for the interfacing of the signals to be provided by
the industrial project partners. The prototypes hardware architecture is - as the focus is
on research and evaluation - slightly different from the system design, which is targeted
on the airport environment.
6.1.3 RoboCup
The objective to integrate the particle filter based tracking system into the ball tracking
of the RoboCup Software and demonstrate the performance gain could not be reached
due to missing time. Preparations for the integration and the simulator test are almost
done, but the test hardware in the loop test framework is not finished and it would require
some additional months to execute all experiments and evaluate the experimental results.
To finish this part of the work it has been moved to future work.
6.2 Contribution to the State of Research
After the end of the non-disclosure agreements with the industrial partners, contributions
to the state of art during the course of the research work were made in the form of
conference papers and an article [99, 98, 97]. These works partially publish research
results obtained during the course of the research. Further contributions are made by
results published in this thesis. Parts of the previously published results are included in
this work for the sake of a complete thesis.
In the editorial of the march 2012 issue of the ICGA journal - titled "The Communication
of Ideas" - Jaap van den Herik stated that "Progress in science is based on the development
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of ideas" and stresses the plain communication of ideas. A PhD-thesis is usually not the
plain communication of an idea - opposed to an article or a conference paper - but rather
the explicit examination of an idea, often more than just one idea, which does not only
explain the idea but also demonstrates their value. This thesis provides the necessary
framework to show the value of various ideas related to the research objectives.
In this subsection I will explain the new ideas contributed to the pool of proven useful
ideas and what of the already existing ideas I could extend to apply them to areas where
they have not been applied before. In addition to the results already published [97, 98, 99]
this thesis makes contributions to the state of research with respect to the theory and
praxis of embedded tracking system architecture , safety oriented Hardware-Software-Co-
Design, and modeling reliability and safety of runway incursion systems. The following
list of the contributions provides an overview on the ideas and insights that contribute to
the state of research - beginning with those already published.
1. Effective zero weight treatment for hardware particle filters, already published in
the proceedings of the Mathmod 2012 [98].
2. It has been shown that general centralized traffic surveillance solutions do not pro-
vide the necessary accuracy and reliability to implement safety measures against
a particular dangerous kind of runway incursions. This result has been published
partially in an article [99].
3. It has been shown that it is possible to increase runway safety, through the use of
local sensors and signals using embedded data fusion algorithm, already published
in proceedings of the IEEE-MFI 2012 [97].
4. A new extension of hardware-software-co-design formalisms to support semiauto-
matic safety and reliability analysis.
5. It has been shown that it is reasonable and possible to significantly increase the
performance of small autonomous robots using embedded tracking algorithms with
respect to power consumption and heat dissipation.
6.3 Directions for Future Work
The research done has answered a few questions but ,as usual, raised more. The decision
which of these should be in the focus of the future research did prove as challenging as
the central research of the thesis. As for the thesis, not only scientific topics but also
engineering topics are relevant for future work. Many of the scientific ideas formulated
in this work are off limited use without the embedding in an engineering context, this is
particularly true for the mathematical models, formal architecture, and algorithms that
provide a new scientific solution that allow a better solution of an engineering problem.
6.3.1 Embedded Tracking Systems
The architecture for the embedded tracking system and its implementation developed
in this work proof the concepts, ideas, and the feasibility of a real world realization.
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On the engineering side what remains open is A) to bundle all the insights gained and
the experiments made into a formal and software framework that allows the convenient,
semiautomatic integration of the hardware into application scenarios, B) to optimize some
aspects of the hardware to increase the performance of the design, and C) round up the
implementation with more formal models to choose from.
On the scientific side there are numerous challenges regarding the better support of do-
main specific concepts and background knowledge in an architecture based on concurrent
computation. The further integration of these enhances the performance of the tracking
system in scientific terms, such as the error or probability of convergence.
6.3.2 Automotive
Currently the automotive field is about to face of a new generation of cars. The devel-
opment of self driving cars have made enormous progress during the last years. Google’s
autonomous cars have so far traveled over 300.000km under very challenging conditions
without an accident. In 2013 autonomous cars are allowed in 3 states of the USA for
driver license tests. Less ambitious but more common are driver assistance systems that
aim to prevent accidents or at least minimize the harm from accidents by providing en-
hanced situational awareness and even actively taking over the control of the vehicle in
case of a missing reaction from the driver. Currently deployed hardware and software does
not support the integration of multiple sensor data across cars to build a more complete
and accurate model of the surrounding of a group of cars. The developed hardware and
software supports this kind of fusion that allows a better estimation of traffic situations.
Also commonly used alpha-beta filters and Kalman-filters can hardly predict the outcome
of a multiple vehicle interaction for more than a few seconds. The particle filters intrinsic
ability to model arbitrary probability distributions allow the prediction of the probability
distribution over the possible courses of a multi-vehicle interaction. With this information
a better and coordinated planning of car actions will become possible that is based on a
multitude of possible futures. However these solutions need to be realized as hardware in
order to be optimally suited for the automotive field. What does work for an autonomous
test car does not work for every day usage. This applies mainly to functional safety and
reliability, where software solutions do usually not meet the demands, and the computa-
tional complexity of the data fusion algorithms does not allow a physical form as compact
as desired, unless done in hardware.
6.3.3 Robotics
Future work in the robotics domain is closely coupled to the future work regarding em-
bedded tracking systems. Without any further progress in the research on the embedded
tracking system the work will focus on the task to integrate a prototype into a robot from
the RoboCup humanoid soccer league for tracking teammates, opponents, the ball, and
possible obstacles. The performance of the robot with the tracking hardware would than
be compared to that of a robot without tracking hardware. A scientific challenge is to
extend the concept to track individual primitive features from monocular video streams
and derive the semantics of the tracked primitives using Bayesian inference. A similar
approach based on machine learning [108] and Kalman filters[89]to establish semantics
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has been published lately.
6.3.4 Airport
During the works required to gather the necessary background knowledge for the devel-
opment of a runway incursion system, see airport traffic surveillance objectives, it became
clear that the currently deployed systems do not provide full cover of the most dangerous
runway incursion scenarios for various reasons. The nature of commercial airport opera-
tions demand solutions that satisfy the needs of multiple industrial standards while being
affordable. Complex system architectures for local surveillance, that do not seamlessly
fit into existing infrastructure, are therefore often not even considered for deployment.
The complexity of the system architectures is mostly due to the computational demands
of sophisticated data fusion algorithms, particularly those needed for tracking and image
processing. Therefore the integration of the developed system design into a commercial
hardware, such as the IO-Remote by ADB, or sensors would help to provide local run-
way incursion technology that satisfies the needs of airport stakeholders and provides
the necessary safety demanded by governmental institutions like the NTSB. Adding bet-
ter support for domain specific concepts, like map based movement stochastics, to the




For almost every part of the RIPAS in Section 5.2, implementations are available. In
RIPAS systems, different components for the same task are often used concurrently to
achieve a better performance of the overall system.
A.1 Traffic Information Services
Traffic Information Services (TIS) provide local traffic information for the participating
users. The reliability of the technology depends on the topographical circumstances and
the setup of the antennas at the airport as well as on the aircraft systems. During runway
incursion prevention system tests in 2000, it was found that the failures of the system
to alert the pilots in time were caused by unreliability of the Automatic Dependency
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B) traffic
data [9, 119, 10, 59]. The update rate of the traffic information also depends on the
topographical circumstances and the antenna setup, and has been found to drop down to
0.1 Hz in field testing [57].
TIS-B Traffic Information Service Broadcast (STIS-B) is a service that transmits air-
port surface traffic data. It can be viewed as the ground to air communication of the
Adaptive Dependency Surveillance-Broadcast. This service could suffer from inconsistent
timing of the traffic data, as found at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW);
also, such systems could provide unfiltered data from all of the sensors that must be
filtered by data fusion algorithms to avoid false alarms, as encountered at DFW [59].
ADS-B Automatic Dependency Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is a surveillance tech-
nology for tracking aircraft as part of the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) [82] The United States will require the majority of aircraft that operate within
its airspace to be equipped with some form of ADS-B by January 1, 2020 [82]. ADS-B
messages usually include position, altitude, speed, and heading. The usual update rate is
approximately 2 Hz [57]. For General Aviation (GA), the message accuracy is often not
as good as that of modern airliners because it is not smoothed by inertial sensor data.
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A.2 Traffic Surveillance Sensors
Airport ground traffic movements can be assessed in various ways, surveillance sensors
monitor the position and movement of vehicles through different means. One can generally
distinguish between sensors that are part of the vehicles and sensors that are part of the
airport infrastructure. There are sensors in between these two polar points that require
an active part on both the vehicle and the airport infrastructure.
Vehicle Sensors
Vehicle sensors are sensors that are part of the vehicle. Most aircraft today have a broad
range of sensors, which can be roughly classified into GPS, inertial sensors, and extrinsic
sensors.
1. GPS: The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based positioning system
with an accuracy that is often better than 10 m. The accuracy can be enhanced
by the use of a Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS), to approximately 1
m. DGPS uses ground-based reference stations to estimate a correction factor and
can achieve an accuracy of 0.3 m- 2 m. The heading of a vehicle can be determined
with an accuracy of 0.01 degrees to 0.1 degrees.
2. Inertial Sensor: Accelerometers, gyroscopes and odometers can be used to estimate
the movement of vehicles with high update rates and to interpolate and smooth
the position estimation given by the GPS. The resulting accuracy is much higher
than that of the GPS-only based position estimation, and a reliable prediction of
the movement of the vehicle is possible.
3. Extrinsic Sensors: This class of sensors measures some properties of the environment
of a vehicle. Because sensors that assist driving are already successfully in use in the
automotive field, the same class of sensors can be used to enhance the situational
awareness of pilots and vehicle operators. These sensors can detect obstacles such
as pedestrians or vehicles at a reasonable range to avoid collisions during taxiway
operations.
Airport Sensors
Airport sensors are part of the airport infrastructure. One of the most important proper-
ties required by the sensors is that they work under challenging environmental conditions,
for example, when the visibility of pilots and Air Traffic Control (ATC) is limited. How-
ever, even sensors that are suited only for clear weather could prove to be useful because
field studies found that the visual ’out of the window’ detection of runway incursions often
fails or lags behind automated alerts even during the best weather conditions [104].
1. Surface Movement Radar (SMR): A global and usually non-cooperative sensor that
detects vehicles over the whole airport area. Its update rate is usually approximately
1 Hz. Its capabilities for locating smaller vehicles and pedestrians are limited.
Even high performance systems such as Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model
3(ASDE-3) radar and Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X (ASDE-X)
radar suffer from Multi path reflections that can lead to false target reports [57].
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2. Low Cost Surface Movement Radar (LCSMR): These mill metric radars are available
with resolutions of 0.25 m and with ranges of 800 m and 360 degree coverage. Update
rates are approximately 1 Hz. By deploying these radars at strategic places in the
airport, full coverage can be achieved. The systems are usually small and can be
installed near the ground (2 m height) [1].
3. Universal Medium Range Radar (UMMR): This limited range radar has high spatial
and time resolution. It is often used in automotive applications. Its resolution allows
the reliable detection of targets as small as pedestrians.
4. Multilateration Mode S Radar (MLAT): Used as SSR, this type of radar requires
the target to wear an active transponder. The position of the target is calculated
from the signal run times to different receiver stations. The signal can also be used
to establish a data link to transmit information such as speed. The update rate is
usually 1 Hz, but special localized systems can reach up to 6 Hz through the use of
active transmitters. In practice, transponders are often not used by flight crew and
ground traffic [62]. Some MLAT systems (installed prior to 2005) may receive but
not distinguish between ADS-B and TIS-B messages, resulting in a malfunction of
the tracking algorithms [110].
5. Microphone Arrays: Experimental systems that identify and locate aircraft by their
sound. The localization quality has been found to be quite high in experimental
field studies. Sound signatures also allow the resolution of the aircraft type.
6. Thermal Cameras: Thermal cameras are used to detect planes by their thermal
signature. Field studies found these cameras to be useful for the surveillance of
larger aircraft.
7. Cameras: Used for the surveillance of hot spots, localized high resolution high
speed cameras can be used to identify and locate aircraft accurately but suffer
from disadvantageous environmental conditions. Some systems use a supplementary
thermal camera to address some of these problems.
8. Microwave Barrier: Used for the surveillance of stop bars, this type of sensor has
been found to be quite reliable and even allows for the detection of vehicle types,
according to a field study [20]. Microwave sensors have also been used in a EURO-
CONTROL study [86].
9. Inductive Loops: Used for the surveillance of stop bars, inductive loops have been
found to be unreliable by some authors [75] and reliable by others [28].
10. Magnetic Field Sensors: These sensors are experimental sensors that use the defor-
mation of the earth’s magnetic field to locate and identify planes [23]
11. Laser scanner: Laser scanners provide detailed information but are quite expensive
and suffer in performance under challenging environmental conditions; thus, they are
not the first choice for runway incursion detection. However, recent advances in the
development of all-weather infrastructure and automotive laser scanner technology
could change this limitation.
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A shortcoming of many sensors is that the uncertainty with respect to the accuracy,
probability of detection, and false alarm probability is that it changes with the location of
the vehicle, or even with the constellation of the vehicles at the airport. A good example
is the MLAT performance, that is very well documented in the reports [77, 78], and gives
a vivid impression of the qualitative differences between various locations. Figure A.1
shows plots of the uncertainty of MLAT measurement. Most data fusion systems do not
integrate the local uncertainty, which leads to a false estimation of the accuracy of the
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Figure A.1: Local uncertainty values of MLAT measurements. The plots show that,
despite the good overall performance of the MLAT, there are systematic errors that appear
to be directly related to the location of the detected vehicle on the runway. The data was
taken near an taxiway runway intersection.
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A.3 Human Machine Interfaces
Pilots and ATCOs have different needs for Human Machine Interfaces (HMI’s). While
Pilots mainly depend on the output of the HMI, ATCOs also need the Human Machine
Interface (HMI) as an input device.
Figure A.2: HMI Visual Alerts. Left: Visual alert in a Head-Up Display (HUD). Right:
Visual alert in an Electronic Moving Map (EMM). Because the pilot’s attention may not
be focused on the EMM, audible alerts have been found to decrease the reaction time.
Images are reprinted from NASA report [13].
Flight Crew HMI
HMIs for pilots must be integrated into the cockpit of aircraft. In the opinion of the pilots,
runway safety HMIs are valuable but increase the complexity of the cockpit. Therefore,
most pilots advised to integrate the HMI into multi-function displays (MFD), to reduce
the complexity of the cockpit and to allow larger displays [109, 54].
• EMM: Electronic Moving Map: The electronic moving map is a Map that shows
the airport and the traffic around the plane. This map can be set to different
modes, displaying the map from different viewpoints. Routing information can be
integrated to show the route on the display. The plane is also shown. Depending
on the operational state of the aircraft, pilots favor different views on the maps; for
taxiing, top down views and slightly perspective views are favored, while for landing
operations, a perspective view from the aircraft to the runway is favored.
• IMM: Integrated Moving Map: Roughly the EUROCONTROL version of the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA)/ National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) EMM[109].
• Audible Alert: Because the attention of both the pilot and co-pilot could be focused
on things other than the display’s runway incursion warnings and alerts, audible
signals have been found to be of great value in various studies [119, 109].
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• HUD: Heads-up displays project valuable information into the field of vision of pi-
lots. Directions of converging traffic can be shown, and vehicles can be marked, to
draw the attention of the pilot to dangerous situations. Additional information on
aircraft and vehicles, such as speed, can also be shown in the HUD. This capability
could provide vital information because it has been found in runway incursion inci-
dent investigations that pilots of landing aircraft experience slow moving interfering
traffic as being non-moving [86].
• RTS: Radio telephony can be used by airport-based runway prevention systems, to
transmit warnings and to provide alerts that are audible to pilots. RIPAS can also
be enabled to broadcast alerts and warnings to pilots and ATCOs, which results in
a reduction in the reaction time.
Figure A.3: Left: An Integrated Moving Map (IMM) used in the European Airport
Movement Management by A-SMGCS 2 (EMMA2) project. Right: Electronic Moving
Map (EMM) used during a NASA field and simulation test. In both maps, the runways
have a lighter color than the taxiways. The EMM on the right shows the route of the
aircraft. These images are reprinted from NASA and EMMA studies [109, 56].
ATCO HMI
ATCOs use HMI in a different way than pilots. For surveillance functions, the display
function of the HMI is required. For control and guidance, ATCOs must input information
into the system, e.g., for route deviation detection, a RIPAS must have information about
assigned routes to compare against surveillance information.
• Electronic Flight Strips (EFS): EFSs can be used to detect conflicting clearances or
to predict bottleneck situations in runway usage [32].
• Interactive Airport Maps (IAM): IAM are GUIs for ATCOs that show the airport
and the traffic situation as assessed by the surveillance equipment of the airport.
In addition to displaying alerts and conflicts, IAM could support automatic routing
functions and could integrate information from other sources such as electronic flight
strips. They operate best with cooperative targets, where reliable information on
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speed and heading are available and are shown at the display next to the vehicle or
the aircraft.
• Audible Alert: ATCOs often do not want to look away from the traffic during work
[104] Therefore, they could miss warnings or alerts on a display. Audible alerts draw
the attention of ATCOs to dangerous situations.
• Tactile switches provide haptic feedback that enables ATCOs to work without check-
ing a display for the confirmation of triggered signals [86].
Figure A.4: Air Traffic Controller (ATCO)-Human Machine Interfaces (HMI): Left: Air-
port Surface Detection Equipment- Model X (ASDE-X) ATCO display. Right: Ad-
vanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) display. Images
are reprinted from NASA and EMMA reports [110, 79].
A.4 Airport Traffic Signals
When used together and with an automatic guidance system, the following signals provide
a reasonable safety net that is independent of cockpit based systems. Field studies of the
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) and the FAA
found that these signals, even when used as partial solutions, had a large impact on the
runway safety and reduced the number and severity of runway incursions significantly.
Figure A.4 shows a schematic of the Runway Status Lights (RWSL) that uses some of the
signals that are introduced here.
Runway Guard Lights (RGL) Runway guard lights (RGL) are lights that illuminate
hold lines (stop bars). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recommends
one red light every 3 m on the hold line. The lights should be visible under all weather
conditions. A major deficit is that the usage of stop bars differs across the major airports
in Europe, leading to an inability of flight crews to deal with a red stop bar. There
appears to be evidence that, at some airports, pilots are advised to cross illuminated stop
bars as a matter of routine, leading to confusion among pilots.
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Figure A.5: Runway Entrance Lights (REL), Taxiway Hold Lights (THL), and Runway
Intersection Lights (RIL) with input from Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE)
compose a safety net. Graphic courtesy MIT Lincoln Laboratory and FAA [65].
RGLs provide a better situational awareness of flight crews if they are consistent with
RTS. RGLs were found to be ignored by flight crews under certain conditions in a study
by EUROCONTROL. The same study found that RGLs are more visible if LED lights are
used instead of tungsten bulbs and recommends that the distance between two adjacent
lights should be 1.5 m instead of the 3 m recommended by the ICAO. One reason is that
the 3 m stop bar configuration has been found to be not immediately distinguishable from
taxiway and other background lights [86].
The manual setting of stop bars by the ATC does not increase the workload excessively
and directs the attention of the ATCOs to the hold line operations. However, during the
EUROCONTROL study mentioned above, it was found that ATCOs sometimes forget
to turn on the stop bars when a vehicle has passed the hold line. It is, therefore, recom-
mended to take an approach similar to the Hamburg Airport, where stop bars are turned
on automatically as soon as a vehicle has passed the stop bar.
RGLs alone lack any means of directly signaling a stop bar violation to pilots because
the pilots cannot see the RGLs once they have violated the stop bar. The left image in
Figure A.4 shows the positioning of the RGLs and the way that they work.
Runway Entrance Lights Runway Entrance Lights (RELs) are red lights that are
positioned at runway entrances from the hold line along the centerline of the taxiway to
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Figure A.6: Left: Runway Guard Lights (RGLs), as proposed by the FAA. Right: Run-
way Entrance Lights (RELs), as proposed by the FAA. Graphic courtesy MIT Lincoln
Laboratory and FAA [65].
the centerline of the runway. They can be illuminated in case of a stop bar violation or in
case of high speed traffic on the runway to notify vehicles approaching the runway from
the taxiway of the dangerous situation and the runway activity status. RELs are available
as LEDs that are embedded in the pavement.
RELs can also be used to notify a vehicle if it caused a stop bar violation. However,
RELs are only visible for a short time for the pilot/driver if the vehicle is moving fast.
Therefore, to use RELs in such a way, the delay between the violation of the stop bar and
the activation of the RELs must be minimal. Some systems attempt to predict whether a
vehicle is about to overrun a stop bar; however, in a simulation experiment, it was found
that the general surveillance requirements, as specified for ASDE-X and A-SMGCS, do
not permit a reliable prediction unless the speed of the vehicle is very high and the distance
to the stop bar is very close. A solution that has been found to work in our simulation is
the use of automotive sensors for the surveillance of hotspots. These sensors can measure
the speed of a vehicle using a Doppler effect with update rates of up to 30 Hz. Alternative
technologies for predicting a stop bar violation are microwave fences and inductive loops.
To reliably determine the speed of a vehicle, multiple fences or loops are necessary. The
right image in Figure A.4 shows the positioning of the RELs and the way that they work.
Lead On Lights In contrast to RELs, Lead On Lights (LOL) show that it is safe to
enter the runway from a taxiway. They are positioned similar to REL installations but
are green. They create a better reassurance of ATC clearance than just turning off the
illumination of a stop bar. Moreover, the LOL are still visible when the RGLs are no
longer visible because the aircraft is too close to the stop bar. Intelligent multicolor LED
lights embedded in the pavement are ideal for the combined installation of RELs and
LOLs. Figure A.4 gives an impression of what an LOL installation could look like.
Runway Intersection Lights (RIL) Runway intersection lights are lights that are
embedded in the pavement of the runway in the vicinity of runway crossings. These lights
are turned on in case of a conflicting usage of the runways, e.g., two aircraft starting to
move along crossing runways. The lights need to cover a long distance to provide signals
at a reasonable distance to the runway crossing. The left image in Figure A.4 shows the
positioning of the RILs and the way that they work.
Taxiway Hold Lights (THL) Taxiway hold lights signal to planes that are ready to
begin their take off roll that the runway is not safe because of interfering traffic from a
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Figure A.7: Right: Simulated Lead On Lights (LOL), as seen by the virtual pilot of a Lear
jet. Left: External view of the same situation as in the right image, showing the aircraft
positioned just in front of the hold line. Both images are screenshots from the Microsoft
Flight Simulator (FSX) Software; the LOLs were implemented using the FSX-SDK.
taxiway, e.g., in case of a stop bar violation. These lights indicate that pilots should not
take off but instead should wait until the lights turn off. The right image in Figure A.4
shows the positioning of the THLs and the way that they work.
Figure A.8: Runway Intersection Lights (RIL) and Taxiway Hold Lights (THL), as pro-
posed by the FAA. Graphic courtesy MIT Lincoln Laboratory and FAA [65].
Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal Part of Final Approach Runway Oc-
cupancy Signal (FAROS) sets the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights to
flashing mode, indicating to aircraft that the runway is occupied during the final ap-
proach. An FAA study found that the flashing of the PAPI did not result in a significant
decrease in the final approach route of the landing aircraft [44].
Follow the Green Follow the green is an approach for avoiding route deviations. Green
lights are positioned along the centerline of the runways and taxiways to lead vehicles from
one place in the airport to another. The lights are turned on and off in such a way that




The unscented transform is a transformation developed to deal with non linear trans-
formations of linear defined probability density functions. The underlying idea is that
is is easier to approximate the transformed probability density than to approximate the
transformation. The unscented transform has been developed by Julier and Uhlmann in
1997, see [61, 60] a brief introduction can be found in [111]. The unscented transform aim
to capture and preserve the moment of the probability density function.
For most sensor data given in polar coordinates the transformation is straightforward,
the σ-points, for each dimension µ− σ, µ, µ + σ, are transformed from polar coordinates
to Cartesian coordinates and the mean µ and covariance Σ is then calculated from the
transformed sigma points. The error induced by this transformation is strongly dependent
from the amount of uncertainty of the sensor measurement and the distance to the sensor,
see B.2
Generation of the sigma points
For the selection of the sigma points X three parameters have significant influence:
• n: The number of dimensions of N(µ,Σ). For each dimension at least two sigma
point have to be chosen to capture the principal moments of the distribution in each
dimension.
• α: A scaling parameter that determines together with κ how far the sigma points
are spread from the mean.
• κ: A scaling parameter that determines together with α how far the sigma points
are spread from the mean.
• β: Another parameter that can be used to encode higher order knowledge about
the distribution, for Gaussian distributions 2 is optimal [111].
• λ = a2(n + κ) − n: Intermediate parameter that describes the spread of the sigma
points.
In the algorithm the following terms are of special interest:
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Figure B.1: The unscented transform applied to medium quality SMR measurements.
The top row shows the sigma boundaries mapped to Cartesian space for distances and
angles common to airport traffic surveillance. The lower row shows the detailed sigma
boundaries of close, medium, and long distance measurements and the sigma boundaries of
the approximation by the unscented transform. The original probability density function






: The ith column of the lower triangular of the Cholesky decomposi-
tion L of (n+ k)Σ. [60]. For the trivial case where the dimensions are independent,
meaning that only the diagonal entries contain σ2i , i ∈ n L is a matrix with σi as
diagonal entries. For other cases where the entries outside the diagonal are not 0
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Generation of weights
Attached to each sigma point Xi is a weight wi. The weight w0 is a special case as it is
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1
2(n+ λ) , i ∈ n+ 1, ..., 2n (B.8)
Figure B.2: The unscented transform applied to medium quality SMR measurements.
The top row shows the sigma boundaries mapped to Cartesian space for distances and
angles common to airport traffic surveillance. The lower row shows the detailed sigma
boundaries of close, medium, and long distance measurements and the sigma boundaries
of the approximation by the unscented transform.
Computation to the new mean and covariance
The new mean µnew and new covariance Σnew are computed using the weighted trans-















The unscented transform applied to the polar to Carte-
sian problem
When applying the unscented transform to the problem of converting normal distribu-
tions from polar coordinates to Cartesian coordinates the results strongly depend on the
parametrization of the normal distribution. The bigger the uncertainty, the bigger the
error of the approximation. The transformation is quite precise for UMRR measurements
and Laser measurements, but has a significant error for long distance measurements of
older SMR.
Figure B.2 and Figure B.1 provide an overview of the sigma boundaries for SMR mea-
surements and UMMR measurements of objects in a reasonable distance and angle to the
sensor. Also, the figures show detailed plots of example measurements that display the
nature of the error induced by the unscented transform. The leftmost plot in Figure B.2
shows that the transformed probability density function covers an area that is not covered
by the original probability density function.
176
Appendix C
Formal Complexity of the Data
Association Problem
This appendix covers the complexity of the data association problem. The first section
states the formal complexity analysis based on publications on the topic, the second
section aims to explain the cause for the complexity by example, and the third section
gives a brief overview of approaches to deal with the complexity in real time applications.
C.1 Formal Complexity in the Literature
The established definition of data association is :"’The process of assign and compute the
weights that relates the observations of tracks (A track can be defined as an ordered set
of points that follow a path and are generated by the same target.) from one set to the
observation of tracks of another set."’ [42].
The formally correct treatment of the data association problem is considered to be NP-
Hard1. May N be the number of observations and tracks for a series of discrete times.
A proper treatment of the data association problem requires the proper probabilistic
treatment of all combinations of possible associations between tracks and observations.
This requirement raises the number of possible assignments to N ! [17] , see Figure C.1
for an example. The computation is considered equivalent to the problem of computing
the permanent of the matrix [17] that has been shown to be NP-Hard[114], which implies
that the data association problem is also NP-Hard [17]. While even solving the problem
only for the time t0, t1 is NP-Hard, the problem gets increasingly complex as time passes.
Consider a series of k discrete times. For the proper probabilistic treatment the number of
possible mappings is N !k−1, were only one mapping is the true mapping from observations
to objects/tracks. A detailed explanation and proof can be found in[17] and [114]. For
many real world scenarios effects such as missing observations, false positives, multiple
observations per object, and multiple objects causing a single observation significantly
1According to [46] NP is the class of problems that can be solved by a non deterministic Turing-
machine in polynomial-time. NP-hard (Non deterministic Polynomial-time hard), in computational com-
plexity theory, is a class of problems for which is at least as hard as any problem in NP but maybe even
harder, so it is not NP-complete, which would require the problem to be part of NP . Such problems
are considered intractable, as it requires to much time to compute their solution, except for special small
instances.
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increase the complexity of the data association.
Figure C.1: The 2 leftmost boxes show the possible data associations for 2 tracks and
2 observations (N = 2) for 2 sets of observations of tracks from times ti− 1 and ti
(k = 2). There are four possibilities to assign the tracks to the observations, but from
these two pairs are semantically equal, so only N !k−1 = 21 = 2 combinations remain. Each
additional consecutive set of observation that is added to the series could result in the
data association shown in the top box and effectively multiplies the number of possible
mappings by N ! = 2 resulting in N !k−1 = 22 = 4 possible data associations for a series of
3 (k = 3) time steps, shown in the rightmost box.
C.2 Explanation by Example.
Consider the data association of sensor readings at a single time step t0 where the number
of objects N is known2, and there are N detected features in the sensor readings that
might be caused by any object. These features will be referred to as observations in the
following text. Each object may be the cause for any observation(s) or for no observation.
Each observation may also be caused by any object(s) or no object at all and relate to
an error of a sensor. Displayed as a so called data association matrix this looks like the
table shown in Figure C.2.
So the number of possible data association matrices, using only 1 and 0 weights, is 2NN .
Here a cell with a 1 indicates a causal relationship from the row of the cell to the column
of the cell, meaning that the row’s object caused the column’s observation. A 0 indicates
that there is no causal relation between the according object and the observation. The
rightmost column has a special role as a 1 indicates that the object did not cause any
observation in the timestep represented by the matrix. A 1 in the bottom row indicates
that the observation is a false alarm and was not caused by any of the tracked objects but
by some other factor. In the consequence a 1 in the lower right cell indicates that there
is no missing observation, and no false alarm.
This includes some impossible configurations, which have a probability of 0. These im-
possible combinations are all matrices where there is a zero row or a row with a 1 in the
2Often the number of objects is unknown, it will be shown that the problem is NP-Hard even with a
known number of objects.
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Figure C.2: A data association matrix, as explained in the text.
last column and at least another 1. Also impossible are columns with a 1 in the bottom
row and at least another 1 in any row.
E.g.: The m data association matrix for two objects and two observations has 3 rows:
The first row for object 1, the second row for object 2, and the third row for false alarms.
The matrix has 3 columns: The first column for the first observation, the second column
for the second observation, and the third column for the missing observation.
While even solving the problem only for the time t0, t1 is NP-Hard, the problem gets
increasingly complex as time passes. Consider the case that there are ten data association
matrices for k consecutive times (t1 . . . tk) where the number of objects and observations
remains constant. For an exact treatment of the data association problem one has to
consider not only all data association matrices for each time, but rather has to consider
all possible sequences of data association matrices of all consecutive times. The number
of possible sequences is then (2NN)k. For the proper probabilistic treatment the number
of possible sets is N !k−1, were only one set is the true mapping from observations to
objects/tracks.
C.3 Approaches for Data Association in Real Time
Applications
Fortunately algorithms and methods for the computation of approximations of the data
association exist that are much faster and yield reasonable good results. These approaches
reduce the complexity of the computation based on assumptions about the causality.
A significant reduction of the complexity can be achieved by the assumption that, given
the data association at the discrete time t is correct and the formal representation of
tracks holds all relevant information for the correct data association, the data association
can be done based on the information available at discrete times ti−1 and ti. Since the
mathematical models and the formal representation are abstractions and do not hold all
relevant information for all situations algorithms based on this assumption do work very
well in controlled environments as long as the objects do behave as expected.
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Another way to significantly reduce the complexity of the data association is to ignore
associations between tracks and observations that are so unlikely that they are consid-
ered to be negligible, and use algorithms and data structures that reduce the number of
possible associations by systematically including only the associations that have a signif-
icant probability. The number of different implementations of this approach depend on
many factors and are so numerous that an introduction is beyond the scope of this work.
Therefore the following sketch of a method based on this approach should serve to explain
the underlying idea in brief.
Consider that observations and tracks are represented by the same set of N variables.
The data structure that holds the information on the observation and tracks is a grid of
overlapping cells over the vector space spanned by the variables. Observations and tracks
are mapped to the cells of the grid using the most significant part of the variables and
the association between an observation and an object is only computed for objects and
observations in the same cell of the grid. Given that the separation distance between
tracks is usually shorter than the diameter of a cell and the length of the error vector of
the observations is also shorter than the diameter of a cell, this approach approximates the
exact probabilistic computation of the data association, in the best case with a complexity
of O(M) for M Tracks and M Observations at a given time t, by ignoring unlikely
associations between tracks and observations.
If both approaches are combined it is - under very favorable circumstances - possible to
reduce the complexity of the data association to O(min(N,M) ∗ k) for N Observations,
M tracks and k discrete times.
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